Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

100. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 5, 1990, 3:40–5:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• START

PARTICIPANTS

• Bartholomew
• Burt
• Kanter
• Timbie (notetaker)
• Arensburger (interpreter)
• Akhromeyev
• Nazarkin
• Peresypkin
• Koltunov
• Masterkov
• Popov (interpreter)

Bartholomew: We also have our transcript of the discussion in Moscow. It includes the reading into the Baker-Shevardnadze record of the agreed elements of common ground on ALCMs by Mr. Kanter. After that your Minister took a short break to consult with your delegation. He returned to say “He believed we could say that the entire package had been agreed with the exception of range.”

Akhromeyev: I have the record of the same sentence. “Yes in principle we reached agreement on the other questions. Only one question remains, the range.” We agreed on all in principle. However we do have differences. (Referring to the Soviet position paper on ALCMs that he had provided the previous evening) We have yet to settle whether the maximum for Soviet ALCM heavy bombers should be 12 or 16, whether 20 applies to future Soviet bombers, the floating levels, etc. We should report them to ministers.

Bartholomew: Paragraph 1 (of the Soviet paper) concerns ALCM range. We disagree on 600 km range. We agree that there we disagree. But in paragraph 2 the number 12 was agreed in Moscow, and should remain. Akhromeyev: Is that your final say?

Bartholomew: This was resolved in Moscow. It is difficult for us to see a compelling argument to reopen this. If we start to reopen agreed issues, instead of knitting together this agreement we will unravel it. Akhromeyev: OK. Then we are agreed on 10 and 20 for future Soviet bombers, and 8 and 12 for current Soviet bombers, and 40% more bombers for the USSR.

Bartholomew: Let us be clear we are not working out a text here, we are agreeing to elements that are recorded in the ALCM elements of common ground. Akhromeyev: Right, we are agreeing on numbers, not language.

Bartholomew: As for your paragraph 3, this is contrary to the Moscow agreed elements of common ground, which state that future ALCM heavy bombers will be attributed 10 ALCMs and can be equipped for no more than 20. Akhromeyev: We disagreed in Moscow and still disagree.

Bartholomew: As for paragraph 4, the question in Moscow was this: Whatever number of ALCM heavy bombers the US had, the USSR could have up to 40% more. There would be no ceiling on the number of US ALCM heavy bombers. We could set that level according to our own force plan within the overall limits with no subceiling. That is what Baker was clarifying in his statement to Shevardnadze, and he was also reasserting the long-standing American rejection of any such subceiling on ALCM heavy bombers. Akhromeyev: That is the way he put it.

Bartholomew: You say you did not say yes or no. I say this was one issue which we discussed and then said everything was agreed except for range. Now you say on further study you say you want a ceiling on ALCM heavy bombers. Our answer has to be what is has always been—no. Such a limit would not be a contribution to stability.

Akhromeyev: Let me be honest. In Moscow we addressed two questions. The first question raised by Secretary Baker was that the US did not want limit X on ALCM heavy bombers. He said the US could have a floating level. We agreed to floating levels on ALCM heavy bombers. Then he raised another question—the floating level should not have a ceiling. The US should decide how many heavy bombers should be equipped with ALCMs. We did not say yes or no. This is purely a military question, Shevardnadze did not intervene. We did not answer this point. On further study we give you an answer. We cannot agree that the number of ALCM heavy bombers is a unilateral decision. There must be a limit. We propose 90–115. If you don’t like this figure, say what level suits you.

Bartholomew: It is not a question of level, it is a question of the concept itself. We have long rejected a subceiling on ALCM heavy bombers. This continues to be our position. We are disappointed to see such a major issue coming back to the table.

Akhromeyev: I understand, but there are two of us in these discussions. This is our position on this subject. We’ll have to agree on points of disagreement, they cannot be resolved unilaterally.

