[Extract, with enclosures.]
Mr. Perry to Mr.
Seward.
Legation of the United States,
Madrid,
March 15, 1862.
Sir: The expedition against Mexico has excited
and maintained more interest in Madrid than almost any other subject,
ever since the fleet sailed from the Havana. But it has been principally
to know and comment upon what was happening in America, and of which you
must be better informed than we can be here.
Until latterly little of interest has occurred in Spain itself connected
with this subject. The information and views conveyed to you in Mr.
Schurz’s despatch of November 17 (No. 41) was singularly correct and
opportune according to my own knowledge, and I could add little to the
import of that paper.
I informed you on the 26th of January (No. 26) that the action of the
French Emperor in sending out a general with strong re-enforcements to
his army in Mexico without previous consultation with this government,
and with the supposed object of putting the French contingent upon a
footing to act independently of the Spanish general-in-chief, had
produced surprise and chagrin here. Spain had supposed that she was to
take the direction of the land operations in Mexico, and General Prim
left Madrid in that understanding.
The candidacy of the Archduke Maximilian of Austria for the projected
throne in Mexico, put forward by France, was another blow upon Spanish
hopes. For a considerable time it seemed doubtful whether this
arrangement would be accepted by Spain in any event; but this candidacy
is now recognized by the Queen’s government, though at the expense of
much of
[Page 484]
the enthusiasm with
which they at first went into this business, and perhaps with the
scarcely avowed hope that the course of events in Mexico will itself
defeat the plan.
It is also evident that, for some time past, the tendency here has been
to draw closer to England in the Mexican affair, so as the better to
make head against the vigorous initiation of the French Emperor.
Your attention will not fail to be drawn to the visit of the Duke of
Brabant, heir of King Leopold, of Belgium, to Seville. The duke has just
arrived at Valencia, and will proceed immediately to Seville, where the
Duke and Duchess of Montpensier (sister to Queen Isabel) reside.
We have heard the name of the Count of Flanders (younger brother of
Brabant) mentioned frequently of late in connexion with the projected
throne in Mexico, and you will remember the significant declaration of a
Madrid ministerial journal, as early as December last, to the effect
that if the throne of Mexico were not to be occupied by a Spanish
prince, it would, at least, be pressed by a Spanish princess.
The journey of the Duke of Brabant is publicly stated to be merely a
family visit to his cousins, and the delicate health of the duke is
given as his reason for seeking the climate of the south of Spain at
this time; but there is little doubt it is really an embassy for
negotiating the marriage of the Count of Flanders with the eldest
daughter of Montpensier, who enjoys the rank of a Spanish infanta. The
movement is meant to conciliate the sympathies of England and Spain upon
this young couple as candidates for a constitutional throne in Mexico,
and, no doubt, it is hoped to make this candidacy prevail in preference
to that of Maximilian by means of the Mexicans themselves.
If this cannot be managed, there are many in Madrid who believe General
Prim capable of maintaining the republican form of government in Mexico,
and that he will be sustained by England. The Spanish government
declares and repeats in all its organs that, if such is the deliberate
determination of the Mexican people, Spain will not oppose their wishes;
nor will the Spanish forces in Mexico ever attempt to force a monarchy
upon that people against their will.
* * * * * * * * *
Your information from Mexico will be better and more recent than any
here. Ours shows, however, that General Prim had adopted, practically,
upon the scene of operations the same policy of close and intimate
understanding with the English representatives, whilst his relations
with the French admiral were not so harmonious. We know, also, that Prim
had already excited the animosity of the Spanish residents in the
republic who have always acted with the clerical or monarchical party of
Mexicans. Formal written memorials from these Spanish residents,
complaining of General Prim, I am informed, have already reached this
government, and fifties, hundreds of private letters have been received
in Madrid criticising, and even denouncing, his conduct in the strongest
terms.
You will have noticed, also, that the French journals have denounced what
they call the temporizing policy of General Prim, and have been led to
indulge in some unflattering expressions about the “poor Spaniards” and their expedition, which have driven the
press of Madrid furious. Even the ministerial journals during the past
week have hardly been able to dissemble their rage.
Thus it is both true and evident that all cordiality of feeling and
sympathy is already lost between these allies in the invasion of Mexico.
Whether any harmony of purpose still exists, you will be better able to
judge than I.
In this state of affairs here, the telegraph announcement a few days
since,
[Page 485]
that General Scott had
been appointed an envoy or commissioner by the President of the United
States, to proceed to Mexico with powers to treat with the Mexican
government and with the representatives of the allied powers, produced a
deep impression upon this government and the political circles of the
capital. The personal signification of General Scott with ourselves is
understood here. The history of his glorious campaign in Mexico is
tolerably familiar, and the conviction that such a man would not go to
Mexico without great powers and means to effect the results proposed by
our government, made this news to be the prominent theme of conversation
and of some degree of apprehension in all circles. The impression seemed
to be that General Scott would be very likely to succeed; that means
would be found to make or preserve peace; and that the real object of
the allied powers would be frustrated.
