397. National Intelligence Estimate1
NIE 64.2–68
Washington, May 2, 1968.
CONSEQUENCES OF CIVIL STRIFE IN NIGERIA
Conclusions
- A.
- The Federal Military Government’s (FMG) forces clearly hold the upper hand in the Nigerian civil war and a military victory for Biafra seems highly unlikely. We cannot, however, rule out a settlement which left a Biafra with a large degree of autonomy. The Ibos, who dominate Biafra, are resisting stubbornly because they believe that Federal forces are intent upon exterminating them or at least reducing them to subjugation in a reunited Nigeria.
- B.
- Whatever the outcome of the war, we believe that political instability will plague Nigeria for some considerable time to come, and that traditional tribal and regional dissension throughout the country will persist. The new internal division of the country into 12 states will exacerbate the divisive trends. Moreover, we see no national leadership in sight capable of winning the broad popular support or otherwise exercising the national control needed to deal effectively with the complicated tasks of political, social, and economic reconstruction.
- C.
- The civil war and the preceding months of confusion have virtually halted economic development in areas controlled by the FMG, and have drastically disrupted Biafra’s economy. If the FMG achieves a military victory, it would face complex problems of economic and political reconstruction, and would seek considerable outside help. Although it could expect large petroleum earnings, resumption of economic development will depend on political and security conditions. The economic outlook for a reunited Nigeria over the next several years appears dimmer now than it did a few years ago.
- D.
- The position of the Soviets has improved as a result of Moscow’s promptness in providing military equipment to the FMG; this is likely to persist. The US has lost influence primarily because the FMG resents the US policy of noninvolvement in the civil war. After the war, Nigeria is likely to follow a foreign policy more nonaligned and less pro-Western than in the past, and the competition among foreign powers will be a disruptive factor on the Nigerian scene.
[Here follows the Discussion section of the estimate.]
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Director of Central Intelligence Richard M. Helms, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on May 2.↩