Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

273. Memorandum From the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (Crimmins) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)¹

Washington, June 18, 1964.

SUBJECT

• Continued Assistance to Manuel Rayʼs JURE as “Autonomous Group”

I understand that the Special Group at its meeting today will explore the question of the desirability of continuing the support of Cuban exile “autonomous groups”. I understand further that there will probably be no decision taken at this meeting.²

Pending this basic decision, we have an immediate problem with respect to Manuel Ray and his organization, JURE. Ray wants three things from us: (a) an immediate special grant of funds (over and above the funds he received at the beginning of this month) to recoup his losses from the recent fiasco; (b) intercession with law enforcement agencies in Puerto Rico to relax the very strict surveillance they maintain over his principal vessel so that it can leave Puerto Rico for Costa Rica; and (c) intercession with the Dominican Government to give him a base and, possibly, broadcasting facilities in the Dominican Republic.

The question is: Should we meet any of these requests in view of Rayʼs recent performance?

Ray has been guilty of violations of the rules of “autonomy”, of major errors in judgment, and of lack of success. He has mounted his operation from and maintained his bases in US territory; he has informed Tad Szulc of the New York Times, apparently in detail, of Crimmins support for him; he has used Szulc as a channel for making requests for further support from US officials; he has carried out his projected operations ineptly and carelessly; and he has failed in a humiliating and noisy way.

These are grievous mistakes. Some, perhaps, can be mitigated by a plea of extenuating circumstances, but taken together they could easily justify our washing our hands of Ray and his group. There are, however, cogent reasons, in my opinion, for giving Ray another chance.

The basic argument in favor of continuing support for him is the fact that his strategic concept of political operations provides at least some hope for loosening up the situation within Cuba. As you know, his plans call for infiltration of small groups into Cuba (no hit-and-run attacks from the outside) with the object of beginning small-scale propaganda operations in urban and suburban areas, validated and reinforced by occasional sabotage. The idea is to raise a symbol of organized, coherent and gradually expanding resistance to Castro and to attract disaffected elements of the regime and of the mass by establishing the beginning of an alternative to the regime. Rayʼs political platform, which is certainly left of center, and an echo of the original promises of the revolution, probably has greater potential for appealing to sectors of the power structure than that of any other group available to us. His proclamation of May 20 (copy attached)³ was, in my view, a very effective piece of political propaganda.

As it is with all exile groups, it is impossible to assess the accuracy of Rayʼs claims to support in being within Cuba. Probably the most that can be said is that, given his role in the revolution, his reasonably important post in the early days of the Castro regime, and his general political beliefs, his claims have more plausibility than those of others. A prickly personality, Ray should not be viewed as having the leadership qualities of Fidel nor should his movement be expected to sweep the island. Probably the most that we can prudently and realistically expect from a successful effort by Ray is a gradual loosening up of the internal structure. On the other hand, even if he gets inside and begins to work, it is entirely possible that he will lay a massive egg. We simply cannot be sure.

Basically, however, his strategic political concept has merit; it is his execution which has been miserable.

The Agency reports that JURE people say that they have learned bitter lessons from the June 1 fiasco⁴ and that they will not repeat them. It is entirely possible that they have been shocked into realizing the necessity for greater care and for abiding by the rules of engagement. Their pleas for our intercession with the Dominican Government stem from their knowledge that we have meant what we said when we stipulated that US territory cannot be used as a base of operations. This has been borne in upon them with special force because they claim that a significant, if not major, part of their operational problems was caused by their inability to employ US-based equipment which was under strict surveillance.

With respect to Rayʼs revelations to the newspaperman, there is now no way for him to correct that blunder. No amount of references to the general lack of discretion of the Cuban exile or to similar (but lesser) breaches of security by the other “autonomous” leader can justify it. The only small comfort that can be drawn in the area of security is that the Anguila Key fiasco improved the general cover for US support of JURE. Among the press in general, in fact, Artime, because of his history, is much oftener credited with US support than Ray. Unfortunately, Szulc is more influential and may be more ready to use his information than most. It should be noted that, if we were to intercede with the Dominicans in Rayʼs behalf, his establishment in the Dominican Republic would tend to confirm to Szulc Rayʼs account to him and the hollowness of our insistence that we have not supported him.

Taking all these factors into account, I recommend that we meet Rayʼs first two requests immediately, provided that:

1. He agree to cease completely the use of US territory for mounting operations;

2. He agree to keep his mouth shut, to keep away from Szulc, and be prepared to deny totally any statements on US support attributed to him by Szulc; and

3. He be made to understand that if these conditions are violated all assistance will be cut off forthwith, and in the case of a violation of the first condition, all his equipment in the United States will be seized.

Regarding intercession with the Dominican authorities, we should take no action pending the basic decision on policy toward autonomous groups in general.⁵ If it is decided to continue support for such groups, I recommend that we do intercede but that we limit ourselves to having the appropriate officer of the Embassy (Ambassador or DCM) repeat to the President of the Triumvirate the standard formula (in effect, Ray is a respectable and dedicated Cuban exile leader) which CAS already has used in reply to an inquiry from Reid Cabral. Ray himself should, of course, make the specific request to the Dominican authorities.

1. Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 5412 Special Group/303 Committee Records, June 18, 1964. Secret; Sensitive.
2. In a June 18 memorandum updating his May 14 memorandum to Bundy (Document 269) Chase included a few additional points for the Special Group meeting. He added the options of searching harder for an alternative to the U–2 and encouraging the exile groups to make internally-mounted rather than the externally-mounted raids that he had proposed in his May 14 memorandum. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Exile Activities, Vol. II, 1964–1965)
3. Attached but not printed.
4. Regarding this episode, see Document 270.
5. According to Johnsonʼs Notes on the June 18 303 Committee Meeting, it was decided to tell Manuel Ray that we “agreed with him that he should operate from outside the US. He must establish a base outside, and then we will help him as we have undertaken to do. We will help him get his boat out.” Johnson also noted that “On Artime, we shall continue as we are now doing.” As for rumors of assassination plots against Castro and selected Cuban leaders, McCone and McGeorge Bundy were to inform Attorney General Kennedy to use U.S. law enforcement agencies to prevent such plans. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 5412 Special Group/303 Committee Records, June 18, 1964) McCone sent Bundy an August 19 memorandum reviewing the FBIʼs investigation of reported exile assassination plans. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Exile Activities, Vol. I, 11/63–7/65)