Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

66. Memorandum of Discussion at the 260th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, October 6, 1955, 10 a.m.¹

Washington, October 6, 1955, 10 a.m.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and a report by Sherman Adams concerning the President’s health and plans for future interviews by government officials with the President; and a briefing by the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Lieutenant General C.P. Cabell, concerning significant developments affecting United States security. The portion of Cabell’s briefing covering the Soviet-Egyptian arms deal is printed in volume XIV, p. 553. Vice President Nixon presided at the meeting.]

2. The Situation in the Middle East (NSC 5428;²NSC Action No. 1394–b³)

Mr. Dillon Anderson said that the next agenda item provided an opportunity for any member of the Council to bring before it for discussion items which were not normally placed on the NSC agenda but which were discussed directly between the Council member and the President. He had had no advance notice on such an agenda item but members were free to raise such problems at this point.

At the invitation of the Vice President the Secretary of State said that he wished to discuss the recent arms agreement and the possible agreement on economic assistance entered into between the U.S.S.R. and Egypt. This maneuver had already had strong repercussions. In the first place, the government of Iran has informed us that it is prepared to join the Baghdad Pact if the United States so desires and if the United States will agree to bolster the military and the economic position of Iran. The Iranians wanted an answer to this question in a couple of days.

Secretary Dulles said that he was not inclined to give the Iranians the indications of U.S. support that they wanted. This was so primarily because Secretary Dulles was not sure that we had either the money or the matériel to provide such support. More importantly, however, he was inclined to reject the request because there was genuine concern on the part of the Soviet government as to the direction of future relations between Iran and the Western Powers. Anything which we might now do which seemed to indicate that Iran was to be used as a military base would produce a strong reaction from the Soviet Union. We still have great hopes that the new relationship between the U.S.S.R. and Egypt can be held to a minimum of significance. Such hopes would be abruptly ended if we should urge Iran to join the Baghdad Pact.

A Soviet approach similar to that made to Egypt had now been made to Saudi Arabia. As a direct result of this approach, the Saudi Arabian Ambassador had just come up to see Secretary Dulles with a request for additional U.S. arms to be supplied to his government under the existing reimbursable contract. Secretary Dulles had told the Ambassador that he favored this additional request in principle but could not at this time pass on the details. Secretary Dulles added that he believed it to be of the greatest importance to avoid a situation in which the Saudi Arabians could say that they had tried to buy arms from the U.S. and failing in that effort, had been obliged to turn to the U.S.S.R.

On the occasion of the same visit the Saudi Arabian Ambassador had raised the question of grant aid to Saudi Arabia by the United States. In response, Secretary Dulles had pointed out that the United States had already offered grant aid to Saudi Arabia but that this had been refused because of Saudi Arabia’s unwillingness to fulfill the conditions which Congress had placed on such grant aid. In reply the Ambassador had stated that his government would renew the request for grant aid and would study once again the problem of compliance with the requirements laid down by Congress.

Secretary Dulles pointed out that as a matter of fact, Saudi Arabia was in no need of any kind of economic assistance from the United States. Saudi Arabia had plenty of resources which were expended very foolishly by its government. For that matter, it had plenty of ready money to buy all the armaments which it believed it needed.

Finally, said Secretary Dulles, the government of Iraq which, he pointed out, was the most pro-Western of the Arab States and which was already a member of the Baghdad Pact, had been telling this government that in view of the developments in Egypt, the United States would be well advised to divert to Iraq some of the assistance which it had programmed for Egypt. Moreover, Iraq was arguing that is should be permitted by the United States to interfere in the situation within Syria. Secretary Dulles pointed out that it was a long-cherished ambition of Iraq to absorb Syria. The Iraqis were now informing us that this was a good time to take this step and they were asking us to permit them a free hand to do so.

Secretary Dulles said that he was not disposed to accede to the Iraqi request. While the United States was, of course, concerned about Communist influence in the government of Syria, if Iraq actually moved on Syria it would cause serious trouble throughout the entire Middle East. For example, Israel would be greatly exercised since the absorption of Syria by Iraq would give Iraq a common boundary with Israel. Moreover, if we permitted Iraq to absorb Syria, our entire policy of military assistance to the Middle Eastern states would no longer be defensive as we intended it to be. Finally, Saudi Arabia feels that it has a vested interest in preventing any union between Iraq and Syria. Accordingly, any United States permission to Iraq to move against Syria would gravely affect existing relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia and would have an adverse effect on United States military bases in Saudi Arabia.

