319. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran1
54. As it appears Shah has already agreed in principle acceptance invitation visit Moscow, urtel 20,2 we wish to avoid impression in responding to his request for advice that we are trying influence him to change his mind. On other hand approach should not be such as to give Shah justification for saying US encouraged him to go and therefore be held partly responsible for any unfavorable results of visit. You may use following views in discussion with Shah or Ala, pointing out of course it is up to Shah to make decision.
In US view recent spate Soviet invitations to heads of state indicates no fundamental change in Soviet policy but is part calculated peace offensive and attempt divide and weaken free world solidarity. Soviet hope lull fears and win over uncommitted countries or at least convince them to follow course of neutralism. Although USSR has backed up its recent friendly overtures to Iran by such tangible moves as return of gold and agreement for frontier demarcation, it is certainly not Soviet policy to encourage economic and political stability in Iran or to assist it in maintaining its sovereign independence and playing an honorable role in area defense. We agree with Ala’s belief invitation at this time is Soviet attempt discourage or intimidate Shah from adhering to Baghdad Pact.
Several factors argue against haste in formal or public acceptance of invitation or early date for actual visit. Perhaps most cogent these reasons is forthcoming Summit Meeting and necessary subsequent period for assessing and observing effects any decisions reached there. It also our view Iranian public, which is gradually coming to realize good effects firm Iranian policy vis-à-vis USSR and is moving from historic neutralism to recognition advantages casting lot courageously [Page 755] on side of free world, would be confused by Shah’s visiting Moscow at a time when there is considerable discussion as to possibility Iran entering formal alliance with friendly neighboring states. Without considerable careful preparation, public opinion might interpret visit as shift in Shah’s policy of alignment with free world. It might also be injurious to dignity and prestige of Shah if he should appear to reply with alacrity to bidding of country at whose hands Iran has suffered so much in years just past and which has until recently carried on virulent propaganda campaign against Iran, including assistance to subversive elements within country.
In addition Summit Meeting there are several other upcoming events which it would appear Shah would rather have behind him at time Moscow visit, i.e. staff talks with Turkey, Iraq, and Pakistan and visit of Turk President Bayar to Tehran in September. Because Shah has already indicated acceptance in principle to Soviet Ambassador we see no difficulty or embarrassment if he should take his own time in making next move and let Soviets cool their heels until he ready to indicate date he considers convenient. As sovereign ruler independent country he is under no necessity of making excuses or giving reasons for not setting early date.
Department assumes Shah would limit his role in Moscow to that of constitutional monarch.
You should assure Shah US will be glad to discuss with him fully points that might be taken up in Moscow and answers he might give as well as any subjects on which he desires our advice or which may occur to us.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.11/7–255. Secret. Drafted by Baxter; cleared by William A. Crawford, Deputy Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs; and approved by Allen. Repeated to London and Moscow.↩
- Document 316.↩