Mr. Adams to Mr. Seward.
Sir: I take advantage of the absence of any despatches this week which call for reply to give you an account of a conversation which I had with an unofficial person last Saturday morning at his request.
He began by alluding to the excitement taking place in the cotton market, and the sudden increase of the demand growing out of a conviction that the supply was likely soon to fail. The effect of this upon the population of the manufacturing region was becoming more and more perceptible. It was therefore desirable to ascertain as far as possible what the prospect was of obtaining any considerable quantity from the southern States. He wished me to tell him what I could from such sources of information as were open to me.
I replied that the supply was, in my opinion, somewhat dependent on the progress of the war. So long as there was a formidable power in the field which left open the possibility of a maintenance of the rebel authority, there was scarcely a likelihood that the timid class of planters, at heart well disposed to the Union and not disinclined to convert their cotton into money, would take the risk of an open committal. As to the duration of the war, it was a matter of opinion, in regard to which he must form his own as well as I. Much would depend on the turn it might take before Richmond. The pinch was at that point, and it seemed to me that such were the necessities of the rebels, some positive result could not be very long delayed.
He said that the case was becoming very grave in Europe. . A failure of this staple so vitally necessary to the subsistence of a numerous population could not take place without the risk of much difficulty. There were symptoms already of a disposition to get up agitation and to give to the discontent of the distressed operatives a political direction. He then intimated quite broadly that the governing power, as well in France as in England, was not in a condition to withstand any great severity of pressure from this quarter. I understood him as speaking from good sources of information. Indeed I can readily conjecture precisely what they are. The result might be some joint representation to the government of the United States, the nature of which he rather hinted at than described.
To this I observed that the possibility of such a proceeding had been within my contemplation. But I could not help thinking it would only have the effect of complicating the embarrassment of the parties that might undertake it. Thus far the policy of my government had been carefully conservative. Its object to save the country, and especially the madmen of the south, from the dangers growing out of a precipitate treatment of the real cause of the war—the political abuses of the slaveholding system. But the [Page 123] time might come when forbearance would cease to be a virtue, and every other consideration would yield to the instinct of self-preservation. The government had already been compelled to go so far as to examine and explain the possibilities of its action in certain contingencies. I had communicated a despatch to Lord Russell, within a few days, which had, for the first time since I had been here, entered into a grave exposition of its views on that subject. Any action of foreign nations like that suggested could be viewed only as imparting a moral strength to this dangerous element in our social system in America, and therefore requiring a more immediate and radical extermination of it. The consequence might be a social convulsion in the southern States, which, so far from yielding relief to the necessities of Europe, would put an end to all the prospect of obtaining any from that quarter for years. I had always thought that the great error of these governments had been in not seeing at the outset that their best interests were involved in the earliest possible restoration of the authority of the United States. Had they acted in that sense the war would have been at an end before this. But their actual policy had done just enough to give a sort of moral sanction to resistance, which had kept it dragging along until now. And now they were debating the expediency of a course which might, indeed, very much aggravate the distresses of all parties, but which, so far as I could see, would not end in any attainment of those objects for which it was to be professedly undertaken.
He said that this was his own view, and that he had urged it strongly elsewhere. In his opinion, the policy towards America should have been different, and the moral support of Europe so far assured to the government of the United States as to preclude any hope among the insurgents of possible assistance. But all that was over. There had been, from causes which he enumerated, a good deal of sympathy entertained for the rebel cause. Somebody had said that English people always sided with rebellion. (I might have added, but did not, except in cases of their own.) The difficulty now was serious. He was still in hopes that at least a half million bales might come to relieve the pressure. I said that I saw great cause for believing that it would, and the late rapid rise in price would, in my opinion, do much to hasten it. At all events, he resumed, the idea had occurred to him that some manifestation should be made by the government, he did not care in what form, of its consciousness of the nature of this distress among foreign nations, and of its desire to aid in relieving it. In short, his opinion seemed to be that some rather careful friendly exposition of the whole question, as bearing upon the policy of other countries, might be of use to check the direction of popular opinion against us in Europe; for he was not sure that most of the nations of Europe would not join in some way or other in a representation. He wished me to write thus much to you.
I promised to report the substance of the conversation, and you have the result.
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,
Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.