Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

314. Letter From the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)¹

Washington , June 27, 1955 .

Dear Mr. Secretary: Recent developments bearing on Iran’s possible affiliation with a northern tier Middle East defense arrangement impel me to request that urgent consideration be given to increasing military assistance to Iran.

With hopes that Pakistan may soon accede to the now–functioning Turco–Iraqi Pact, note should be taken of recent evidence indicating that Iran is beginning to move in the direction of affiliation. The Shah has continued to reiterate that he intends that Iran will join. As you know, he recently took the initiative in arranging military staff talks with Turkey, Iraq and Pakistan. The United States and the United Kingdom will be represented by observers at these talks which will take place in the near future.² At the same time, there are also signs that other important political elements in Iran are moving toward acceptance of the Middle East defense idea.

On the other hand, the Shah continues to maintain that before joining he must have some assurance that Iran will be able to play an effective part in Middle East defense and will not be simply the weak link in a chain. Thus, he has frequently expressed his desire for clear evidence that the United States will assist in building up his armed forces in order that they may make a real contribution. Politically, the time has now come when we must give a positive response in order to prevent the growth of doubt concerning the firmness of our intentions.

I realize that it is not possible at this time to make a definitive estimate of the specific role that Iran would play in a northern tier defense system, or of the forces it would be expected to contribute. However, for the purpose of my proposal, it is not necessary that we pre–judge the final decision regarding Iran’s place in Middle East defense. This decision must await the completion of efforts to evaluate the Iranian armed forces and the development of a Middle East strategy. Meanwhile, for political reasons, it appears imperative that a start be made in the very near future. Enough has been learned since our exchange of letters of October 8³ and November 8 last year, to indicate that we do want Iran to join in a Middle East defense arrangement and that there must be an increased military program in that country if Iran is to play any part at all in area defense.

Some clear and positive action taken at this time will also have the important effect of strengthening the hand of the Shah in his efforts to provide firm leadership and strong direction in Iranian internal affairs. The support of the United States has a direct bearing on the strength of his internal position.

Therefore, I believe that political considerations not only justify but strongly demand that we take action immediately to expand the MDAP program. Hence, I recommend that urgent consideration be given to the approval of the following steps:

1) that a program of about $50,000,000 be authorized for military assistance to Iran, this money to be expended at the rate of about $25,000,000 per year during Fiscal Years 1956 and 1957. The expansion must be of sufficient size to produce the desired political impact on Iran. It is our estimate that a program roughly of this magnitude would be necessary to achieve this desired impact. The Department of State, of course, does not advocate any particular kind of military program and would leave to Defense the question of how these funds might best be used.

2) that the new Ambassador to Iran, the Honorable Selden Chapin, be authorized to take the following position at his first meeting with the Shah:

a) that it is too early to define in exact terms Iran’s future role in Middle East defense, or exactly what contribution it will be expected to make or how much assistance it will be necessary for us to give;

b) but that without committing ourselves to any specific future program (which would depend on many contingent factors) we are prepared to expand our program in Iran and have therefore planned to provide the following additional military assistance during the next two years. (Here the Ambassador would give an indication of the character and types of assistance to be given, omitting reference to the amount of money involved.);

c) that we believe this aid will greatly benefit the Iranian armed forces and thereby make it feasible for Iran to accede to a Middle East defense arrangement at an early date.

Finally, it is particularly desirable that a favorable decision be made prior to the arrival in Iran of Ambassador Chapin, early in July. Given the Shah’s concern over this problem, it is clear that he will expect the new Ambassador to bring with him some definite indication of American intentions. The political advantages of being able to give the Shah such assurances immediately upon Ambassador Chapin’s arrival would be considerable. It would also be a propitious moment to encourage the Shah to make an early decision on affiliation with a defense arrangement.

For the foregoing reasons, I would appreciate it if the Department of Defense would give urgent consideration to the approval of the increased military assistance program suggested.

Sincerely yours,

John Foster Dulles ⁴

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/6–2755. Top Secret. Drafted by Hannah and Dixon on June 25.
2. See Documents 6 ff.
3. Reference is to a letter from Wilson to Dulles, October 8, 1954, enclosing JCS comments on a plan for reorganization and expansion of the Iranian Army; see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, p. 1063, footnote 2.
4. Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.