I also have some proposals for language changes in the draft telegram which I
would like to discuss with you. I hope that we may be able to get together
early today on the telegram so that I can submit comments to State as
quickly as possible.
Attachment
ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED TELEGRAM TO AMERICAN EMBASSY
BANGKOK
I. Objectives of the Young Report
The proposals made by Ambassador Young in the report which he brought to Washington were
designed essentially to accomplish three broad objectives:
- a.
- The purely political objective of reassuring the Thai of our
support and our determination to defend their independence.
Ambassador Young’s purpose
was to deal with the “morbid fear gripping the Thais” and thus to
reduce the likelihood of a shift to a neutralist policy.
- b.
- The strengthening, through military, economic and communications
measures, of the Northeastern border area of Thailand in the face of
the new threat posed by Communist successes in Laos.
- c.
- The organization of Thailand for economic development.
Ambassador Young’s program for
achieving these objectives was put together in great haste. It is
therefore not surprising that it is better designed to achieve the
first, and relatively simpler objective, of political reassurance than
it was to accomplish the other two. With respect to these latter it is
defective in two respects: (a) it is not based upon a fundamental
analysis of the willingness and ability of the Thai to carry out
necessary programs; and (b) the proposed programs are inadequately
related to the last two of the above objectives.
II. The Willingness and Ability of
Thailand to Carry Out Required Programs
As Ambassador Young’s report
states, Thailand is a relatively static society which continues to live
a very lackadaisical existence. The many deeply rooted reasons for this
circumstance can be described only briefly here. Thailand has made a
unique adjustment between traditional and modern ways and there is
little tension in the society from this source. Having avoided becoming
a colony it also avoided the emotional and ideological consequences of a
nationalist revolution. As a result Thailand is almost totally lacking
in ideological conflict and assertive nationalism. The elite groups are
relatively open to those who acquire a higher education and education is
available to most individuals with talent. The nation is relatively
homogeneous and free of communal tensions and dissidence. Food is
plentiful.
All of this has produced a society in which there is very little sense of
national purpose or drive for change. The basic question is whether
Thailand can develop a sufficient sense of urgency to deal with the new
potential threats to its existence and whether it can develop the
motivation
[Page 871]
and leadership to
undertake the economic development which may be necessary to support the
security effort.
The Young Report recognizes the
absolutely crucial importance of achieving effective leadership,
organization and planning in Thailand. However, there is no real
analysis in the report of how this essentially political objective is to
be accomplished; the emphasis tends rather to be upon U.S. actions. We
need a careful analysis of the areas in which we could hope to get
effective action out of the Thai and of the techniques by which such
action can be stimulated. If we conclude, as is possible, that little
effective Thai action may be expected, we may decide that it would be
more effective to throw the mantle of U.S. power around Thailand by a
specific commitment to defend her against indirect as well as direct
aggression, backed by speedy reaction to evidence of threat.
The balance of this paper examines the congruence between the objectives
of the Young report and its
proposed programs for carrying them out, indicating also in each case
the extent to which the proposed telegram would endorse the Young recommendations. In general, the
telegram, like the report itself, is better designed to achieve the
political objective of reassurance than it is to achieve the security
and economic development objectives. But doubts on the latter score have
resulted in a watering down of several proposals with the result that
the political impact is also likely to be reduced.
The telegram is being sent now because Ambassador Young has requested action on an urgent
basis. Such urgent action is needed primarily for purposes of political
reassurance. For this reason, despite all of the reservations about the
Young report itself which are
expressed in this paper, I recommend that the telegram be sent. It
endorses those aspects of the Young recommendations that it seems possible to endorse
at this time.
III. The Consistency of Ends and
Means
- A.
- The Political Objective. Ambassador Young’s
proposals for an expanded military assistance program were intended
to implement the Vice President’s implied commitment to the Thai
Government. It is doubtful whether the report’s proposed economic
program would be politically very reassuring since, though it
represented an increase over the program included in the
Congressional presentation for FY
1962, it reflected a reduction from FY 1961 levels. The reason for the reduced level is, of
course, the emphasis under the new aid concept upon economic
development loans the level of which is not projected. As indicated
in more detail below, the proposed telegram endorses the military
program in a more unqualified way than it does the proposed economic
program.