Bartholomew: I must begin by telling you paragraph 5 is particularly disappointing because we made a real effort to meet your concerns. What we proposed and believed was agreed and to our mutual benefit was distinguishability not on the basis of your paragraph 5 but on the basis of external differences observable by NTM and differences visible to on-site inspection. In other words, the US took a major step to meet the Soviets on on-site inspection to solve this. And indeed to support this we proposed and believed it was agreed to an exchange of information and exhibitions to confirm the information and distinguishing features. Based on that we said non-nuclear ALCMs not distinguishable by the differences we proposed would be permitted but treated as nuclear. In other words, if they were not distinguishable, if they did not have differences observable to NTM and to on-site inspection, they would count as nuclear whatever they were. Finally, and this was an important step for us, we proposed and believed it was agreed that there would be access to designated storage areas at bases for non-ALCM heavy bombers and bases for converted heavy bombers to enable confirmation that any ALCMs at those bases are in fact non-nuclear. We made an offer for access to the most sensitive areas of important bases. So we cannot accept this notion of functionally defined distinctions. We think our proposal in Moscow solved the problem on a basis acceptable to both.

Bartholomew: I must ask you a question. What does the last phrase of paragraph 5 mean (and with regard to effective verification of the aggregate level of warheads on ALCMs)?

Akhromeyev: I will explain it. This is a reference to the verification process to find out the exact number of nuclear-armed long-range ALCMs on each side. Both sides would exceed the limit. Burt: Are you talking about a limit on the inventory of ALCMs? Akhromeyev: This is verification, not a limit. Each party has the right to know the number on each side. Burt: Is this a non-deployed ALCM limit?

Akhromeyev: This is not a limit. Both sides will exceed the 6000 limit. Suppose the Soviet Union exceeds by 200. You would have the right to verify the number. We should have that right to verify the actual number of US ALCMs. As for what you have said on distinguishability, we will study your language overnight.

Bartholomew: This concept of verifying the number of ALCMs is a totally new and totally unacceptable idea.

Akhromeyev: I would like your language on distinguishability. Bartholomew: It is in the Moscow agreed elements of common ground. Akhromeyev: We will look at it tonight and reply tomorrow.

Bartholomew: Paragraph 6 also directly contradicts the Moscow elements of common ground. Akhromeyev: This is unacceptable to you. We understand.

Akhromeyev: Permit me to answer the questions you raised on SLCMs. Let me work from the position paper I gave you last night. The first paragraph is about a politically-binding statement on SLCMs. There is no disagreement on this point. The second concerns each side making annual statements on the planned stocks of long-range SLCMs, with the maximum number specified for each of the next five years.

Bartholomew (holding up the text² of the Moscow bracketed draft SLCM declaration): This is the document in english that was agreed in Moscow except for the brackets. It is the basis for the statement by our two ministers that SLCMs “would be dealt with by parallel, politically-binding declarations for the duration of the START Treaty.” Akhromeyev: There is agreement on this.

Bartholomew: We are talking about nuclear missiles. Akhromeyev: Yes, nuclear-armed SLCMs. Bartholomew: As you see in the Moscow text, we are prepared to say “will not exceed” but “maximum” is not appropriate to a political document. Akhromeyev: This is not treaty language. In principle we have agreement.

Akhromeyev: Moving to paragraph 4, agreed in the negotiating record would be the total number of long-range SLCMs and the number on each type of warship. Our ministers talked about this in Moscow and we believed we reached agreement. As long as the sides are aware of the types of warships that carry SLCMs, and the numbers on each type, the sides would have the ability to monitor numbers of SLCMs.

Bartholomew: This point introduces the idea of an agreed limit on the number of SLCMs overall and the number for each ship type. We cannot accept this, and this is contrary to what we did in Moscow and the Moscow joint statement. Burt: I don’t understand the reference to agreement in the negotiating record. It was clearly stated on your side that the understanding on SLCMs would be separate from START. Akhromeyev: We are talking about the context of a separate paper.

Bartholomew (holding up the bracketed text of a draft SLCM declaration): What is this that ministers addressed in Moscow? An Under Secretary of State and a Deputy Foreign Minister and two Ambassadors worked this paper. We regarded it as agreed except for brackets. What were we doing?

Nazarkin: What Akhromeyev is saying is consistent with the Moscow common elements. Bartholomew: There is no mention here of limits on numbers or by type of ship. That is inconsistent with the very nature of this document.

