Mr. Adams to Mr. Seward.
Sir: I have this morning received despatches from the department numbered from 214 to 217, inclusive. I yesterday succeeded in obtaining the expected conference with Lord Russell. I began by reading to him the copy of your despatch No. 8, containing instructions to Mr. Burlingame, in [Page 71] China, agreeably to your direction, and I made an offer to leave a copy with him, which he accepted.
I then opened the main topic with which I was charged. I expressed to his lordship my reluctance to touch upon any subject which looked like complaint at this time, when everything was so quiet between the two countries, but it seemed to be the duty of public men not to confine themselves merely to the study of the present. If there were reasons to suspect the existence of causes of irritation which might lead to serious differences between nations, even at a remote period, it was the part of prudence to make an early effort to remove them. In this sense, I desired to speak of the tendency of the efforts continually making here, reports of which were sent by every steamer to America, to supply to the insurgents the means of persevering in their resistance to the government. It could not admit of a doubt that their hopes of final success, though much weakened, were still buoyed up by the encouragement obtained in the supplies from here. On the other hand, the people of the United States drew inferences of a hostile disposition to them in a corresponding degree from the same sources. I was bound in frankness to add that the various occurrences which confirm this notion were too apt to revive the recollection of the original measure to which they were traced as natural consequences. I had reason to believe the government to be so strongly convinced of the fact that the original recognition of the rebels as a belligerent was their only remaining moral support, that I felt it my duty once more to bring the subject to the attention of her Majesty’s government. Although I had heretofore received repeated requests so to do, I had been indisposed to press it, from a belief that any such movement would be unavailing. In a late visit to Paris, however, where I had conferred with Mr. Dayton, I had learned from him that in a personal conversation with the Emperor, in the course of which the latter had represented the urgency of the necessity for cotton, he had, in reply, dwelt upon the difficulties experienced from the effects of the Emperor’s recognition of the belligerent right of the rebels in prolonging the war, and had pressed for the withdrawal of it. The Emperor had not shown himself averse to entertaining the question, but had referred to his co-operation with Great Britain and to the necessity it imposed of consultation with it in this case. The knowledge of this fact had determined me on my side to propose the same thing here. I should not go into any repetition of the argument on the subject, but should content myself with expressing the conviction that nothing would more conduce to establish perfect confidence in the disposition of Great Britain, and to accelerate the reopening of the customary intercourse and trade between the two countries, than such a step.
His lordship alluded, first, to my report of Mr. Dayton’s conversation with the Emperor. He presumed it was confidential, and therefore he could take no cognizance of it. All that he was bound to know was what had been mentioned by Mr. Thouvenel to Lord Cowley of Mr. Dayton’s conference with him. He had only learned by this that there was some general conversation. He did not learn that Mr. Dayton had offered any distinct proposition. No reference of the matter had been made to this government by the French. I said this was precisely the point I desired to arrive at. The impression I received was that such a reference had been promised.
I did not tell Lord Russell the most significant portion of Mr. Dayton’s report of his conversation with the Emperor, because I felt bound not to commit him. From the tenor of yours to me (No. 211) of the 31st March, I am led to believe you are fully possessed of it. My object was simply to see where the responsibility for the policy rests. A discovery which a [Page 72] comparison of the tone maintained by the respective parties renders it not difficult to reach.
His lordship enlarged once more upon the magnitude of the region engaged in the revolt, and upon the urgency of the call to provide for the new emergency. He attempted an analogy between the course taken by Great Britain in this case and that of the United States towards South America after the revolt of the dependencies of Spain. Subsequent events had only confirmed the correctness of the decision. For the very efforts to which the United States had been compelled to resort proved the magnitude of the task undertaken, and they were still engaged in pursuing their object without absolute certainty of success. The wish of Great Britain was to remain neutral and impartial. They had no cause of quarrel with the southern States. We might fight it out with them. The southern people seemed, from the accounts in the morning papers, to be finding equal fault on their side for their not taking part with them. We on our part seemed to be urging for what was equivalent to joining our side to put them down, yet that was a course which we had professed not to desire.
