Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

411. Memorandum From Robert H. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow)⁰

Washington, June 23, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Proposed Program for Thailand

I attended a meeting in the State Department yesterday for a further discussion of Ambassador Young’s proposed program for Thailand.¹ Discussion focused on a draft of a telegram prepared by Bob Cleveland. Following is a summary of the major points that emerged from this discussion and other private discussions I had on Thursday on the subject. I submit this for your background information, but would be interested in any reactions.

1. While the Vice President made no explicit U.S. commitment to support an increase in Thai armed forces, he did talk to Sarit about the possible desirability of an increase and talked in terms of how much of the burden the Thais could bear.² Accordingly, it is the Washington view that at least an implied commitment was made and Sarit views it as an actual commitment.

2. The FY 1962 Military Assistance Program for Thailand as presented to Congress includes a $30 million increase (total program $48.9 million). This additional $30 million is sufficient to cover equipment requirements for the proposed 25,000 man increase in Thai forces.³

3. The principal problem is posed by the proposal that the U.S. provide in addition approximately $10.8 million in baht per year for budgetary support for the proposed increase. The exact amount of budgetary support required will have to be determined on the basis of the study by the U.S. economic team which leaves for Thailand today.⁴

4. We would not, however, provide budgetary support directly because that would involve us in the indirect support of a number of non-military activities run by the Thai armed forces. Rather, we would provide additional development aid at the required level which would in turn release resources within the Thai budget for support of the additional military forces.

5. Two possible methods of financing the local currency costs were suggested. One possibility was sale of food or fiber provided under P.L. 480.⁵ However, there seemed to be general agreement in the group that Thailand could not absorb any more food or fiber. The other possibility was to obtain the money from the $500 million contingency fund being requested from Congress. The Executive Branch has, in testimony on the Hill, already stated for the record that Southeast Asia would probably be an important claimant for such funds.

6. It was the view of Jack Kaplan that our commitment to budgetary support should be for FY 1962 only. We were saying in the Congressional presentation that supporting assistance would be discontinued after FY 1962. It was the view of Bob Cleveland, however, that in the negotiations with the Thai we would eventually be forced to commit ourselves to two or three years of financing the baht requirement.

7. I raised the question of whether we accepted the proposed “security area” concept on which at least some part of the military program was to be based. I suggested that perhaps it wasn’t a good idea to put the military in charge of all civilian (and even some private) functions as seem to be proposed in the detailed military plan. It was argued that there was really not very much new in this concept since, after all, the military ran the government in Thailand. I was unable to get anyone else interested in this question, though the paper itself suggests, I pointed out, that it is a new concept. I am not clear that the Thai military controls local government, etc., in the way here proposed. I plan to look into this subject further.

8. Though it is justified as part of a general program based upon a concept of dealing with the problem of Thailand’s remote frontier, most of the new elements of the so-called socio-economic program are straight economic development projects of the sort formerly called technical assistance—e. g., university improvement, vocational education, modernization of civil service, community development. Since a significant part of our aid effort has been concentrated on the Northeast, a case can be made that these programs are related to the problem of the Northeast. But fundamentally, they are economic development aid.

9. ICA, consistent with the new aid concept, does not want to commit the U.S. to such projects until it has determined in consultation with Thailand, what programs should have highest priority. The new economic mission is to make recommendations on this subject. Then specific projects can be considered and approved within such priority programs. We want to get away from the idea of annual aid level commitments and also want to concentrate our efforts in a few areas. (There are presently approximately 40 projects in the relatively small Thai program. We have already agreed to an $11.3 million terminal grant to finish three highway projects.

10. The character of the dilemma we face in this case is that, partly as a result of the wobbly situation in Thailand resulting from the situation in Laos and partly because of the expectations developed by the Vice President’s trip, we are faced by a political need to provide immediate evidence of our support. But the new aid concept precludes economic aid in the absence of some real development effort by the country concerned and in the absence of a careful examination of individual projects.

11. I suggested that one way out of our dilemma was to have the proposed message endorse the concept of deterring guerrilla warfare in Northern Thailand through a series of economic, political and military measures while leaving the details to be worked out in consultation with the Thai by the new economic mission. There was some skepticism as to whether this would really be satisfying to Sarit. He wanted concrete evidence of our commitment. However, it was agreed that the general concept of the Young report should be endorsed in the telegram. (It was not included in the draft.) It was also agreed that the message should begin with a statement of the aid concept.

12. The message is being redrafted on the basis of the discussion and will be considered in a smaller drafting group today. I will sit in as an observer to keep myself informed. Once it was cleared in the Department (I believe they expect Alexis Johnson to sign off on it), it will be sent via Battle to Bundy for possible clearance with the President. It is being drafted on the assumption that the President will himself approve it, though it is recognized that you and Mr. Bundy will exercise discretion in this regard. It is hoped that the message can be cleared in time to get it out over the weekend.

Bob

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Thailand, Vol. I, 6/61–7/61. Secret.
1. Regarding the Ambassador’s program, see Document 412.
2. See Documents 408 and 409.
3. As a result of further examination of the Young program, it has been determined that it calls for a 25,000 man increase over existing force levels rather than for a 30,000 man increase as had been initially supposed, [Footnote in the source text].
4. See Document 416.
5. P.L. 83–480, the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act, approved July 10, 1954, provided for the donation or sale on favorable terms of U.S. agricultural surplus to friendly governments; for text, as amended, see 68 Stat. 454.