This was feared, at least, and weighed upon the spirits of political
circles so that yesterday, when the telegraph again announced that
General Scott’s name had been withdrawn from the Senate by the
President, and he would not go to Mexico, it was greeted with joy and an
evident sensation of relief.
I know nothing of the causes or incidents of this nomination or
withdrawal, but report to you simply the sensations produced at this
capital by these successive telegrams, and my own impression, judging
from this place, that the measure of General Scott’s nomination was
eminently wise, and, perhaps, the best thing our government could
imagine to be done for our interests in Mexico. But I judge only in the
light of appearances in Europe.
It will not be amiss again to recall to your mind the representations
contained in Mr. Schurz’s despatch (No. 41) concerning the personal
character and personal circumstances of General Prim. At the same time
that the French newspapers urge this government to recall him, all the
retrograde ultra Catholic and absolutist journals in Madrid have been
making a strong effort to discredit him, and labor for his replacement
in the command of the expedition by some other general more agreeable to
themselves. The liberal journals defend him, and the ministerial press
declares and redeclares that the government is completely satisfied with
his conduct and defends and upholds him. They will uphold him. The
present government of the Queen will hardly think of bringing back upon
themselves, in Spain herself, the personality of General Prim as a
disappointed man.
You will be able to gather from the circumstances I have mentioned that
the intervention of our government in this Mexican business is already a
subject of considerable apprehension, and it is broadly stated in some
journals that unless the object of the allies is attained now, promptly,
the ultimate result of the whole business will be neither more nor less
than the establishment of a protectorate by the United States over
Mexico, and the triumph of our principles throughout America. Others
catch at straws; give great importance to the inaugural address of Mr.
Jefferson Davis; and in spite of the triumphant march of our armies
cling to the hope that our civil war will yet last for years. These
things would have lost their interest before they could reach you.
I enclose for your perusal only two extracts from the Epoca, ministerial journal, showing the avowed policy of the
Spanish government in regard to the throne,
And remain, sir, with the highest respect, your obedient servant,
Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State.
[Page 486]
[Untitled]
[
Translated from
La Epoca,
*
of Madrid, of
March 13, 1862.]
“The high contracting parties bind themselves not to seek for
themselves, through the employment of coercive measures, foreseen by
the present convention, any acquisition of territory or especial
advantage, nor to exercise over the domestic affairs of Mexico any
influence in derogation of the right of the nation freely to choose
and constitute the form of its government.”—Article 2d, treaty of London.
The Mexican question is necessarily for some time to be the subject
of earnest thought in Spain and Europe. It touches us very nearly.
Its solution may exercise an influence too great on the destinies of
Spanish America to allow us not to devote all our attention to it,
and at the same time we should discuss it with that calmness and
moderation which, if there were no other considerations, would call
forth our feelings of patriotism. The highest interests are
involved, and in view of the complications or benefits to which it
may give place we completely forget the political position we occupy
in the Spanish press.
In two points of view this matter merits attention: under that of the
feeling which, it is said, has inspired what is called the
conservative party in Mexico, in regard to the attitude until now of
the representatives of Spain in that country, and in examining the
differences to which that conduct may have given rise among some of
the cabinets which, guided by the same noble thought, have concerted
those measures for restoring peace and tranquillity to the Mexican
republic.
The complaint made by the Spanish party is, that the allies at first
thought of treating with the constitutional or Juarez party, but
have done little or nothing to quiet the strong power in array
against it. The reply is brief: The allies did not go there to
revive old quarrels. What could be done was not to be by giving way
to one or other of the factions that were injuring the country.
The prompt restoration of order, even by the establishment of a
constitutional monarchy, would not compensate bygone disasters. That
would be as poor a basis as for Ferdinand VII, in the civil war of
1823; or, for the elder Bourbons, that which placed Louis XVIII on
the throne.
But what prevented the partisans of monarchy and of Spanish alliance
from opposing Juarez after the allies had arrived at Vera Cruz? Two
facts, which as symptomatic, should be considered by the three
allied powers.
That disembarkation gave pretence to many to accept the amnesty
offered by Juarez, on the ground of defending their common country.
At the same time the correspondence, &c., of the Diario Español shows that at no time or
place, from any party, or from natives or from Spanish by descent,
did French or Spanish receive any aid or countenance, nor even from
the thousands of Spaniards, French, or English established in the
country. Perhaps they deemed more convenient for the allies to
settle affairs, and not initiate measures in agitation of this or
that idea, of this or that principle, or even of certain princes,
although that may be here considered popular in Mexico.
