Office of the Historian

269. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)1

Washington, May 14, 1964.

SUBJECT

  • Special Group—Cuba
1.
Continued exile raids2 are going to make it tougher to keep the lid on Cuba between now and November. This is just the sort of thing that evokes a highly emotional response from Castro. As things stand, he seems convinced that we are tied into the raids—as indeed we are.
2.
There seem to be two things we can do.
(a)

We can make a real effort to stop the raids. While CIA says that this canʼt be done, I wonder if thatʼs true. For example, the cessation of assistance and pressure on countries like Nicaragua to cease providing facilities might do the trick.

This step is a drastic one and could lead to angry charges (in the U.S. and elsewhere) that we are lending positive support to Castro. It is probably a step we would not want to take unless it became clear that these exile raids, which we canʼt control, were propelling us to the brink.

(b)
We can cut off all our ties with these exile groups (e.g. money, equipment, intelligence information). The exile grapevine is a sensitive one and the word will get around that we are really not involved. Hopefully, this word will get to Fidel and he will keep his eye focussed on the exiles rather than on us (specifically, a U–2). In sum, at a minimum, we might want to be impregnable to the charge that we are connected in any way with these exile activities.
3.
This strikes me as an urgent problem which we should grapple with now. Moreover, there may be a good deal of support in town in favor of doing something. My talks at State indicate that Alexis Johnson, [Page 655] Tom Mann, and John Crimmins are also unhappy about the present trend of events.3
4.
You may want to initiate a discussion of this matter4 at the Special Group meeting today.5
GC
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Exile Activities, Vol. I, 11/63–7/65. Secret; Eyes Only.↩
  2. On May 13 one of Artimeʼs commando groups struck the Port of Pilon in southern Oriente province, damaging warehouses and, according to an official Cuban announcement, destroying approximately 70,000 tons of sugar. The CIA was advised that Artime planned another raid on two radar installations in Cuba for early June.↩
  3. A notation in Chaseʼs handwriting in the left margin next to this sentence reads: “This may or may not be still true as of 6/4/64.”↩
  4. A notation in Chaseʼs handwriting at the bottom of the memorandum reads: “P.S. Also, we might want to consider making a distinction between types of raids. Externally-mounted noisy ones (e.g. Artime) are bad. Internal quiet ones are more tolerable.”↩
  5. The Special Group postponed decisions about the autonomous exile groups until June; see Document 270.↩