Narzarkin: It is right that the Moscow document does not mention numbers or levels. We did not reach agreement on the issues that determine those levels—whether nuclear-armed missiles or all SLCMs, and the range threshold. Akhromeyev: The US is against any total level on SLCMs for the US or the USSR.

Bartholomew: The US position is that we are prepared to abide by the agreement in the Moscow joint statement—parallel politically-binding declarations. We cannot accept numerical limits on the total number or the number per ship type. This is excluded by the paper we worked in Moscow and by the joint statement.

Akhromeyev: I would like a clear-cut answer. Is the US against including in the deal the exact level of SLCMs for each side? Burt: We are willing to state that the number of SLCMs deployed will not exceed a given number. We are prepared to give you this declaration every year.

Akhromeyev: The question is would the level be recorded in the negotiating record? Burt: This would be a separate declaration, not in the negotiating record. Bartholomew: Each year we will give you this paper with these numbers.

Akhromeyev: I understand. These levels will not be exceeded. You will not tell us the exact number, but will not exceed these levels. The question is whether the two sides will reach agreement on a certain equitable level.

Burt: The idea is not for the two sides to reach agreement on a level. The idea is for the two sides to express that the number of SLCMs deployed will not exceed a certain number. For example, suppose the US plans for the year beginning 1991 to deploy X SLCMs. We could say in our statement that our planned deployment of SLCMs will not exceed X. Suppose the USSR decides to deploy Y. You could state that your planned deployment would not exceed Y. We would make these statements for the period five years ahead, and they would be politically binding.

Akhromeyev: I am in no way questioning the agreement in Moscow, or the principle on which it was based. But we should reach agreement on a certain maximum level that would not be recorded in this document. This maximum level would extend for the duration of the START treaty.

Nazarkin: Such a commitment would not be part of the treaty. It would not require ratification, and not be a part of the statement. It could be a common understanding in the negotiating record. In the past this did not come up, we didn’t have enough criteria to address this issue. Now we are close to agreement and should start to think about such an understanding.

Burt: Agreeing on any limit assumes we can verify that limit. That is the whole concept behind the declaration approach. Bartholomew: Moreover, an agreed number between the two of us would convert this from a politically-binding declaration into a legally-binding deal that in our system we would have to send to the Hill. We cannot do that because of the problem of verification that Amb. Burt identified.

Burt: Let us take another look at the work done in Moscow. This is a sophisticated political document. It takes into account the verification problem. It assures that neither side will undermine or circumvent because of the declarations they will make on deployment plans.

Akhromeyev: We have a cardinal difference here. It has nothing to do with this document. I accept this document from the first line to the last line. The difference of opinions is in a different area. We will sign a treaty on reducing strategic arms. This document lies beside it. The purpose of it is to put a certain limit on strategic offensive arms. I refuse to understand how we can sign a document that does not limit SLCMs. Shevardnadze shares my thinking. This is a cardinal difference in our attitudes, we should report this to ministers. In form, we agree to the language. This question did not come up in the past because we did not have a common understanding of the definition of long-range SLCM. Until we agree that a long-range SLCM is a SLCM over 600 km, and you persist in saying 300 km, we are confronted with a situation where it is fruitless to agree on numbers. We do not yet have a common understanding on what a long-range SLCM is.

Bartholomew: That is why we put brackets in the draft text. We did not agree on range in Moscow. Akhromeyev: I agree we disagree. Now we are agreed that we are addressing only nuclear SLCMs under certain conditions. There is also the range threshold. In the past it was useless to talk about numbers. These are rather big differences. I believe our ministers should hear from us.

Bartholomew: Let us sum up. Our negative view on paragraph 4 is also our view on 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10. There were two and only two SLCM issues after Moscow. One, whether only nuclear SLCMs are included or nuclear and conventional, and two, whether 300 km and up are included or 600 km and up. Now you are saying yes to nuclear if we say yes to 600. Akhromeyev: Da.

Bartholomew: I cannot say yes. Independent of the issues of nuclear and range, we believe any numerical limits such as proposed in paragraphs 4 and 6 of your paper were excluded by the agreement in Moscow. The US cannot agree in any case. This is our position of paragraphs 4, 5, and 6.

