Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

408. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State⁰

Bangkok, May 19, 1961, 9 p.m.

2096. Geneva for FECON. CODELJohnson. Vice President Johnson, accompanied by members of his party, Amb Young and members US Mission staff, and PriMin Sarit accompanied by FonMin Thanat at all times, and through most meetings by all leading military staff members, met on three occasions during Vice President Johnson’s visit, each lasting about two hours. First and second sessions, while devoted primarily to question capability Thai Armed Forces and possible US and Thai measures to enhance capability also touched on need for Thai and Lao representation at Geneva and possible Thai, US and SEATO military action Laos in case, resumption hostilities. Communiqué essentially agreed on at close second session. Third session expected to be largely formality releasing communiqué to press, but Sarit however held VP for extended discussion on question of what action US prepared take if Communists violate cease-fire or if, following conference breakdown, Communists resume hostilities. Sarit, obviously asking this question primarily for his own information, based question on his need respond to Phoumi’s query reported Embassy telegram 2061 to Department.¹

Discussion on readiness and capability Thai forces and need for expansion Thai defense budget and US MAP program will be covered separate telegram.²

During first meeting VP inquired about TG decision to participate Geneva Conference and stated this so essential he would even urge PriMin to go. He emphasized that there is dangerous conflagration in region spreading this way and it surely worth considerable effort on part TG if this will forestall thousands of men having to go to war. PriMin expressed doubt whether Geneva Conference can lead to concrete and useful results. VP replied it probably will not if influential leaders don’t go, leaving the conference to Communists and fail to take this opportunity spotlight Communist tactics. It was President Kennedy’s desire that VP discuss current emergency situation with leaders throughout Southeast Asia and urge that strong men be in Geneva “talking turkey”. Essential that, if conference should break down, people all over world and in US be convinced we have made best effort work out peaceful solution. Important world understand that leaders of stature of PriMin have no interest in aggressing on anyone or in fighting if this can be avoided. VP urged PriMin also to speak to RLG in this vein so that they will also be represented. PriMin said he would do this but indicated RLG at this point quite discouraged. VP again alluded to public opinion particularly in US; with Rusk in Geneva fighting it out there with communists in words, RLG representatives ought to be standing by his side. VP acknowledged some doubt as to whether we will get peace we seek at Geneva but emphasized again that it must be made clear we have done everything possible in that forum. He stated again President’s wish, expressed in his letter to the PriMin (Embtel 2084)³ that Thailand be strongly represented at Geneva to help get peace we all desire. Much better to talk than fight as long as we don’t have to give up any principles.

Discussion with PriMin of Thai military capabilities logically led to examination of missions which Thai armed forces might be expected perform and this in turn raised question of possible military action in Laos. VP asked, if there is violation of cease-fire or the conference breaks down, how many Thais are ready to move into Laos, ready and willing to go in with SEATO, tomorrow if it should be necessary. PriMin stated he would be ready to move one regimental combat team (more than five thousand men) right now if US is also ready to move. Reference was made at this point to Thailand’s SEATO commitment under Plan 5 to provide two battalions, a total of about three thousand men. VP inquired whether PriMin would be ready to increase these numbers if necessary, what would be maximum number ready to go if button is pushed, out of 70,000 or more available army forces. PriMin said if US and SEATO are also ready to go and situation demands, then he is prepared to put in any number required.⁴

VP asked PriMin whether he really believed it was wise to have Americans, white men, coming into Asia to fight in Laos, or should fighting on ground not better be done by Laotians and Vietnamese and Thais themselves. He asked in several ways whether, having psychological factors in mind, PriMin judged it wise to bring white men into this region to shoot Asians. Was it wiser for America instead to concentrate on every manner of aid and equipment that could be provided? PriMin reiterated that Thais have men and are ready to go if America is also ready to go. He said probably question of fighting does not arise in present circumstances anyway since it would be role of Americans and other outsiders to take over positions in Laos now in RLG hands (Note: He presumably was referring to points along Mekong) in order to foreclose Communist seizure these points.

