Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

316. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹

Tehran, July 2, 1955—3 p.m.

20. At meeting last night called at Ala‘s request, Prime Minister told me Soviet Ambassador had recently delivered to Shah letter from Marshal Voroshilov² inviting Shah visit Moscow. Letter had stated situation seemed most appropriate now for such visit in light good effects recent financial and border agreement. Marshal had expressed view friendly, neighborly relations should exist between two countries and to this end he thought Shah and he should seize opportunity discuss subjects of mutual interest including economic matters. Ala stated Shah had replied orally that in principle he accepted invitation but as to timing he would reflect upon matter and would later inform Soviet Ambassador. Written acknowledgment along these lines being drafted by Foreign Office.

Ala said for Shah to have declined invitation would almost certainly have been taken by Soviet Government as deliberate rejection friendly overtures. Shah had no illusions, however, about problems involved in such visit and had asked Ala discuss matter with me and with British Ambassador with request we seek from our respective governments advice and counsel re (a) timing of visit, and (b) topics for discussion and attitudes to be taken. Ala associated invitation with Soviet fear Iran considering formal alliance with West and hope convincing Iran leaders advantages neutrality.

Later same evening I sat with Shah at weightlifting contest between US and Iran teams and he discussed matter at some length. He said that he felt compelled respond favorably to invitation and in fact hoped that something good might come of it if Soviets should by any chance be at all sincere in recent conciliatory attitude. He thought, however, sole purpose of exercise from Soviet viewpoint almost certainly to prevent Iranian adherence to collective security pact. He emphasized he counting heavily upon US for advice as to what would be most propitious time for visit and suggestions as to what attitudes should be taken on various subjects which might arise. I asked what effect this development might have upon timing of Middle East staff talks, to which Shah replied this one question upon which he would appreciate US-UK advice. He said that from his viewpoint he saw no reason why staff talks should not proceed irrespective Soviet invitation. (Shah said he had heard nothing recently from other participants re timing of staff talks. He expressed pleasure that US as well as UK had decided have observer present when talks held.)

In my conversation with Ala he raised question prospective “summit” meeting³ and gave me message which he said Shah wished him convey. (This matter was not raised by Shah in our conversation.) Ala said Iran Government had heard from its Ambassador in Egypt on basis “authoritative information” that Soviets intended bringing up for discussion at Geneva situation Middle East and particularly Iran, presumably with objective creation “neutral belt”. Ala said Iran Government had confidence US would not undertake any negotiations which might be detrimental Iran’s interests. However, Shah and he felt they should state quite frankly to US and UK that Iran would greatly resent any negotiations affecting Iran without Iranian representation. In reply my statement assuring Ala of the validity of his comment that US would not dispose of the rights of other countries, he said “off the record” that while he certain of this, he less sure negotiation policies other participants and felt Iran position this connection should be set forth quite clearly.

I hope Department can instruct me soonest re response which I might give Shah.⁴ Our preliminary reaction with respect some questions involved as follows:

(a) In circumstances it would be unwise endeavor dissuade Shah from going to Moscow, or even to show that we entertain doubts re wisdom his doing so;

(b) On assumption advice upon timing of visit and attitude toward specific issues can best be formulated subsequent to summit conference, it might be well advise Shah not to decide upon date until after that meeting;

(c) One particular factor which US might bear in mind is that, should contemplated staff talks or developments concerning US military aid be sharply disappointing to Shah, period immediately following such disappointment would be most inauspicious for visit;

(d) As of now believe it would be advisable for Shah‘s trip take place after visit Turkish President here, now scheduled for September; and

(e) Shah might well be advised limit role in Moscow so far as possible to that of constitutional monarch.

Rountree

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.11/7–255. Secret. Repeated to London and Moscow.
2. Kliment Yefremovich Voroshilov, Chairman, Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union.
3. Reference is to the meeting of Heads of Government of the United States, United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union, July 18–23, 1955. For documentation, see vol. v, pp. 36 ff.
4. In a memorandum to Dulles, July 5, Jernegan raised the issue of the Shah‘s visit to Moscow and the Shah‘s request for clarification of U.S. military aid to Iran as reported in the letter supra. Jernegan noted that any reply should be coordinated with the British who had also been consulted by the Iranians. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.8811/7–555) For the Department‘s instructions, see Document 319.