Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs, Accompanying the Annual Message of the President to the Third Session Thirty-seventh Congress
Mr. Pike to Mr. Seward.
Sir: I have the honor to enclose you the communication of this government, in reply to mine of the 22d and 28th of March last, asking for a review of their position on the questions of granting belligerent rights to the seceding States, and of excluding the piratical vessels of those States from the ports of the Netherlands. You will perceive that the government declines to change its present attitude on these subjects.
[Page 603]I neglected in my last to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of March 15, (No. 47.)
I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,
Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.
[Translation]
Mr. Maesen De Sombreff to Mr. Pike.
Sir: As a continuation of my communication of the 1st of this month, I have the honor to bring to your knowledge that the government of the Netherlands considers that it ought to sustain the principles held in 1861. Whatever may be its desire to please the cabinet at Washington, it cannot withdraw from the self-styled Confederate States the rights of belligerents, nor modify the instructions given in the month of December, 1861, to its colonial authorities relative to the duration of the sojourn of armed vessels of the United States of the north and of the south in the Netherlands ports, without limit of time, as well as privilege which has been given to them to ship coal without limit as to quantity. A fresh examination of the question has only confirmed the King’s government in the opinion maintained by those who preceded them in power, that is to say, that civil war exists in America, and that the Netherlands have proclaimed their neutrality, it followed logically that the States self-styled confederate should be recognized as belligerents.
This opinion, based in theory on the authority of the best publicists, and confirmed in practice by the conduct pursued not only at an anterior epoch but even in modern times by the principal European powers, and, what is more, by the United States themselves; this opinion has guided the ministers of the King in their line of conduct towards the two parties in opposition in America, and is the same as that which prevailed in the councils of France, of Great Britain, and of other powers.
After the developments entered into upon this subject in the communications to the legation of the United States, under date of 17th September, 15th and 29th October, and 14th December, 1861, it will be, without doubt, useless to turn back to them, or to support them by new arguments.
Recognized as belligerents, the secessionist States might, according to the law of nations, arm privateers, and they could not be treated as pirates, as the cabinet at Washington would have it, only seeing such States in the light of rebels, and in the violation by them of the Constitution, only rebellion.
Besides, all their armed vessels could not be regarded prima facie as privateers. This lies in the very nature of things, and results likewise from the definition of privateer, (corsair.)
It followed, consequently, from the attitude taken by the government of his Majesty, that the vessels-of-war of both parties should be admitted on the same conditions into the ports of the Netherlands, our proclamations excluding only privateers, except in case of stress.
This consequence was admitted, in what regards France, by Mr. Dayton, American minister at Paris, who writes to Mr. Seward the 12th June, 1861, “that part of the declaration (‘the French declaration of the 10th June’) which puts the vessels of the United States in the same category as the [Page 604] vessels of the Confederate States, may, I think, be justly complained of; but this grows, at most, out of the recognition of those States as belligerents”
The recognition of the rights of belligerents in the Confederate States is not a question of opportunity nor of policy; if such were the case, one might discuss its maintenance in relation with the ever-varying exigencies of the latter. But the question here treated belongs to the law of nations, of a consequence inherent in neutrals towards belligerents.
I will content myself with citing an author generally esteemed, Mr. Hautefeuille, on rights and duties of neutral nations, (I, 450:) “Nations,” says he, “which desire to remain neutral, must accept the position; in fact, if they would be respected by the two parties, they must recognize and respect alike both of the two. The foreign prince who should refuse to fulfil the obligations of neutrality towards insurgents could not require of them to consider him as neutral; he would be sin their eyes the ally of their enemy, and they would treat him as such with justice.”
It is therefore impossible to the King’s government to change the line of conduct thus far followed. How could it, besides, by no longer conceding to the southern States the rights of belligerents, by excluding their vessels from its ports, by treating them, in a word, as pirates, apply to them a treatment from which the United States themselves have recoiled, as has been observed in the despatch of December 14, 1861 ? The northern States have not condemned as pirates the privateers of the southern confederates, but have considered them as lawful combatants. We cannot do more than the government of the Union. This is what caused the remark, so far back as the month of June, 1861, of Lord Russell in his despatch to Lord Lyons, (North America I, p. 42:)
“We could not treat 5,000,000 of men, who had declared their independence, like a band of marauders or filibusters. If we had done so we should have done more than the United States themselves. We surely could not be expected to go beyond the United States government themselves in measures of severity.”
It must, then, be well understood that, under such conditions, and whatever may be its regrets for the evils which now afflict the great American republic, the King’s government cannot consider the two contending parties otherwise than as two belligerents, the one employing against the other the forces at its disposal, conformably to the principles of the law of nations.
It refers to its anterior communications, and repeats the assurances given again and again that, in continuing to receive in the Netherlands ports the vessels-of-war of the northern States and of the secessionist States, it will not be permitted that such vessels should make of one or other of her ports the base of their operations against the commerce of their adversaries.
I pass now to the second question contained in your letter of 22d March last, to wit: whether the government of the Netherlands, if it refuses to exclude from its ports the vessels of the confederates, will return to the restrictive measures adopted when the Baron de Zuylen was at the head of the department for foreign affairs, and which have since been changed under Mr. Strens.
In this regard I permit myself to observe to you that I could not understand how your government could desire the re-establishment of measures which actually were, and would again be, applicable to both parties, and which were, at the time, the cause why the Union ship Iroquois would not enter the port of Curacoa under the rule of said restrictive measures.
It was on that occasion that the last were modified, which was brought to your notice the 30th of December, 1861.
It follows, from advices which have since reached the government, that the new commander of the Iroquois has expressed himself well satisfied [Page 605] to find the precedent restrictive measures withdrawn, and thus to have the privilege of taking as much coal as he might wish. These measures are also favorable to Netherlands commerce with the United States, so that the interests of the two countries are in perfect accord.
If the instructions given before the month of December, 1861, were now returned to, the government of the Netherlands might not only be taxed, with good reason, with trifling, but would hurt its own interests, as well as those of the Union, considering that the consequence of said instructions would be, as has been remarked in the communication of Baron de Zuylen, dated October 29, 1861, that the vessels-of-war of the United States, also, could no longer be able to sojourn in the Netherlands East Indian ports more than twice 24 hours, nor supply themselves with coal for a run of more than 24 hours.
The cabinet of the Hague will never refuse to that of Washington anything that is really just, or even not essential nor prejudicial to the rights and interests which it is called upon to defend. It leaves with confidence to the government of the republic the just appreciation of motives which have, in the present juncture, guided the policy of the King’s ministry, and they venture to cherish the hope that the judgment which will be formed of it at Washington may conform with the sentiments of sincere good will which so happily exists between the two peoples and their respective governments.
Accept, sir, the renewed assurance of my high consideration.
Mr. Pike, Minister Resident of the United States of America.