VP noted that ChiComs might respond to such American action with some five hundred thousand troops. Russians would be delighted to see us tied down in Laos, leaving them a free hand to move on Berlin, Iran, Korea or elsewhere on next day. With whole world situation in mind, is this wise, or should US not confine itself to providing equipment, training and leadership? He again put to PriMin the choice of US sending in equipment and all manner of aid or sending in Marines, “rich Americans”, with all the possible provocations of ChiComs and Russian reaction that this might imply. PriMin maintained his point that if Americans don’t move, others will not. It is of course essential that US supply necessary equipment but if there is a flare-up of war, Americans must also come in. At present time, with lull in fighting, the job is to bring in aid and equipment to strengthen forces here. If and when fighting breaks out again, however, and if it is not possible to bring it peacefully to a stop, America’s forces should step in. PriMin said that nations in region look to US directly much more than they look to SEATO.

VP then referred to problems this question raises in US where Korea is fresh in people’s minds. There would be serious problem at home in sending Americans to fight in Laos when there are sufficient numbers already in area to do job. Nevertheless, he asked PriMin whether he specifically recommends sending of US forces into Thailand and Laos now and if so what should be their size and their mission. Sarit said at this moment he was not suggesting sending US troops to Thailand or Laos and emphasized that he was not asking for American troops for defense of Thailand but only equipment. Moreover he was of course sympathetic with US reluctance to send forces but said this is something it was hard for us to avoid as world leaders. Some time earlier, when fighting was still going on, he strongly believed US and Thai forces (and perhaps others as well) should go into Laos to help out govt forces. This is inappropriate right now but we should take opportunity we have now to talk together and decide about future action. It is most important that US intentions and decisions be known.

Sarit then referred to questions raised with him by General Phoumi about US plans and intentions (Embtel 2061). RLG is hard-pressed and in desperate situation and is prodding TG for advice as to whether they should keep on facing pressures bearing on them or give in. A crucial element in this is US intentions. VP said if conference fails, and we must prepare for worst while hoping for best, he thought it essential countries in Southeast Asia get together and determine what they believe should be done and put a concrete proposition to us. He urged Sarit to take leadership with Vietnamese and Laotians and others and propose what US and SEATO and others should do, at same time stating unequivocally what Thailand is prepared to do if cease-fire would blow up. On being pressed again by PriMin for more specific statement of US intentions, VP stated that because of present state of American public opinion it is not possible to speak with finality at this time. US Congress believes public is in no frame of mind to send American boys to fight in Laos, especially when Americans are not satisfied that Laos are fighting very hard themselves. He hopes President Kennedy will be able formulate his position after VP’s return and know what help can be provided if conference should fail. Of course first business at hand is work at Geneva to make clear to public opinion that peaceful effort is being made. If this fails, we must call the roll and see what each one in region will do. US will also say what its part will be. NSC will have to find immediate answer in this case. Sarit made clear he also does not face with equanimity resort to force but said circumstances may compel us to this. In conclusion VP stated he could not say with finality what USG will do on this question. President Kennedy of course has great influence with Congress but his word is also not final. RLG should not throw in towel and should know we will remain alert to help but at this time we cannot say specifically what action we would take in light of subsequent developments.

At later stage in their talks VP also threw out idea perhaps what was necessary was a Pacific NATO covering entire region from San Francisco westward. As in NATO there might be single command with a Norstad in charge with each nation contributing its forces and ready to go when button is pressed. Sarit responded that it sounds like good idea and inquired whether this would put SEATO into deep freeze. VP explained he was simply exploring a concept noting SEATO leaves many areas uncovered and excludes several firm allies. Likewise it does not provide for forces in being.

Young

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.11–JO/5–1961. Top Secret; Priority. Repeated niact to Karachi, priority to Geneva, priority to CINCPAC, and to CINCPACPOLAD.
1. Telegram 2061, May 16, reported that Sarit informed Unger that he had received a personal communication asking Sarit three questions: could the Royal Lao Government count on full support of the United States against the Pathet Lao; if the fighting was resumed would the United States send troops; and would SEATO do the same? (Ibid., 751J.00/5–1661)
2. Document 409.
3. In telegram 2084 from Bangkok, May 18, the Embassy reported that Vice President Johnson delivered President Kennedy’s letter to Sarit. Both Sarit and Thanat were pleased with it, and Young stated that Thanat was prepared to work closely with Rusk at Geneva. (Department of State, Central Files, 751 J.00/5–1861)
4. In telegram 2085 from Bangkok, May 19, the Embassy reported that during the course of this discussion on possible intervention to aid Laos, Johnson “specifically asked PriMin whether he wanted to have US soldiers stationed in Thailand now and Sarit replied in the negative.” The Vice President did not raise the issue again. (Ibid., 033.11–JO/5–1961)