But we. consider that it is not the disgust of restless parties in
Mexico. With every desire not to aggravate small matters of
irritation, we must say the self-love, vanity, and national pride of
France is mixed up in this question. France, always accustomed to be
foremost, took umbrage that the Spanish army and fleet was in sight
of Vera Cruz before the other allies. Afterwards, with an
irrepressibility more Andalusian than northern, on the conception of
the idea of a monarchy for this or that prince in Mexico, they
deemed the thought and fact should be simultaneous; and it was
enough
[Page 487]
that the tri-color
should wave on San Juan for the Mexicans to acclaim Maximilian I as
King of Mexico. Was that Spain’s fault? Could the allies thus belie
the most important article of the treaty of London?
We need not argument. The question is satisfactorily settled by the
attitude of the English government and Parliament, and public
opinion. England, as well as ourselves, proclaims her respect for
the will of the Mexican people, but makes no opposition to her
choice to become a monarchy, and that certain names are acceptable
to her sovereign. Singular enough, we, who have been accused of
plans of ambition—of conquest in Mexico—are now charged with
temporizing, as excessively well-disposed to the constitutional
government in Mexico and the people. If the first charge was
groundless, this need not grieve us, for it is especially our
interest that our influence in Mexico (and that of Europe also)
should not be accompanied by any disastrous consequences for her.
The basis of our influence in Mexico should consist mainly in the
lofty disinterestedness of Spain, and in her profound respect for
the true interest of the Mexican people.
Doubtless we would be pleased were a Spanish prince by acclamation
made King of Mexico, or that by the side of any prince of high
character a Spanish princess should take her place. In all this we
agree with our colleague “La España.” But at present opinion is not
in Mexico so just and favorable as it should be to Spain. And from
considerations arising from the respective situations of Europe and
America at present, either a republic should exist in Mexico or a
monarchy should be established which should be Catholic and constitutional at the
same time, although not Spanish. We, far from
opposing this in any way, would entreat our country—our government
and public—to support measures tending to those two supreme results,
constituting a stable condition of things in Mexico, preventing her absorption by the United
States, and keeping up the intimate alliance of the three
western powers in face of the eventualities
to which the American question may give
rise.
Therefore it would be ill done to expect from us that, influenced by
these or those motives, in our opinion, of little weight, and which
will in time pass away, we should place ourselves in competition
with France about Mexico. On the contrary, we are sure that Spain
will on this occasion give a lofty example of loyalty compatible
with honor to the two nations by whose flags ours now, perhaps,
waves side by side in Mexico. Those will be greatly mistaken who may
believe that if Mexican opinion decides upon a constitutional
monarchy for that country, so disturbed by anarchy, Spain, because
this or that prince might, in the plentitude of her power, be called
by the Mexican people to direct her destinies, would prefer a
republic, unstable and exposed to dangers, to another order of
things, which, opening an unlimited scope to the legitimate Spanish
influence in America, would obviate at some given time that which
European powers, separated in action, could not do in resistance of
the invasive spirit of the United States, which, with scarcely the
dawn of peace between them, already threaten war against all the
latin nations in America.
[Translation.—Extracts and substance.]
From La Epoca,
of Madrid, of
March 13, 1862.
The mission of Scott is probably to calm the excitement produced
among the irritable Yankees by the presence of European troops on
that continent.
It is our duty emphatically to deny that Spain would maintain, at any
rate,
[Page 488]
a republic in
Mexico. It adheres strictly to the treaty of London, and wishes a
stable government established by the will of the people.
A monarchy sustained by our protectorate would require great
sacrifices from us. The continuance of the republic—that is,
anarchy—would bring round its absorption by the United States. To
conciliate the great majority, to keep the conservatives with us,
and look forward to a policy which will connect England, France, and
Spain with Mexico is the true course. Spain will follow it.
From La Epoca, of Madrid, of
March 14, 1862.
La Crónica de ambos mundos courteously asks our opinions, which we
never disguise. We think that, in domestic as well as foreign
questions, nothing is worse for governments than the negative
policy. For some time the statu quo may
answer; but in the end solutions come, often contrary to those who
have not met them by an affirmative and resolute policy. The policy
we advise as to Mexico is that of good sense, of true foresight, at
the same time strictly sustained on the principles of international
law, and of the treaties and conventions which have been agreed upon
between England, France, and Spain. We desire Mexico, in the
plentitude of its power, to act decidedly upon the question of its
form of government. We, however, prefer monarchy to republic—the
first based upon the popular vote and the loyal adhesion of the
three powers.