Akhromeyev: You are very clear. This is the most important difference today. The US and the Soviet Union have different opinions on whether to set up a level for SLCMs on both sides. The US believes it is not necessary. We always considered such a level should be set. It could be in the negotiating record or some other mutually binding document. Whatever the way, it should be recorded and established. It is most difficult to resolve this problem.

Burt: If we adopt the politically-binding declarations approach, and state levels in the declaration, we would not exceed those levels. Akhromeyev: But before that we should agree on those levels. The text of the 1987 summit joint statement says “the sides committed themselves to establish ceilings on such missiles, and to seek mutually acceptable and effective methods of verification of such limitations.”

Burt: By thinking about this in a sophisticated way, we made progress in Moscow. That approach would solve your problem and our problem. Akhromeyev: I was not involved in Moscow. I would have raised this issue.

Bartholomew: Two governments met, they worked, they produced a bracketed text, they reached conclusions, they agreed on a joint statement. Akhromeyev: That is true. I support the statement language 100%.

Nazarkin: The question of levels has always been discussed in the negotiations. In Moscow the question of ceilings was not included because we did not agree on two negotiating criteria—range threshold and nuclear versus non-nuclear. At that point it was fruitless to discuss levels because we did not agree on what comprises a SLCM. Let me emphasize again we are not talking about including this as part of the Treaty or a Protocol, we want a common understanding.

Akhromeyev: I have not participated in Geneva, but for 20 years I have written directives to the teams in Geneva. In all the directives I wrote, and in all the directives Geneva received, the question of determining the level of SLCMs was present at all times. We should report this difference to our ministers.

Bartholomew: I must assume the most authoritative statement is the statement of the Soviet Foreign Minister in conjunction with my Secretary of State.

Bartholomew: As for the other paragraphs in your paper—7, 8, 9, and particularly disappointed at 10—let me say I believe that what we did in Moscow on SLCMs was a good outcome for both sides. We do not seek unilateral advantage, we want to build stability for 15 years and more. If one side were to secure unilateral advantage through this treaty, it would be worse than if we never tried to build what we are building. This text meets the concern you are speaking of. It creates transparency, stability, and predictability through politically-binding limits. Let me ask you to look again at this in the light of what I have said, one can always have second thoughts. This is a good approach for both of us. We are seven weeks from the summit. We need to have a process, and not do anything that puts the process in question. We need to solve new issues rather than come back to questions that have been agreed. This Moscow text is a good solution.

Akhromeyev: You expressed regret over point 10. I must tell you in point 10 we have the words of Gorbachev. He has mentioned this to Shultz and to Baker. I recall the struggle with Nitze over the points in the statement at the summit. I don’t know how Shevardnadze will modify my position. The cornerstone of the position taken by the Soviet government is that there should be established on SLCMs a level on both sides. Compromises are necessary. They could be made in verification, in other fields. But to refuse to establish a level on SLCMs would be giving away a position of my government. No one would understand.

Bartholomew: This document establishes a politically-binding limit on the level on both sides. If you don’t understand it establishes a politically-binding limit, I don’t know what I can do.

Akhromeyev: In your approach each side establishes its own limit by itself. This does not lead to any limit on SLCMs. The SLCM problem can only be solved when each side agrees to equal limits.

Bartholomew: You have wanted a SLCM limit for a long time. We resisted any limit on SLCMs. This is a reasonable outcome. It isn’t what you want, or what we want. It is a politically-binding limit. It is not what you want, but goes farther than we want. You must recognize that this is a negotiation, neither of us is going to get 100% of anything. With what we did in Moscow, you can say you got your object, and we can say we got ours.

Akhromeyev: Our difference on this question is so important we should take it to Moscow and report to the top leadership. I will report to our government and seek instructions. We will then have to undertake certain moves.

1. Source: Department of State, Office of the Under Secretary for Arms Control, International Security Affairs, Lot 01D127, 1969–1990 Subject Record of James P. Timbie, START Meetings (Bartholomew) April 1990. Drafted on April 11. The meeting took place in the T Conference Room.
2. The draft statement on SLCMs is in Department of State, Office of the Under Secretary for Arms Control, International Security Affairs, Lot 01D127, 1969–1990 Subject Record of James P. Timbie, START Meetings (Bartholomew) April 1990.