- B.
-
Strengthening the Northeast. Ambassador
Young states at one
point that the over-all concept of his report is this: “The
vulnerability of Thailand’s remote frontier is the principal
problem to solve.” There is no perceptible inclination in
Washington to question the importance of strengthening the
Northeast. In fact, it is said that something like fifty percent
of our past economic aid effort has gone into that area. But
there are questions as to whether the proposed programs have
been well related to this objective.
The military program gives the impression of having been worked
out with greater attention to the potential threat in the
Northeast than does the economic program. It emphasizes the
development of counter-insurgency and counter-guerrilla
capabilities and proposes a related Thai administrative
reorganization. However, the report also states that the Thai
armed forces must be prepared for “large-scale modern warfare”,
and the program includes such “traditional” items as
modernization of two tank companies and addition of five
minesweepers (to “keep open the sea lines of communication in
the Gulf of Thailand and the river approaches to. . . Bangkok”).
These were items that were included in the already-planned
MAP program for Thailand.
The new counter-guerrilla, counter-insurgency program has been
simply added to an existing program without a thorough
re-examination of the over-all force and equipment
structure.
The proposed telegram endorses in a
general way the proposed additional equipment program (estimated
cost: $30 million) without suggesting review of the
already-planned MAP program for
FY 1962 of $19 million. It
does not, however, endorse proposed manning levels, but instead
approves a “modest increase” in force levels and calls for a
re-examination of the extent to which the increase can be met by
re-assignment of current forces (p. 3, par. 2–a). One may guess
that the field response to this latter suggestion will be
negative. The Vice President’s talks implicitly committed the
United States to paying a part of the budgetary support costs of
the proposed increase in military forces. (The report projects a
U. S. share of $10.8 million per year.) The telegram leaves this
problem for subsequent negotiation between Thailand and the
United States (par. “D”, p. 7). A Young proposal for MAP aid to strengthen the Border Police is, under
the proposed telegram, to be studied (par. 1–h, p. 3).
Most of the elements of Ambassador Young’s proposed socio-economic program are
activities of the same general character we have been carrying
on in Thailand. In fact, according to ICA, most of them are items that were included in
the original USOM proposals for
the FY 1962 program and were
turned down in Washington. An examination of both the text and
the maps in the report indicates that the only element in this
program peculiarly applicable to the Northeast is the proposal
for the preparation
[Page 873]
of
a plan for four “agrimetro centers” in the Northeast.2 The proposals for
technical advice in community development and for the
establishment of a joint U. S.-Thai commission to assist in
modernizing Thai agriculture relate partly, but not wholly, to
the Northeast.
The telegram proposes that a U.S. economic
team, now on its way to Thailand, look at the agrimetro center
proposal and that it explore with the Thai Government the
possibility of a joint agricultural commission. The telegram
does not specifically cover community development, but that
subject is presumably also within the purview of the economic
team. (?) The proposed telegram would also approve Ambassador
Young’s proposals for
increases in USIA programs
relating to the Northeast (and to student activities) and would
authorize provision of equipment [less than 1
line of source text not declassified] for a pilot
project “remote areas program”. The latter is essentially a
scheme for improving communications in remote areas by providing
regular air services between major villages and large
centers.
- C.
- Economic Development. As noted above, most
of the proposals in the “socio-economic program” are of the same
general sort that we have been conducting in Thailand. The economic
team now on its way to Thailand will attempt, as one of its major
functions, to determine priority program areas and to prune severely
the forty-odd projects we now support. It will review the Young proposals in this light. It
will also seek to determine how Thailand’s own resources can be
better mobilized for a development effort. Until this team has made
its report we would not, under the proposed telegram, approve any of
the specific elements of the proposed socio-economic program. We
would, however, explore ways in which Thai capabilities for economic
planning can be increased and would release additional funds for
feasibility studies of economic development projects involving a
total potential foreign exchange cost of $100 million. This approach
is designed to avoid our commitment now to a series of projects.
Such commitment would be inconsistent with our efforts to reorient
our aid program.