For all these reasons Secretary Dulles repeated that he was disposed to give a negative reply to Iraq’s request for a free hand in Syria just as he was disposed to give a negative reply to the request of Iran that the United States approve Iran’s announcement of entry into the Baghdad Pact. On the other hand, he was still disposed to acquiesce in the request of Saudi Arabia so that there could be no possible pretext for Saudi Arabia to seek arms and assistance from the Soviet Union. Secretary Dulles said, however, that he would be glad to have the views of the members of the Council on his proposed decisions.

Secretary Humphrey said that he had talked with the Finance Minister of Iran during his recent visit to Istanbul and believed the Minister to be both capable and reliable. As outlined to him, the financial program for Iran seemed to be well thought-out. On the other hand, Secretary Humphrey felt he should warn that each of these Middle Eastern states watched all the others like a hawk. Every time the United States undertook to provide anything to one country, all the others expected at least as much U.S. assistance. For example, the Iranians realize that we have done a lot to help the Turks. If, therefore, we go on to provide the Turks with the additional assistance of a 300 million dollar loan, we can anticipate repercussions in Iran. Secretary Humphrey concluded by expressing his approval of the decisions on Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia proposed by Secretary Dulles.

Secretary Dulles emphasized to the National Security Council his conviction that the United States must find more money and resources to devote to its objectives in the Middle East than we had figured hitherto. Accordingly, he hoped that Secretary Wilson and the Joint Chiefs of Staff would carefully look over the situation and see where we could “loosen up”.

Referring to Secretary Dulles’ proposed answer to Iran’s request for our attitude on its joining the Baghdad Pact, Secretary Wilson inquired whether in the recent past the United States had not been most anxious to induce Iran to join the Baghdad Pact. Secretary Dulles replied that this was indeed the case and we would be willing to have Iran join the Pact this very day if the Defense Department would come across with the military supplies that the Iranians desire and that the Iranians will probably need to meet the increased danger to Iran which would result from its accession to the Baghdad Pact. Secretary Wilson said that he had yet another point. Admiral Radford had referred a while ago to the advantages which their school building program had conferred on the Communist Party of Indonesia. Would this not suggest that the United States ought to do something additional to strengthen Iran’s internal stability?

Admiral Radford informed the Council that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were very much concerned about the situation throughout the entire Middle East. In addition to the points already covered, he indicated that Pakistan also was eager for additional United States assistance and is at the moment full of recriminations against the United States for failing to supply more aid. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were now faced squarely with the problem of finding additional financing for Pakistan. If we do attempt to find such additional financing, we shall probably have to cut aid programs elsewhere in the world. Admiral Radford offered the opinion that our general aid program to Iran consisted at the moment of about all that the Iranian military forces could effectively absorb. To step up military assistance to the Iranian armed forces would not accomplish very much in a practical way to increase Iran’s military capabilities. The British, Admiral Radford pointed out, were extremely skeptical of Iran’s overall military capabilities and were much more inclined to argue that we should build up Iraq. The Turks, in turn, are also seeking additional United States support in order to build up Turkish forces which could be useful in the defense of the Middle East as a whole.

Secretary Wilson advised that we had best take a very good look at what we can do to increase assistance to the Middle East area as a whole. Apropos of Secretary Wilson’s comment, Governor Stassen asked why it might not be possible to cut the forces level of the ROK Army from 20 divisions to perhaps 14 and to use the saving thus obtained to increase military assistance to the nations of the Middle East. Admiral Radford replied that such a proposal was easier said than done and that the almost certain result would be the loss of South Korea to the West. Governor Stassen replied by stating his understanding that General Taylor had actually recommended a cut in the strength of the ROK Army. He added that he understood furthermore that the Chinese Communists had withdrawn very large numbers of their forces from North Korea and adjacent areas.

General Cabell warned that despite the withdrawal of some Chinese Communist divisions, very strong Chinese Communist forces remained in and near Korea.

Admiral Radford stated that in point of fact the South Koreans, far from wanting to cut their forces, would like to go up to 36 divisions. In our recent negotiations we managed to convince the ROK Government to maintain existing levels of 20 divisions. Admiral Radford added that he personally knew nothing whatever of any recommendations either from General Taylor or from General Lemnitzer to reduce the current number of ROK divisions.

