Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

270. Memorandum From Albert E. Carter of the Office for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research to the Director of the Bureau (Hughes) and the Deputy Director (Bunker)¹

Washington, June 4, 1964.

SUBJECT

• ARA–Agency Meeting of June 3, 1964

PARTICIPANTS

• ARA—Mr. Mann, Mr. Crimmins, Mr. Pryce
• CIA—Mr. FitzGerald, Mr. Herbert, Mr. Cheever, Mr. Bolton
• INR/DDC—Mr. Carter

Cuba

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the attached CIA prepared paper entitled “A Reappraisal of Autonomous Operations.”²

Mann read the paper and commented with regard to “II Current Status” at the top of page 5 that he was not sure it was accurate to say he had “argued and suggested.” He said he had simply “raised the question.”³ FitzGerald remarked it was a draft paper that would not be used “outside this room.” Mann said it was not an important point.

Crimmins liked the paper. FitzGerald said it was one-sided, but that “the more we worked on it the more one-sided it became.” Mann thought if we cut off aid the Cubans could blackmail us and it could get out.

Crimmins then said that before proceeding with this discussion he would like to fill Mann in on the apprehension of Manolo Ray by the British in the Bahamas. He said Ray and party were picked up on Anguila Key Monday afternoon.⁴ They were discovered by the British on a normal patrol. Ray tried to get away, but the British pursued and picked him up. A U.S. Coast Guard plane assisted, said Crimmins, “as is usual in such cases.” Crimmins explained that Ray was not using his own name, but that his identity was evidently now known. He said there were three Americans in the party, including a Life photographer and a girl radio operator.

Crimmins thought that being picked up ten days after he was supposed to be in Cuba would make a laughingstock of Ray. He saw it as a “sticky” public relations problem for us also.

In response to a question from Mann, Crimmins explained that we collaborate with the British in matters of this nature “for many reasons”, particularly since August 1963 when Castroʼs forces kidnapped a group of Cuban exiles from Anguila Key.

Crimmins said in the present case the British want to take the position they cooperated with us, but that the fact is we were cooperating with them in their waters at their request.

He said there was a precedent for the present case in that another group of Cuban exiles was picked up on Anguila Key by the British a few months ago, tried, fined $210 each, given suspended sentences of 90 days and deported to the U.S.

Crimmins said when we capture such groups we simply seize their equipment and set them free.

Mann thought we might quietly suggest to the British they do about what we do in cases like this. He thought we might tell them they were heading into a hornetʼs nest, that they had a hero.

It was explained that the group was due in Nassau at 1:30 June 3 (the day of the meeting) and that they would undoubtedly be tried, as were the others. It was decided that “without really twisting their arm” the British would be asked to low key the matter as much as possible. Mann suggested Crimmins talk with Alex Johnson about how to handle this aspect of the matter.

FitzGerald said a related development was that weapons “from a West Coast carriage factory” made for Ray had been traced by U.S. officials to a basement in Miami which is now under surveillance. Included in these, said FitzGerald, is a special “assassination” weapon.

FitzGerald also reported that Artime will put to sea Friday (June 5) for two operations in Oriente province, one east and the other west of Santiago. FitzGerald seemed to think these operations would be more “cream puff” in nature than the Pilon raid. It was his understanding that they would not involve landings.

At this point Mannʼs next appointment was announced and there was no time to return to a discussion of the autonomous operations paper. Mann said he would study the memorandum and probably arrange a special meeting to discuss it.

1. Source: Department of State,INR/IL Historical Files,ARA/CIA Weekly Meetings, June 1964. Secret.
2. Attached but not printed. This June 3 paper drafted by FitzGerald included a review of the history of the autonomous exile groups program, the consequences of terminating U.S. support for them, and conclusions. The main conclusion was that “The cessation of autonomous commando operations—the only remaining external sabotage activity since unilateral CIA operations of this type were stood down in January 1964—would effectively kill the remaining chances of carrying out the objectives of the Integrated Covert Action Program initiated in June 1963. While the cost would be high, it might well be worth the sacrifice if the U.S. is prepared for armed intervention in Cuba and if the OAS will unequivocally support it.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Exile Activities, Vol. II, 1964–65)
3. In a June 16 memorandum to Bundy, Chase stated that FitzGeraldʼs reappraisal “was apparently instigated by Tom Mannʼs expressed feeling that if we mean what we say under the warning paragraph of the OAS resolution (subversion is aggression), we should keep our hands clean and cease support of autonomous exile operations.” (Ibid.)
4. June 1.