Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

314. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State¹

New York,September 27, 1955—7 p.m.

Dulte 4. From Secretary for Hoover. Following is proposed telegram to Cairo. From Secretary.

I discussed with Macmillan last evening action which US and UK should take as result of Egypt–USSR arms purchase agreement.² We are agreed that, if carried through, it would inevitably have most serious adverse consequences with respect to: (a) increased tension in area; (b) Soviet penetration of and increased influence in area; and (c) US–UK relations with Egypt. We therefore agreed: (1) to make, with Pinay, approach to Molotov whom we are seeing this evening,³ informing him that the whole “spirit of Geneva” would be seriously jeopardized, if not permanently damaged, by this move on part of Soviets, which can only inflame Arab-Israel relations, and which comes immediately after major move on part of US that has received world-wide political support to bring about a settlement of principal Arab-Israel issues; and (2) make simultaneous US–UK approaches to Nasser (in which French may also join although we will not urge them to do so.)

I therefore wish you to see Nasser at earliest possible opportunity and deliver to him the personal letter from me contained in the immediately following telegram⁴ and say that I have asked you also to give him following oral message from me.

“Regardless of what Moscow may say, or what Nasser may quite sincerely like to believe, arms agreement of the nature he contemplates constitutes a major step by the Soviet Union to: create trouble in the area by fanning the flames of an arms race; gain as large a measure of penetration and influence there as possible; and, through both these means, work toward Soviet dominance. It will be an easy thing for the Soviet Union to so arrange matters that the equipment they provide will be useless without continuing and increasing Soviet technician support and supply of parts and ammunition. Once the total equipment of the Egyptian army has incorporated Russian material to the extent contemplated in the Egyptian-Soviet arms agreement, Egypt will be dependent upon continued Soviet good will and cooperation, since failure to continue a supply of spare parts would render such a large proportion of Egyptian arms useless. It is by similarly innocuous-looking initial measures that the Soviet Union has brought about a vise-like control of one country after another. The Soviet Union also, of course, must recognize that an inflow of arms of this amount into Egypt will result in Israel’s seeking similar acquisitions and quite possibly forcing issues at this time leading to all-out warfare in the area before Egypt was able to benefit from an increase in its arms.

As Nasser knows, the US exerted its influence to bring about a settlement of the Suez base problem, looking to Egyptian sovereignty over the base. It goes without saying that we made this effort in the expectation that Egypt would retain its independence and would not succumb to efforts by the Communist world to bring about a situation where the base would be controlled by Soviet equipment dependent upon Soviet provision of parts, to which increasingly onerous conditions could be attached.

Nasser must have in mind also that the US has endeavored to show its earnest desire to help and support Egypt and his regime. We have been, and would continue to be, willing in cooperation with the British to exert influence upon the Sudan to secure an agreement on division of the Nile waters. We have been and would continue to be willing, in context of Egypt–Israel settlement, to grant assistance, in addition to any loan the World Bank might make, in the construction of the Aswan Dam. We have endeavored to handle our cotton surplus with a maximum regard for Egypt’s export needs.

With respect to the furnishing of arms,Nasser will recall that, following the conclusion of the Suez base agreement, we offered to provide grant military assistance provided Egypt would sign the usual form of agreement required by US legislation. More recently, we approved Nasser’s request to purchase US arms. Subsequently he has asked for special financial facilities, which we would be prepared to provide in the context of his cooperation in carrying out the recommendations in my August 26 speech.

We believe, on the basis of Nasser’s frequent statements, that the Egyptian Government is convinced that Egypt’s best hope for future political and economic growth lies in close cooperation with the West. This we most earnestly desire. We appreciate that Nasser has, for the purposes of his personal leadership and the stability of the present regime, need of an early acquisition of military equipment. We are told that finance has not been a main obstacle with respect to the Egyptian Government’s purchase of arms from Britain; and, given Nasser’s cooperation in my August 26 effort to prevent an early outbreak of hostilities or a disastrous arms race in the area, arrangements could be made to facilitate Egypt’s purchase of arms in the US. The only thing therefore that separates him from acquiring the arms which he needs from the West, with whom he has repeatedly stated Egypt’s destiny lies, is his cooperation in removing the obstacles mentioned in my August 26 speech. At that time I set forth the contribution which the US is prepared to make to that end. Indeed, on this Nasser has stated that he would be willing to announce publicly that he is prepared to discuss with me steps leading to the implementation of my proposals. It may not be possible to arrange immediately a meeting between Nasser and myself, especially with the imminent possibility of publicity of Egypt’s intention to receive Soviet arms. It should be possible, however, for Nasser to begin with us an immediate exchange of views on this problem, thus preventing an early outbreak of all-out war in the area, which could only be disastrous for Egypt or, alternatively, a greatly stepped-up arms race between Israel and Egypt/with the danger of greater disaster in the future. For all these reasons, I most earnestly urge upon Nasser that he not proceed with his plans to receive arms from the Soviet Union.”

FYI. Your British colleague is receiving instructions to make similar representation to Nasser.

In event Nasser is unwilling to cancel the Soviet arms deal, we shall have to review what the effect of his persistence in the deal will be. There will, beyond any question, be a major public reaction in Great Britain over Egypt’s permitting Soviet penetration into the area so quickly after British relinquishment of the base to Egypt. It would be equally certain that public and congressional opinion in the US would prevent US assistance on the Aswan Dam and other economic aid at a time when Egypt was jeopardizing its ability to remain a fully independent member of the free world. We are aware of the danger of taking action that would further alienate Egypt, but the public reaction to Egypt’s new policy is something which it would be beyond our power to control.

We do not believe that any statement by Nasser about Egypt’s peaceful intent in making arms pact with Soviet will serve to mitigate in any substantial degree inevitable public reaction in US and elsewhere and he should not be encouraged to believe that it would.⁵

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/9–2755. Top Secret;Niact; Alpha; Limit Distribution. Received at 6:39 p.m. Repeated by the Department at 11 p.m. to Cairo for action. Repeated on October 2 to Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad, Amman, Tripoli, Tel Aviv, Ankara, Karachi, Moscow, Paris, and London. (Ibid., 684A.86/10–255) A copy of the telegram on USUN stationery, filed with the source text, indicates that it was drafted by Russell, cleared with Dulles, and approved by Russell, who initialed for Dulles.
2. See Document 310.
3. See Document 317.
4. Infra.
5. Byroade, in a telegram to the Secretary, asserted that “neither I nor any member of embassy staff under my control have taken any part in encouraging Nasser make statement along lines last paragraph Dulte 4.” (Telegram 590 from Cairo, September 28; Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/9–2855)