To this I replied that very certainly we did not desire it. What we did desire was, that foreign nations would leave the matter entirely in our hands. What we complained of was, that the course adopted was not neutrality. That it had not been so regarded by the insurgents themselves was made apparent in the very documents published at the opening of Parliament; for it was certain that the early overtures made by the two powers to obtain a sanction of the declaration of Paris had been construed at Richmond, and, as I thought, with reason, as a ground to expect a further acknowledgment. It seemed to me they had some right to complain of a disappointment of their hopes then raised. I begged, furthermore, to advance an opinion that there was not an example in all the history of the United States or of Great Britain, nay I might say of any civilized nation of the world, of so precipitate a recognition of belligerent rights to insurgents as this one of which we were treating. If there was such an instance, I should be glad to see it. Upon the basis thus made there could be no question that much of the perseverance in resistance had rested, and did still rest. A withdrawal of this recognition was the only thing that would put an end to the delusion. On the other hand, the continuance of it but served to countenance and to stimulate the efforts pertinaciously made by people in Great Britain to sustain them. This led me naturally to enlarge upon the effect produced upon the people of the United States as well as the government by the frequent accounts of the manner in which vessels of all kinds were fitted out from the ports of Great Britain to assist the insurgents. Most of the consuls weekly sent home a repetition of the same story. I had even been told by one of them lately that he believed as many as fifteen vessels were now preparing to make the voyage. Such things could not go on without giving rise to unpleasant implications, which, however unfounded, would be likely to be so far credited as to render them as dangerous as if they were facts. I remarked that his lordship must be aware that the answer that nothing could be done was very unsatisfactory; because it might be fairly presumed that every nation that possessed the will naturally carried within itself the power to prevent abuses of its authority.
His lordship replied, in substance, by expressing his belief that the parties engaged in these undertakings were not so much interested in the cause of the insurgents as in the profits to be expected by running the blockade. Such attempts always would be made in similar cases. For the rest these adventurers were compelled to take their own risk. They had the dangers of capture to encounter, and the certainty of being deprived of their rights of reclamation. The government had no disposition to give them protection.
[Page 73]I observed that this reasoning seemed hardly satisfactory or consoling to persons exposed by the effects of such acts to a long and painful and costly extension of their labors of repression. I then put it to his lordship distinctly, if Great Britain would be contented, should the people of Canada break out into open rebellion, to find the United States promptly declare a neutrality, recognize the rebels as a belligerent power, and then from myriads of posts along the extensive line of boundary and the many harbors on the seaboard tolerate the equipment and despatch of numerous vessels freighted with all the materials necessary to protract the struggle? I very much doubted whether his lordship would be perfectly quiescent under the answer that no violation of neutrality had been committed, and that no power existed to put a stop to the proceedings. His lordship met this by saying that he should certainly object to any such direct expeditions; but there was no evidence in any of the cases I had brought up of destination or of wrong intention. In that of the Oreto, upon which I had addressed a note to him, he had directed an investigation to be made, and the authorities at Liverpool had reported that there was no ground for doubting the legality of her voyage.
I replied that this was exactly what gave such unpleasant impressions to us in America. The Oreto, by the very paper furnished from the customhouse, was shown to be laden with a hundred and seventy tons of arms, and to have persons called troops on board, destined for Palermo and Jamaica. The very statement of the case was enough to show what was really intended. The fact of her true destination was notorious all over Liverpool. No commercial people were blind to it. And the course taken by her Majesty’s officers in declaring ignorance only led to an inference most unfavorable to all idea of their neutrality in the struggle. It was just such action as this that was making the difficulties of our government in the way of giving the facilities to the supply of cotton, which they hoped to furnish in a short time if the whole control of means to put an end to the contest was left to them.
His lordship concluded by a polite expression of regret at these circumstances, at the same time that he could not see how the government could change its position.
I concluded the conversation by saying that I had only done my duty.
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,
Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.