Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

310. Memorandum of a Conversation, New York, September 26, 1955, 9:45 p.m.¹

POM(NY)MC–1

New York, September 26, 1955, 9:45 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• US:
• The Secretary
• Mr. MacArthur
• Mr. Merchant
• Mr. Russell
• Mr. Burdett
• UK:
• Mr. Macmillan
• Sir Roger Makins
• Mr. Evelyn Shuckburgh
• Mr. Patrick Hancock

SUBJECT

• Egypt—Purchase of Arms from USSR

Mr.Macmillan: I took advantage of a call by the Egyptian Ambassador on September 23 to express very strong concern regarding the reports of an Egyptian-Soviet arms agreement. From New York, I sent a telegram asking our Ambassador in Cairo to seek particulars from Nasser and to repeat to him the strong language used in London.

Mr.Dulles:Persons in whom we have confidence confirmed from Nasser today that an agreement of the character reported has been made. The size of the shipments was not indicated but the presumption is that the detailed information we received previously is correct. Our representatives made known our concern and set out the grave consequences for Egypt. We are faced by a difficult situation. We could give arms aid or a security guarantee to Israel but this would only involve us in a cycle. We could throw more weight behind the Turk-Iraq-Pakistan Pact and try to isolate Egypt. Up to now we have supported the Northern Tier but have not been eager to have Arab states bordering on Israel join; nor have we desired to build up an Iraqi challenge to Egypt’s position of leadership in the Arab world.

If the French agree, the three of us could speak to Molotov.² I raised the matter with him on September 20.³ I said I thought it was a grave step which would increase area tension and expressed the hope that the reports were untrue. He unconvincingly tried to pass it off by saying it was a commercial sale with no political implications. In the US the development will have serious effects because of widespread anti-Communist feelings accentuated by the powerful influence in the Jewish press. It will disturb the new atmosphere between Soviets and the Western Powers. I mentioned the matter to Alphand, who was concerned and feared that Soviet arms might filter through Egypt and Libya to North Africa. I doubt that the Soviets will stop the deal but they might moderate the amounts.

Mr.Macmillan: We are faced by a major issue. I have not been able to understand why the Soviets have not made this move previously. It constitutes an aggressive entrance into a new area.

We could reward the “good boys” and punish the bad. We could extend more help to the Turk-Iraq Pact. We are now considering issuing a statement indicating we would welcome Iranian entrance into the Pact. We would not extend additional guarantees, but the statement we have in mind might be helpful to the Iranian Government. We could also give Iraq more equipment and encourage Jordan and Lebanon to join the Pact.

Mr.Dulles: We could become involved in an expensive process because the Soviets have available obsolescent equipment with which they can make attractive offers which we would be hard-put to meet. Saudi Arabia and Syria particularly might be tempted to accept.

I believe the transaction will go far to shatter the spirit of Geneva. I mentioned it to Casey, MacDonald and Pearson and all felt it was bad business. It is a reckless proceeding by Moscow which will only intensify the strains in the area. I do not know what Israel will do.

Mr.Russell: Israel is frightened of a situation in which the Arabs can rush in and bargain off their resources between the USSR and the West. Israel knows she has nothing comparable to offer.

Mr.Macmillan: We should approach Molotov now. It is impossible to believe in the co-existence of two worlds, if the Soviets choose this moment to make such a mischievous move.

Mr.Shuckburgh:Molotov could reply that the USSR would be glad to stop if the West would cease efforts to build up military defense arrangements. He could ask whether we are interested in a neutral Middle East.

Mr.Dulles: Our efforts are directed at an Arab-Israel settlement. We should consider the Russian move in the context of its effects on the prospects for such a settlement. The whole world has recognized that the Alpha proposals are fair. The USSR offer will destroy them. We are not talking of the Northern Tier or our efforts to prevent Soviet aggression. This matter is completely apart from our differences regarding the value of collective security arrangements.

Mr.Macmillan: With Molotov we should stick to the argument that the arms offer will adversely affect prospects for an Arab-Israel settlement.

At the same time we should not abandon efforts at getting Nasser to abandon the arrangement.

Mr.Dulles: If Nasser rejects the offer, he may well be overthrown and we could get someone worse.

Mr.Macmillan: We must try a combination of the carrot and the stick. We could help Nasser as well as hurt him in the Sudan. We could permit him to purchase the minimum arms necessary to keep his position and the US could help him with the high dam at Aswan.

Mr.Dulles: We might be able to sweeten up our arms offer, but we are not in a position to do much with respect to grant military assistance without causing trouble with Israel.

Mr.Macmillan: We could turn to the stick.Nasser cannot have thought out all the consequences of his move. We could tell him frankly that we cannot tolerate it. It is a breach at least of the spirit of the Suez base agreement. The world will not allow the USSR to become the guardian of the Suez Canal. We could make life impossible for Nasser and ultimately bring about his fall by various pressures.

The development is certain to be attacked by the Right Wing Tories in the UK on the grounds that we left Egypt and let the USSR in. The Tories will claim that this is the result of Mr.Eden’s moderate policies.

Mr.Dulles: Mr.Shuckburgh and Mr.Russell might draw up a paper covering the above points for our consideration.⁴ Mr.Macmillan’s comments regarding the Suez base are very important. We did not all work so hard to get a Suez base agreement in order to turn the base over to the Soviets.

In the United States we will not be able to put a good face on the matter. It will be regarded as a major defeat.

Mr.Macmillan: We have not yet completed our withdrawal from the Suez base and a demand might arise in Parliament to stop withdrawal. If we had your support, we might call the whole thing off.

Mr.Russell: If we could get Nasser to move on Alpha we would want to telescope our tactics. We might discuss with Nasser in detail the settlement we have in mind and then present this to Israel. The above course immediately involves the question of whether the US and the UK are prepared to exert pressure on Israel.

Mr.Dulles: We cannot make a deal with Egypt without prior consultation with Israel. We must continue to serve as a friend of both sides.

If Egypt lines up with the USSR, I doubt that US public opinion would permit us to use coercive restraints in the event of an Israel attack. The only reason Egypt doesn’t attack Israel now is that she knows we will take restraining action.

Mr.Shuckburgh: Can the Soviet-Egyptian agreement be used to persuade Israel that she had better make more substantial concessions than we previously had in mind?

Mr.Dulles: I believe Israel would be more disposed now to make a settlement. She might give up a bigger slice of the Negev.

Mr.Macmillan: If we think Israel will accept what we consider a fair settlement, we could then offer this to Egypt.

Mr.Russell: If Nasser maintains he is unable to withdraw from the arrangement now, perhaps we could still work matters out if he would agree immediately to an Alpha settlement and would strictly limit the arms purchased from the USSR to those definitively contracted for.

Mr.Macmillan:Nasser would have to agree to exclude any Russian technicians.

Mr.Dulles: I agree with the suggestion, but we must also work to soften up the USSR.

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627,CF 555. Top Secret. Dated September 30. A note on the source text states that it is not a verbatim report but a paraphrase from notes. The drafter is not indicated.
2. Dulles,Macmillan, and Pinay spoke with Molotov on the subject of the Soviets’ selling arms to Egypt on September 27 at 9:30 p.m. For a summary of this conversation, see Document 317.
3. See Document 286.
4. No such document has been found in Department of State files.