Governor Stassen said that nevertheless he believed that the relative danger to South Korea at the present time was much less than the danger to Iran posed by the Soviet Union. Admiral Radford argued that the reverse was correct and that South Korea was actually in much greater danger than Iran.

Secretary Wilson said that what bothered him was the fact that such large untapped oil reserves existed in the Middle East area; from the point of view of natural resources Korea was no asset to the United States or to the Free World.

[Here follows further discussion of the feasibility of a reduction of South Korean forces.]

Returning to the situation in the Middle East, Secretary Dulles pointed out that in the course of the last two weeks the Soviet Union had in effect opened up a new front in the Middle East. It seemed obvious to Secretary Dulles that we could not fight the Soviet Union on this political front with the existing resources programmed for the Middle East. Accordingly, even though our arms and our military assistance to the Middle Eastern states could not be sufficient to enable these states to halt a Russian invasion, U.S. arms and assistance could have immense political importance in the area.

Admiral Radford agreed with Secretary Dulles that the United States would have to step up the level of its assistance to the nations of the Middle East. He repeated his view that the military assistance program to Iran was satisfactory but admitted that more help was required for Pakistan for example. He referred to his belief that in military qualities the Paks were equal to or better than the Turks. He said that he wished to make the additional point that if hostilities were to break out in the near future between the Israelis and the Arabs, the National Security Council would be obliged to consider what such an event would mean in terms of additional demands on existing U.S. military resources.

With reference to Admiral Radford’s last point, Secretary Dulles stated that he believed it quite possible that the Israelis would launch a preventive war against Egypt. He then referred to the courses of action in the policy paper (NSC 5428) on the Middle East which referred specifically to what the United States would do in the event of hostilities between Israel and the Arab States. He explained that he believed that these particular courses of action were now outmoded and that he did not wish to be bound by their provisions.

The Vice President said that he wished to put a direct question to the Secretary of State. Was his primary reason for saying “no” to the Iranian inquiry about joining the Baghdad Pact based on lack of financial resources to support Iran? Secretary Dulles explained again that financing was not the primary factor. The primary factor was the overall political question; namely, whether United States policy in the Middle East should be directed toward an attempt to insulate the new Soviet-Egyptian relationship or whether United States objectives would be served by seeming to enhance the significance of the Soviet-Egyptian deal by a major counter-move in Iran. The problem is complicated, moreover, by the lack of adequate “policy resources” to carry out this kind of contest with the Soviet Bloc in this part of the world. Secretary Dulles went on to state that he had warned Molotov of the dangers inherent in the Soviet arms deal with Egypt. He did not know as yet what would be the outcome of this warning to Molotov. The Soviets had replied by stating that their deal with Egypt had been a purely commercial transaction with no political overtones. It was barely so, accordingly, [sic] that we might succeed in holding down the Soviet-Egyptian maneuver to the status of a “one shot affair” and that the Soviet-Egyptian deal might actually result in no significant alteration of the balance of power between Israel and the Arab States. However, if we now undertook to tie Iran into a firm military alliance with the Western Powers, if we tried to set up a counter-front in the Middle East, all our hopes of guiding the Soviet-Egyptian transaction would be destroyed.

Seeming to agree with Secretary Dulles, Secretary Humphrey added that of course we could not confine ourselves to aiding Iran alone. If we are prepared to aid Iran, we must be prepared to aid all the other countries of the Middle East.

Secretary Wilson professed to be still much bewildered. Why had we been for so long so eager to get Iran into the Baghdad Pact and now that she was prepared to join, we are opposing the move? Shouldn’t we rather be estimating the minimum cost, by way of U.S. assistance necessary to induce Iran to accept membership in the Baghdad Pact?

In response to Secretary Wilson’s argument, Secretary Dulles again briefly summarized the political issues which counselled against Iran’s accession at this time to the Baghdad Pact. In sum, he said he did not think it wise for the United States to urge Iran to take this move which would amount to casting the die—at least until we can ascertain whether our present pressures on the Soviet Union may not cause the Soviet Union to slow up its campaign to acquire additional influence in the Middle East. Secretary Wilson answered that we should certainly try to keep the negotiations with Iran in the “talking stage” for, after all, it was an important part of our long-range policy in the Middle East to induce Iran to join the Northern Tier Group of States. Secretary Dulles replied that we would certainly not discard the idea of Iran’s joining in the Baghdad Pact. He warned, however, that if we do not now ask Iran to join the Baghdad Pact, another opportunity to do so may not be forthcoming for perhaps six months.

