Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

321. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹

Tehran, July 19, 1955—4 p.m.

108. Following presentation of credentials today (Embtel 100),² Shah took me to his private study where we had some forty minutes talk. After exchange of pleasantries, I stated I had personal message of some importance to give him and read from prepared memorandum containing substance Deptels 55³ and 68.⁴

Shah listened without interruption until I had finished and thanked me for the message. While formality of occasion might have restrained any apparent emotional reaction, he did not, however, seem particularly elated, his reaction being that of one who had heard nothing unexpected. He said that five years ago he had attempted to draw attention of US to necessity building up GOI military forces in order that Iran should take its place in northern defense line against Soviet Union. While appreciating the considerable military assistance extended, he implied that to his regret, for reasons of which he was unaware, the US had not seen fit to act fully upon his suggestion. He was, however, gratified at recent interest shown by President Eisenhower and others.

Shah agreed Iran should eventually join in regional security pact, but felt that staff talks should take place well in advance of any Iran political decision to join such pact. He stated that telegram just received from Iranian Ambassador Ankara reported Turks had suggested these talks be held Habaniya August 4. At a later period when acting Foreign Minister Samii joined us Shah instructed latter to reply date was perfectly satisfactory to Shah who felt that sooner these talks took place the better, but that decision as to date in last analysis naturally lay with Iraqi Government.

Shah reiterated frankly what I understand has already been reported to Department on several occasions as regards his willingness to adhere to the Baghdad Pact. He said Iran must have defense forces which were not markedly inferior in equipment or training to those of Turkey and Pakistan, and that even more important a feeling of confidence should have been built up in Iranian Army and people that their armed forces were capable of taking their place in the line as co-equals with other participants. He also said that eventual political decision would depend to an important extent upon whether Iran would be able financially to maintain an army of that size. While statements I had given him covered this contingency in part he was not at all sure that future revenues of Iran would be sufficient to meet greatly expanded military costs. It was important, moreover, that Iran went ahead with its program to expand economy and to raise standard of living since this was not only humanitarian but was the best defense against communism.

Conversation then turned to summit talks and he asked if we had any information which might be of interest to him. He had read extracts of President’s speech⁵ but said he would be grateful for the text, which Embassy will supply. In response to his direct question I said it was my purely personal impression from statements which had been made by President and Secretary of State that we did not necessarily expect any startling concrete results out of summit but hoped that meetings might contribute to development of atmosphere of lessened tension and greater understanding during which constructive work might be achieved by further direct negotiations.

He said he was in no doubt as to reasons behind Soviet invitation to him to visit Moscow and obviously he had digested arguments which under Dept’s instructions Rountree has passed onto Ala (Embtel 20).⁶ He said he of course had had to accept invitation in principle, but he had no intention of making visit in near future. Here also much would depend on forthcoming developments and he again mentioned Habaniya military talks and visit of Turkish President who he said had indicated strong interest in early adherence of Iran to Baghdad pact.

Since this was our first meeting I gathered impression that Shah although cordial was naturally somewhat reserved and did not express his opinions quite as frankly as he might later. I therefore do not feel that I should attempt any evaluation beyond that given above until I have seen more of him.

Chapin

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/7–1955. Secret.
2. Dated July 19, not printed. (Ibid., 123–Chapin, Selden) Chapin was appointed Ambassador on May 31.
3. Supra.
4. See footnote 2, supra.
5. Apparent reference to Eisenhower’s “Opening Statement at the Geneva Conference,” July 18, 1955; for text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1955, pp. 707–712.
6. Document 316. Presumably, however, the reference should be to telegram 54 to Tehran, Document 319.