409. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Embassy in Greece0
8. CODELJohnson. Ref Embtel 2096.1 When Vice Pres Johnson met May 17 with Prime Minister Sarit (see ref Embtel) Vice President opened [Page 861] discussion by asking PriMin what United States should be doing in Thailand in view of present disturbed situation Southeast Asia. PriMin said Thailand requires help in military and economic fields and then turned to former, outlining present status and capability Thai armed forces. There was some discussion about numbers of effectives and percentage of authorized strength currently being maintained but in conclusion figure for RTA set at about 75,000 out of authorized RTA strength of 150,000, with many units only 50–60 percent authorized strength while those earmarked for use if needed in connection Lao situation run 70–80 percent; lower figures result of budget deficiencies. Sarit also referred to plans for setting up two additional regimental combat teams, beyond ten existing, for use outside Thailand [1 line of source text not declassified].
Vice President Johnson inquired about readiness Thai army units, morale, adequacy, etc. Sarit responded that there no question about morale these troops if homeland threatened. He also judged the numbers large enough to do job that may be required to defend Thailand although to play it quite safe at 50 percent increase to fifteen RCT’s would be called for. He reiterated army’s plans are ready and men ready for action. Modern equipment is continuing need.
VP’s query about possibility bring army up to full strength returned discussion to questions Thai budget. PriMin mentioned civil defense budget three billion baht (about $150 million) out of a total of eight billion baht. VP noted US devotes about half total budget for defense and inquired whether Thailand could not spend more. Sarit said Thailand at limit of fiscal capabilities unless an improvement in economy will make more funds available. There ensued exploration of equipment and funds needed to put army into optimum shape based on four divisional army with some supplemental troops and all equipment modernized to acceptable level. For equipment for army the figure of twelve to fifteen million dollars was mentioned with another about 12.6 million dollars per year for troop pay if unit there to be maintained at nearly full strength. Certain types of aircraft (additional F–86Fs, helicopters and transport planes) and AC and W equipment were mentioned to bring air force to adequate level. $12.5 million would be required for planes and as far as $15 million for AC and equipment. There was discussion of navy requirements including additional minesweeper, two DEs and boats for patrolling Mekong. Having in mind problem in Vietnam where a force of 150,000 is inadequate, VP Johnson asked whether authorized Thai forces closer to full strength and with modern equipment as indicated would give Thailand what it requires for reasonably secure defense. PriMin replied initially these forces could take care of any presently threatened invasion. It was pointed out the additional two DEs that were being sought were for special dangers such as Laos situation and for employment [Page 862] in unconventional warfare. VP emphasized need for considerable capability in guerrilla warfare to meet likely situations in Southeast Asia.
At later stage in discussion Marshal Dawee, Deputy Secretary-General of Military Staff, inquired specifically whether US prepared put up $12.6 million annually required to call up personnel required to bring units up to strength. VP responded that TG should also find out how much it can contribute. It must be recalled US must provide extra strength also for South Vietnam, Philippines and others. In present situation where there is real threat to Thailand, how much can Thailand do for itself? FonMin Thanat noted this necessarily depends on situation. If emergency is acute, economic programs might have to be scrapped and everything devoted to military. VP then emphasized principle of mutual contributions and said President Kennedy will ask him how much Thais will do for themselves. Hoped he would be able to reply that Thais prepared make all out effort protect their own freedom and ready make certain sacrifices as necessary. Specifically he asked would Thailand match what we do with contributions to half that amount or some other fraction? Will Thailand provide troop pay with US providing equipment? He noted increased taxation will be required in US to make necessary funds available and would expect Thailand would also take necessary steps. Sarit also expressed desire get down to concrete decisions at this meeting and reach understanding on how to improve Thai military capabilities. He alluded to other visits to Thailand made by high ranking US officials which came to nothing; he hoped this time there would be some results. In ensuing discussion, when Thais talked about what matching contribution they could make, it became clear they were thinking in terms of pledging funds already appropriated and VP emphasized he was speaking of new contributions over and above what already available. Recognize this might call for extra taxes or other means of raising requisite funds. VP said will be possible for US make its decisions on additional aid quickly once we know what Thai matching contribution will be. It was agreed that TG would try to inform us of their decision as quickly as possible. Also decided Ambassador Young and Acting Prime Minister/Defense Minister General Thanom would get together shortly to organize preparation of memorandum, setting forth joint position on requirements for Thai armed forces, to be despatched to VP on his return to Washington. Memorandum would include notation of Thai matching contribution.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.1100–JO/5–2061. Top Secret; Niact. Repeated priority to the Department of State as telegram 2099 and to CINCPAC and CINCPACPOLAD. The source text is the Department of State copy. Johnson was in Athens returning from his visit to Karachi. Regarding the Vice President’s report to the President on his trip, see Document 4.↩
- Document 408.↩