Secretary Wilson subsequently expressed another possibility. Would it be possible to increase the level of U.S. economic assistance to Iran? Would such a move also annoy and worry the Russians? Secretary Dulles doubted that it would. The Soviets were not particularly exercised about our economic aid or even our military assistance to Iran. What worried them was the possibility that Iran would join in a military pact which they regarded as a threat to their own security.

Admiral Radford said that it was his understanding that Iran was on the point of joining the Baghdad Pact whether or not it got further U.S. assurances for military assistance. Secretary Dulles replied that it was perfectly O.K. if the Iranians elected to join the Baghdad Pact on their own but he very much doubted that they would do so in the absence of a further quid pro quo from the United States.

The Vice President asked Secretary Dulles whether the time had now come for a thorough re-examination of U.S. policy in the Middle East. Secretary Dulles agreed that the time for such re-examination had come as did Admiral Radford who pointed out that the British were pushing us very hard to build up the armed forces of the Middle Eastern states. Of course, added Admiral Radford, largely at our expense. Secretary Dulles said that undoubtedly we would have to respond to this appeal and help the Middle Eastern states to build up their armed forces.

Dr. Flemming inquired whether the situation was not one which called for an interim policy paper both on Iran and on the Middle East in general. Mr. Dillon Anderson reminded the Council that something like an interim policy paper was done with respect to Austria last spring. He furthermore informed the Council of his conversation recently with Secretary Dulles⁴ and the latter’s feeling that a revision of NSC 5428 would presumably be in order. Finally, he indicated that the last time the National Security Council had considered the situation in the Middle East, it had decided to leave up to the Secretary of State the determination of the time when it would be appropriate to undertake a review and re-examination of NSC 5428 (NSC Action No. 1394–b). Mr. Anderson summed up by saying that it was his understanding that Secretary Dulles was now indicating that the time had come to review the U.S. policy paper on the Middle East either on an interim or on a broader basis.

Secretary Dulles stated that events were moving so fast in this area that he was finding himself obliged to make decisions and that he would prefer to make these decisions with more guidance than it might be possible to get from the Planning Board and the National Security Council in the time permitted. Over and beyond these urgent considerations, there was every good reason to review our basic policy toward the Middle East at the present time. Secretary Dulles again commented on the specific courses of action which, according to NSC 5428, the United States was supposed to take in the event of hostilities between Israel and the Arab States. As he looked over these courses of action, which ultimately included the possibility of physical intervention, he did not find them very attractive.

Dr. Flemming again expressed the opinion that the situation seemed to call for an interim policy paper having top priority in the Planning Board’s schedule. Admiral Radford added that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would also appreciate having a firmer basis on which to plan for the contingency of Israeli-Egyptian hostilities. Things could happen very fast in this area and the main point was that the United States should be ready to stop the fighting.

Governor Stassen wondered whether a blockade of North African ports might not be an effective course of action. In his opinion, after the Egyptians began to receive Soviet arms, the Egyptians would play a role toward French North Africa very much like that played by the Chinese Communists in supplying weapons to the Viet Minh in Indo-China. Secretary Dulles pointed out to Governor Stassen that the Soviets are alleged to have said that if the Western Powers tried to interfere with the shipment of arms to Egypt, these arms would be sent into Egypt by air.

Referring to the pleas from Iran and Pakistan for additional military assistance from the United States, Secretary Wilson counseled that if, after examination, we find that there are controversies between the United States and these nations, or if we prove to be behind in promised deliveries of arms, we could certainly speed up these deliveries. Most of the arms which we have promised to the Pakistanis and to Iran could be found somewhere and in a hurry if this proved to be necessary. Admiral Radford warned Secretary Wilson that the matter of getting additional arms to Iran and Pakistan might be more complicated than this. He pointed out that these deliveries of arms were slowed up by complicated U.S. administrative procedures as well as by internal politics and arguments within Pakistan itself. He was afraid that this “hassle” had never really been settled despite lengthy conversations. Secretary Wilson replied that, nevertheless, it would be downright foolishness to let such obstacles prevent the delivery of timely American aid to these nations. Secretary Dulles also advised with emphasis that we cut red tape and get the military supplies moving. Secretary Wilson assured Secretary Dulles that he would do his best.

