Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

336. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran¹

Washington, October 6, 1955—7:46 p.m.

569. The global consideration referred to in your 588² would make it preferable not to have Shah announce intention to adhere to Pact at this time when it could be interpreted as a move brought about by UK and US in retaliation Soviet-Egyptian arms deal. We feel there is danger that announcement under these circumstances might lead to strong Soviet counter moves and that danger of war in area might thus be increased whereas we are hoping that through various pending moves with Soviet Union situation can be quieted down and Soviet intervention minimized. However, we also realize the danger of losing present momentum behind Pact adherence and we do not feel that global considerations above referred to are so compelling as to justify our taking any substantial risk that present delay would lead to a total loss of Iran’s adherence to the Baghdad Pact and northern tier concept.

Therefore, if in your judgment action is necessary now in order to prevent loss you may inform Shah and Prime Minister urtels 572³ and 588 that immediately following formal Iranian adherence Baghdad Pact US prepared issue welcoming statement which will also re-emphasize US policy of support for and assistance in maintenance Iranian independence. When telling Shah you are unable at this time to indicate exact wording of such statement, you may refer to numerous clear declarations US policy toward Iran made during past decade, giving oral quotes from previous public statements summarized Deptel 518⁴ and emphasizing US policy has not changed.

Following is working draft possible statement⁵ for your comments and estimate as to whether it would satisfy Shah:

“The United States welcomes the announcement by the Government of Iran of its adherence to the Pact of Mutual Cooperation signed by Iraq and Turkey on February 24, 1955, and subsequently adhered to by the governments of the United Kingdom and Pakistan.

“Iran’s decision to adhere to the Baghdad Pact is further evidence of the desire and ability of the nations of the Middle East to provide for their legitimate self-defense through regional collective security agreements. The United States has often expressed its belief that such an agreement, particularly between the ‘Northern Tier’ nations of the Middle East, represents the best possible foundation for effective area collaboration on questions of mutual interest. It constitutes a framework within which peace and stability can be strengthened and in which can be developed an atmosphere conducive to progress and constructive cooperation among the member states.

“In the view of the United States, it is especially gratifying that Iran has decided to associate itself with this regional organization. The long-standing interest of the United States in the territorial integrity and sovereign independence of Iran remains a cardinal point of American policy.

“The U.S. takes this occasion to reiterate its deep concern, amply demonstrated in the past, for the well-being of Iran, as well as its continuing interest in assisting Iran and other free nations which are making their own determined efforts to achieve defensive strength and economic and social progress.”

Department concerned by Shah’s implied desire use US and UK statements to bargain for Parliamentary ratification following October 8 speech in which apparently he will not announce firm decision of Government but only attempt “prepare way”. Do not desire that contents any statement contemplated by US Government shall be subject bargaining between Shah and Parliament. Bargaining this kind might result in Parliament demanding stronger statements or commitments on part US before it willing agree to adherence, and in Shah appealing to us to give such commitments. In Department opinion it would be tactical error for Shah to indicate in any way to Parliament that Iran is expecting anything from US as reward for adherence to Pact. If he cannot rest his case on advantages of stability and security-strengthening inherent in regional defense, his position likely become almost untenable.

Question of when Shah can be given text proposed US statement depends largely on sequence of overt official steps under Iran Constitution to effect adherence. Would presentation of Pact to Parliament be preceded by official signature of its text? Request Embassy information on subject of steps involved in process and Embassy opinions on following:

a) At what point will prestige of Shah and authority of Government be irrevocably committed?

b) When could statement be most usefully and safely communicated to Shah privately, bearing in mind uses he might make of it?

c) Should it be assumed that publication US statement would await final Parliament ratification?⁶

Personal from Secretary

I realize that above telegram places upon you a very heavy responsibility but I do not know where else it can be placed and I know you will use your best judgment and whatever the outcome this will be recognized.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/10–555. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Baxter and Hannah; cleared by Crawford of EE; and approved by Dulles. Repeated niact to London, Baghdad, and Ankara.
2. Document 333.
3. See footnote 2, Document 333.
4. The public statements selected for inclusion in telegram 518, September 28, range from an extract of Truman’s message to Congress on March 12, 1947, announcing the Truman Doctrine, to a statement by Dulles upon receiving Ambassador Entezam on October 22, 1953. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.88/9–2355)
5. For text of the statement as released by the Department on October 12, see Department of State Bulletin, October 24, 1955, p. 653.

6. The Embassy answered these questions in telegram 600, October 8, as follows:

   • “Question a: Prestige of Shah will be irrevocably committed whenever decision to adhere forthwith is announced formally and publicly.
   • “Question b: Statement could most usefully and safely be communicated to Shah following formal announcement, but if necessary, few hours previous.
   • “Question c: For best effect, US statement should appear at same time as those of UK and other pact members, immediately following Iranian announcement. To withhold statement until ratification would alienate Shah and severely reduce support for ratification, since undertone of Shah-Majlis relationship is not too good at present, particularly over issue extension term present Majlis.” (Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/10–855)