Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

337. Letter From the Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Baxter) to the Ambassador in Iran (Chapin)¹

Washington, October 7, 1955.

Dear Mr. Ambassador: I want to get out to you as soon as possible a brief note of explanation concerning the niact telegram sent you last night.²

As drafted in GTI and approved all the way up to the Secretary (two important links in the chain were missing because of the absence from Washington of Hoover and George Allen but we had Loy Henderson’s blessing) the telegram started with the second paragraph of the one you received and of course did not have the final personal postscript from the Secretary. Yesterday was a bad day to be working against a deadline because of the Secretary’s very full schedule: he attended a meeting of the NSC for most of the morning³ and then the somewhat protracted burial service in Arlington for Jack Peurifoy. He saw Sir Roger Makins in the late afternoon on several subjects, including Iran.⁴ It was after six o’clock before he was able to consider our telegram. Four of us were with him—Ray Hare,⁵ Francis Russell, Norman Hannah and I. (As you may not know, Ray and Francis are pinch hitting for George Allen and Bill Rountree.) I am setting the stage somewhat elaborately because I want you to realize that the Secretary was personally giving serious and undivided attention to the problem. He discussed it with us thoroughly for the better part of an hour, so that we were able to bring forward all the pertinent arguments and background information. The Secretary said that Iran had been discussed informally in the NSC that morning and that he had felt some hesitancy from many people as to the advisability of Iranian adherence to the Baghdad Pact at this particular moment. Although he knew that the U.S. and probably he personally were credited with the idea of the northern tier, he too had some doubts about the suggested timing and noted the Shah’s statement in your 588⁶ that the announcement of intention to adhere could be done later in the month if the assurances he felt necessary were not forthcoming in time for the October 8 speech. I should point out that the Soviet arms deal with Egypt is a new element which is causing a great deal of concern in all branches of the government and a growing feeling that many formerly accepted policies should be re-examined.

While we were with the Secretary he talked on the phone with Admiral Radford, Secretary of Defense Wilson and Allen Dulles. Radford reported that the Joint Chiefs were strongly in favor of Iran’s entry into the Pact; it was not quite clear what Wilson’s attitude was, but the conversation had something to do with amounts of money available for military assistance; Allen Dulles, the Secretary said, did not think that now was the time. The Secretary then dictated what is now the first paragraph of telegram 569 and the introductory clause of paragraph two. After doing so, he commented that he was placing a tremendous amount of responsibility on you and wondered if he was being fair to put you in such a position. At the same time, he expressed confidence in your doing the right thing in light of local circumstances and so dictated the final personal message.

One point the Secretary made which does not appear in the telegram was that the basis for Iranian adherence seemed rather precarious if it could be accomplished only on the date of October 8 and with strong US–UK assurances. If the Shah had to overcome such great opposition with a knife at the throat of the Majlis, could we not expect that opposition to develop later in such a way that we would find the Shah’s announcement to adhere did not really mean much after all. If there were a firm basis for the Shah bringing Iran into the Pact, the implementing steps to that end could be done a few weeks from now just as well as at the immediate present.

In my view it is most unfortunate that the Iranians have made so much of their need for budgetary assistance. I am sure it frightened many people in Washington to have Iranian officials talk calmly about the need for that kind of assistance for the next two or three years. Any statement which the U.S. makes at the Shah’s request is sure to be considered very carefully by many people here because they think it will be interpreted by the Iranian Government as a commitment to foot bills for the ordinary governmental budget in Iran when Iranian resources are not being tapped.

You have our confidence and our sympathy. We will keep our fingers crossed the next few days.

Sincerely,

William O. Baxter⁷

1. Source: Department of State, GTI Files: Lot 59 D 654, Political Letters—Notes, 1955. Secret; Official-Informal; Personal for the Ambassador.
2. supra.
3. See Document 66.
4. See footnote 2, Document 334.
5. Director General of the Foreign Service and Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.
6. Document 333.
7. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.