Mr. Adams to Mr. Seward.
Sir: Late last evening I received despatches from the department numbered from 194 to 198, both inclusive. Several of them are highly important, and I shall seize the earliest opportunity to act upon the suggestions they [Page 51] contain in my communications with her Majesty’s government. Indeed, you will before this have received my despatch, No. 131, of the 13th instant, which covered a copy of a note of mine to Lord Russell on the case of the General Miramon, drawn up in the sense conveyed in your No. 184, of the 14th of February. As the efforts of disaffected parties here grow more and more desperate in proportion to the increase of the necessities on the other side of the water, I shall find occasion to renew the subject with additional means of illustration.
I take it for granted that even in the midst of your engrossing occupations you find sufficient time to glance at the report of the debates in Parliament on subjects of interest to the United States, and more especially on international questions of rights on the ocean and of blockade in time of war. The most marked indication to be observed is the general sense of uneasiness at the change operated in the position of Great Britain as a maritime power by the enlargement gradually making of the privileges of neutral nations. Whilst on the opposition side you perceive a distinct disapproval of the agreement made in 1856 at Paris, there is equally perceptible among the ministers a disposition to seize the first opportunity to annul the obligations which it has been thought to impose. The remarks of Sir George Cornwall Lewis upon the effect of war upon the measure, regarded merely as a treaty and not as new rules incorporated into the international law, are full of significance. Lord Palmerston has been not inappropriately reminded of the difference between the tone of his speech at Liverpool in 1856 and that in the late debate, whilst even Lord Russell is quoted as having expressed the opinion that some modification of the declaration of Paris would seem to be almost indispensable.
Such are the immediate effects of that which, at first blush, appeared to these enlightened gentlemen a great triumph in the case of the Trent. Such are the consequences of refusing to accept the adhesion of the United States to the declaration of Paris from an over-zealous desire to escape the effect of a precipitate admission of belligerent rights. Both these events have brought vividly to their observation the consideration of the position of Great Britain in the contingency of a war on the ocean. Like the dog in the fable, in snatching at the shadow, they find they have lost the solid meat. A conflict with the United States would, as things are now, at once transfer the whole carrying trade of Great Britain into the hands of the neutral nations of the continent of Europe. It is now becoming plain that, without the additional provision first suggested by Mr. Maury, English interests on the sea are in great jeopardy in time of war, and yet that, with the admission of it, the control of the ocean is forever lost. Whichever way they look there is difficulty. Self-interest being the cardinal point of the policy they seek to pursue, it is plain that the adoption of the declaration of Paris is a sacrifice of which they are beginning to repent. Not the least remarkable among the admissions made in this debate is that which specifies the danger of a war with the United States in the event of a persistence in their former doctrine respecting the cargoes of neutral ships, at the time of the contest with Russia, as having been the main cause that prompted the concessions in that declaration. Thus it would seem that the idea of the growing power of the United States as one nation is everywhere present to their imaginations as the great obstacle in the way of their continued domination of the sea. Can it be wondered at if, under these circumstances, the notion of a permanent separation of this power into two parts, one of which can be played off against the other, were not altogether unwelcome to their hearts ?
To considerations of a similar kind are we indebted for the security that has been afforded to us in our present contest against interference with the [Page 52] blockade. That there has been and still is a very strong inclination in the country to get rid of it is unquestionable. That but for its unavoidable connexion with possibilities of consequences in other and not very remote complications, an attempt of the kind would have been made, I am strongly inclined to believe. The argument that has overborne all these tendencies is drawn from the fear that such a step would only lead in the same direction with the preceding ones taken at Paris. It would ultimately deprive Britannia of her power longer to rule the waves. The “entente cordiale” with France is not yet hearty enough to make such a result altogether acceptable even to the fancy. Neither are the relations with Russia so friendly as to render a voluntary release of the main instrument to keep her in check, a proposition to be entertained with favor. For these reasons no countenance will be given to any remonstrance against our blockade; neither will the general reasoning of Mr. Cobden, in favor of limiting neither will the general reasoning of Mr.Cobden, in favor of limiting the right of blockade, find much response among people in authority. Even the admissions rendered necessary to establish a position in reclaiming the rebel emissaries on board the Trent will be limited, as far as may be, to shut the door against further concessions.
It will then continue to depend upon the degree of concert established among those nations of the world which have ever upheld neutral rights, whether any real advance be made in the recognized doctrines of international law or not, just as it has done in preceding times. Great Britain will concede only from a conviction that such a course is the safest for herself. The remedy for other countries is obvious. It is to unite in the labor of raising the obligations of specific contracts to the level of permanent international law, and to enforce the observation of a consistent system of policy upon any single power whenever it may venture to set up the promptings of its immediate interest as the only rule of action it thinks proper to abide by.
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,
Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.