The Vice President warned the Council that this Middle Eastern crisis came at a very unfortunate time. If things go badly for the United States in this area, there will be many who say that our misfortunes result from the lack of leadership. Accordingly, we must think of what the President would want us to do in these circumstances. Secretary Wilson replied that he was at least sure of one thing that the President would want us to do; namely, to carry out all agreements we had made with the nations of the Middle East.

As for the three policy decisions which the Secretary of State was now facing with Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, the Vice President said that there were so many nuances and so many difficulties that it was best to rely on the judgment of the Secretary of State. The Vice President said he also assumed that the National Security Council Planning Board would promptly step up its review of existing U.S. policy in the Middle East and that the Department of Defense would promptly see what it could do to loosen up on additional U.S. assistance to the friendly nations in the Middle East.

Admiral Radford again stressed the fact that from the point of view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Israeli-Arab problem had the highest priority. However, he also agreed again that the government would have to ask Congress for more money for increasing the scale of U.S. assistance to the Middle East. Secretary Wilson added that if Israel should attack Egypt, every effort should be made to secure United Nations intervention. Above all else, we must attempt to stop the outbreak of any such war.

Mr. Dillon Anderson said that he deduced from the discussion thus far that the National Security Council desired the Planning Board to study three matters; first, the general problem of U.S. military assistance worldwide. This subject was already about to be presented to the Council unless it was decided to postpone consideration of it until after the President’s return. Secondly, the Council wished the Planning Board to study the broad aspects of existing U.S. policy toward the Middle East, much of which Mr. Anderson thought remained valid. Thirdly, the Planning Board should study the particular matter of Arab-Israeli tensions. This portion of our general Near East policy, continued Mr. Anderson, was one which appeared particularly hard to implement.

As to the proposed broad review of NSC 5428, Mr. Anderson thought that the Planning Board would find this a very difficult job and one which would consume considerable time. As for the specific study of the Arab-Israeli situation in the contingency of hostilities, would it not be appropriate, asked Mr. Anderson, for the Council simply to agree and note its agreement that this particular portion of the policy set forth in NSC 5428 was invalid?

Secretary Dulles pointed out that the Council was of course in no position to invalidate by its action any portion of Presidentially-approved policy. If the Planning Board found itself unable to prepare, in time, recommendations for U.S. courses of action in the contingency of war between Israel and Egypt, the National Security Council would have to make a finding in an emergency session.

Secretary Humphrey said he wanted to stress to the Council the importance of proceeding promptly to consider the entire broad subject of U.S. military assistance programs worldwide. Some decisions in this field were essential in view of the development of the budget process for Fiscal Year 1957.

Mr. Anderson assured the Council that the Planning Board would do its best to provide recommendations to deal with the Arab-Israeli contingency as well as to get underway a re-examination of the broader subject of U.S. policy in the Middle East as a whole. He then inquired of the Secretary of State whether the latter desired to have the Council concur in the Secretary’s proposed decisions with respect to Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. Secretary Dulles replied that he would be glad to have the concurrence of the National Security Council in his proposed handling of the decision noted in the Record of Actions of the Council.

At the conclusion of the discussion of this item, Secretary Wilson turned to Secretary Dulles and said that if the latter believed that the Defense Department should step up the tempo of the military assistance programs in the Middle East, he, Secretary Wilson, would find means to do so.

The National Security Council:⁵

a. Noted and concurred in actions which the Secretary of State proposed to take in the existing situation with reference to the current U.S. attitude toward provision of military assistance to Saudi Arabia; Iran’s adherence to the Baghdad Pact; and relations between Iraq and Syria.

b. Discussed the current situation in the Middle East in the light of a report by the Secretary of State, in which he observed that recent developments in the area may have made portions of existing U.S. policy invalid and subject to urgent review.

c. Directed the NSC Planning Board to undertake an urgent review of the policy on the Near East contained in NSC 5428, with particular reference to U.S. courses of action in the contingency of hostilities between Israel and the Arab States.

[Here follows item 3, “Study of the Human Effects of Nuclear Weapons Development.”]

S. Everett Gleason

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Gleason on October 7. The time of the meeting is from the President’s Daily Appointment Books.
2. Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. IX, Part 1, p. 525.
3. See footnote 3, Document 55.
4. Not further identified.
5. Paragraphs a–c constitute NSC Action No. 1447, approved by the President on October 19. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Records of Action)