Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

322. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran¹

Washington, August 5, 1955—5:56 p.m.

226. Urtels 166, 177 and 189.² FYI In view Shah’s obvious desire speed up timetable Moscow visit, Department believes inadvisable counsel further delay. Also there are factors recommending fairly early trip: a) As Shah pointed out, continued uncertainty re his plans may create atmosphere equivocation in Iran which might operate against current political trend toward West, b) In absence overall Middle East defense plans and until complete evaluation Iranian military capabilities (not forthcoming for another year) US not in position answer specifically Shah’s request for greatly expanded military aid. During this difficult but unavoidable interim Shah’s frustrations likely increase. Might be better for him visit Moscow soon while still relatively confident his position rather than next spring when he may be plagued with irritating frustrations, c) Difficult counsel protracted delay when next few months likely see increased number high level visits to and by Soviet leaders.

Would be useful obtain Shah’s ideas on matters of substance Soviets might raise and his anticipated reply which we hope would be non-committal in line his role of constitutional monarch. Has he any indication Soviets might offer economic assistance, suggest non-aggression pact, propose increased trade, or attempt dissuade him from joining Middle East Pact. US interested his views these questions because they have important bearing on US planning re substance and timetable of programs in Iran. Discussion along these lines designed a) assist Shah in formulating his own ideas, and b) modify Shah’s evident belief US has sole responsibility for creating conditions permitting Iran to join Middle East Pact by hinting Shah himself responsible for conducting Iranian affairs in such way as to make it possible for US to assist him. End FYI.

In discussing Moscow trip you may advance following as Department’s views, making clear decision on timing is of course for Shah to make and he in best position weigh all factors.

1. We previously suggested delay until after Summit and FonMin meetings in order be able estimate more accurately Soviet intentions. Early analysis summit talks (Deptel 2 17)³ does not offer reason believe current Soviet friendship maneuvers signify any fundamental change Soviet policies. While October FonMin meeting may produce further grist for analysis we think Shah will be on safe ground if he conducts himself in Moscow on basis foregoing evaluation Soviet position.

2. Shah’s view Summit and FonMin meetings of no concern to him unless Iran directly discussed overlooks value these meetings as test Soviet intentions which makes them important for whole world and certainly pertinent to Shah’s problem of deciding how react to Soviet overtures.

3. Department recognizes validity Shah’s point that delay and continuing public uncertainty regarding Moscow trip may cause Iranian speculation visit will be followed by changes in GOI policies. Fact that invitation and Shah’s acceptance now public knowledge does cast shadow over Iran’s policies which might well be removed by early visit.

4. Shah may consider desirable postpone trip until Tehran visit Turkish President. In view Turkey’s dual position in NATO and new Middle East pact and view its long successful experience dealing with Russians Shah may wish profit from Turkish views on present Soviet posture. Visit of Turkish President before Shah’s Moscow visit might also have effect restraining public speculation as to possible shift Iranian foreign policy.

5. Hope Shah will continue keep Embassy informed his plans and if he later desires discuss subjects for conversation in Moscow, Department glad offer assistance possible.

6. In event Shah again requests specific data re US increased military aid (urtel 164)⁴ he should be informed matter under active consideration Washington. He should be given no further specific assurances at this time nor be encouraged connect your previous assurances of military assistance with ARMISH MAAG submittal May 26.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.00/8–555. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Hannah and Baxter. Repeated to London and Moscow.;
2. In these telegrams, dated July 31, August 2, and August 4, respectively, the Embassy reported that the Shah was contemplating visiting the Soviet Union in the near future. (Ibid., 788.00/7–3155, 788.00/8–255, and 123–Chapin, Selden)
3. Dated August 4, not printed. (Ibid., 396.1/8–455)
4. Dated July 30, not printed. (Ibid., 788.5–MSP/7–3055)