Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

318. Memorandum From the Officer in Charge of Iranian Affairs (Hannah) to the Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Baxter)¹

Washington, July 6, 1955.

SUBJECT

• Problem of Military Assistance to Iran

REFERENCE

• Revised OCB Outline Plan of Operations and New Progress report²

It is suggested that at your meeting with Deputy Under Secretary Murphy this morning³ you may wish to discuss the following matter which is closely related to the problems contained in the OCB documents on the agenda for this afternoon.

While not mentioned in the OCB documents themselves, Secretary Dulles in a June 27 letter to Secretary Wilson⁴ proposed the allocation of about $50 million for military aid to Iran during fiscal years 1956 and 1957. This would continue aid at approximately the level of 1950–1954; i.e., $20 million a year. [1½ lines of source text not declassified] The basis for the proposal is that political factors, such as the timing of Iranian entry into a Middle East defense arrangement, the support of the Shah’s internal position in Iran and the necessity for avoiding the growth of doubt in Iran concerning American intentions all justify a new allocation of funds for military assistance. It was also suggested in Secretary Dulles’ letter that a decision be made on this proposal in timing [time] to enable Ambassador Chapin to offer the Shah some assurances of continued American military assistance at the time that the Ambassador has his first meeting with His Majesty.

Although no reply has yet been received, present indications are that Defense will not agree, on the ground that deliveries of previously programmed matériel can be maintained at approximately the $20 million annual level throughout 1956 and 1957 with not more than $6 million of additional funds. While this may be true, it appears to be a dangerous assumption on which to base our policy. If there is as much as a three year lag between allocation and delivery, then once the pipeline is empty it may take another three years to start it flowing again. There is the danger, therefore, that American military assistance to Iran would begin to fall off just at the time when it is hoped that Iran will begin to participate in a Middle East defense arrangement.

This problem has been given an additional degree of urgency by the fact that Soviet Union has now formally (though secretly) invited the Shah to make a State visit to Moscow (Tehran’s telegram No. 20, July 2).⁵ The Shah has already accepted the invitation in principle but has requested the advice of the US and UK regarding timing and topics for discussion. Since it appears that it would not be practical to advise the Shah to refuse the invitation outright, we are in the position of having to give him specific advice on timing. We, of course, would prefer to delay the visit as long as possible. However, if we are not in a position to give the Shah some definite advice as to timing Iran’s entry into a Middle East defense arrangement and on American intentions regarding military assistance, then it will be very difficult to advise him to delay his visit to the Soviet Union. It appears likely, therefore, that the Shah may regard this Soviet invitation as a tool to be used in smoking out American intentions.

For these reasons it appears all the more urgent that high policy decisions be made in the near future regarding Middle East defense, the Iranian role in that defense and regarding American military assistance to Iran.

1. Source: Department of State, GTI Files: Lot 58 D 338, OCB 1955. Top Secret.
2. See footnote 2, supra.
3. No record of this meeting has been found.
4. Document 314.
5. Document 316.