315. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State1
Dulte 5. From Secretary for Hoover. Following is proposed telegram to Cairo:
Verbatim text.Dear Mr. Prime Minister: I wish to bring to you most urgently my deep concern over reports of the conclusion of an agreement by the Egyptian Government for the purchase of arms from the Soviet Union. It is possible that you may not have realized fully the seriousness with which such a transaction will be viewed in the United States and the consequent difficulty of preventing it from marring the existing good relations between our two peoples.
Since the establishment of the present Government in Egypt, the United States has worked with it in the expectation that a solid basis would evolve for cooperation between Egypt and the nations of the West. We have placed full confidence in your repeated assurances regarding Egypt’s identification with the West. We extended assistance during the negotiations of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on the Sudan and the Suez Base Agreement in the belief that they would make possible close Egyptian cooperation with the West. Our economic assistance programs, Atomic Energy Program, approval of arms purchases, and my statement of August 26 on the Arab-Israel situation are all based on the same general thought. We have tried to handle our cotton surplus in ways which will not prejudice Egypt’s economy and have otherwise sought to support that economy. I am convinced that the economic and social progress you so deeply desire for the Egyptian people can come best through continued association with the West.
The proposed agreement with the Soviet Union inevitably undermines the basic premise upon which we have worked in the past and sets Egypt upon a course which may well separate her progressively from her natural and long-term friends. The agreement cannot be considered a simple commercial transaction. It has deep political meaning. The record of the Soviet Union in this respect is clear. Initial, supposedly friendly gestures, lead quickly to subversion, inextricable involvement in the Communist orbit, and loss of that independence of action which Egypt rightly values so highly.
On the basis of our past cooperation, I feel justified in asking you to ponder carefully the consequences of the course you are now embarking upon. It is my firm belief that it would only augment existing tensions in the area and work to the detriment of the Egyptian people. I am asking Ambassador Byroade to give you my further views and I am hopeful that, as in the past, we will together [Page 528] find a way further to promote close association between our two countries.
Faithfully yours,John Foster Dulles.End verbatim text.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/9–2755. Top Secret;Niact; Alpha; Limit Distribution. Received at 6:54 p.m. Repeated by the Department at 11 p.m. to Cairo for action. Repeated on October 2 to Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad, Amman, Tripoli, Tel Aviv, Ankara, Karachi, Moscow, Paris, and London. A copy of the telegram on USUN stationery, filed with the source text, indicates that it was drafted and approved by Russell, who initialed for Dulles. (Ibid., 684A.86/10–255)↩