145. Memorandum for the Record1
I spent a pleasant 40 minutes with Ambassador Cecil Hourani,2 Bourguiba, Jr.’s advance man. He had no major items to plug. His pitch was that President Bourguiba thought it useful right after our elections to send a few savvy fellows to Washington to get the feel of the new Administration’s thinking about Tunisia and US/Tunisian relations. He and I agreed that the relationship was an unusually comfortable one—we had no major bilateral problems.
He then got on to what I suspect was his chief message. Tunisia was getting a little nervous about becoming too committed to African causes and the OAU. Hourani thought personally (and implied that Bourguiba felt the same way) that Tunisia had to look out more for its own interests, and not pursue too far whatever the African radicals dreamed up. Indeed, perhaps Tunisia could be more useful to the US in African councils, by discreetly acting as a voice of moderation; of course, this would be a most delicate operation. To appear to be a US stooge would be self-defeating. Bourguiba, Jr. would want to discuss when he came here in December ways and means by which Tunisia might thus serve US interests and its own. I assured him that we’d be most responsive to such suggestions (my hunch is that the Tunisians are looking around for ways of making themselves a bit more valuable to us, so as to insure the continuation of substantial US aid).
Though I probed politely about Tunisia’s economic problems, Hourani didn’t even rise to the bait. He didn’t see any major economic issues between us, and failed even to mention either a program loan or Tunisia’s balance of payments difficulties. So I volunteered a few comments about the importance of putting Tunisia’s economic house in order and showing us that it could meet its current balance of payments problem. I also urged coming up with decent projects for the money we had earmarked.
As to relations with France, Hourani doubted they would improve much until DeGaulle died. The great man had a deplorable habit of [Page 220] remembering old grudges. I suggested that perhaps Tunisia could get back into the French market most successfully via the EEC. He agreed.
Hourani expressed some dubiousness about our Nasser policy, to which I gave the standard replies. I pointed out to boot that Tunisia too seemed to feel the necessity of playing ball with Nasser to an extent these days. Indeed we hoped that Tunisia would be more of a voice of moderation in Arab as well as African councils.
As he left, Hourani mentioned that he had delivered to the Vice President’s office a letter from Bourguiba, Jr. The latter also was interested in inviting Humphrey to Tunisia as soon as he could come. I suggested that the best thing to do would be for Jr. to raise this matter with the Vice President-elect when they got together. Naturally, the new VP had received a large number of feelers and would hardly be able to respond usefully for a while yet. Therefore, the more low-key the approach the less potential embarrassment to Tunisia and the US. He got the point.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Tunisia, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 12/63–9/68. Secret. Prepared by Robert W. Komer. Copies were sent to Assistant Secretary Williams, Tasca, and Hutchinson.↩
- Ambassador Cecil Hourani served as Special Adviser to Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba.↩