Office of the Historian

338. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State1

Tehran, October 7, 1955—8 p.m.

598. Following receipt Department’s telegram number 5692 I requested interview with either Shah or Prime Minister Ala. Former [Page 787] being unavailable, I saw Prime Minister at 5 p.m. (Amini and Ala also present) and spoke from following notes which he took down verbatim: (underlining mine)3

  • “1. When Iran formally adheres to the pact, a strong statement will be issued by the US Government, including reference to assistance and US interest in the territorial integrity of Iran.
  • “2. The US Government believes that it would be a tactical error for the Shah to bargain with the Majlis over the prospect of a United States Government statement and US rewards for joining the pact. He should, in the opinion of the US, act only because of the advantages of stability and increased security for Iran.
  • “3. The Soviet-Egyptian arms arrangement brings in a completely new factor for consideration by His Majesty. The US hopes that through various pending moves with the Soviet Union the situation can be quieted down and Soviet intervention minimized. There is a possibility that Iran’s adherence to the pact at this moment might be viewed as retaliation, brought about by the US and the UK for the Czechoslovak arms arrangement, and strong Soviet countermoves might result. The US Government suggests that His Majesty would do well to weigh the problem and to delay action until the situation becomes clearer, although US views regarding Iran’s adherence to pact remain unaltered.”

It will be seen from the foregoing that I elected to risk delay in the belief that there would not be a “total loss”. I am happy to say I was confirmed in this by Prime Minister’s reply to my later question as to whether there was any danger impetus might be lost by delay, to which he and Amini replied “no”. Prime Minister stated Shah had wished to adhere at early date because of Soviet activities with press and Majlis.

Unless it is changed tonight in conference between Shah and Ministers, Shah’s October 8 speech will make reference to possibility Iranian adherence to a security pact of type compatible with UN Charter and endorsing substance Prime Minister’s statement to Majlis (my telegram 491 September 21).4 Prime Minister made it clear there was no commitment as to timing in this speech.

My comments and answers to Department’s questions will be forwarded tomorrow.5

Chapin
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/10–755. Secret. Repeated to London, Baghdad, and Ankara.↩
  2. Document 336.↩
  3. Printed here as italics.↩
  4. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 688.00/9–2155)↩
  5. See footnote 6, Document 336.↩