93. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Zoellick) to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Ross)1
START Contingencies
Dennis:
The last paragraph of Don Oberdorfer’s story today2 cites a Soviet Foreign Ministry official’s remark (presumably made after arrival in Washington) that the Soviets would prefer to deal with MIRVed mobiles in follow-on negotiations. It’s not certain that this foreshadows what Shevy will tell Baker later today—but it’s likely.
We should consider where a polite “no, thank you” would leave us on some of START’s big ticket issues—heavies and mobile ICBM sublimits. Without a resolution (or even a U.S. proposal) at this Ministerial, we would not return to these issues until the May meeting, the same meeting we’d want to introduce and perhaps hope to complete a joint statement of goals for the follow-on negotiations. But there will be reluctance around town to decide on START II goals until such question as heavies are settled for START I.
In addition to the time bind this could put us in, we could find that, unless we move quickly to make negotiable proposals on heavies and mobile sublimits, the Pentagon will use the opportunity between now and May to push for tough limits on those systems (on the grounds that we shouldn’t “side step” any more now that the Soviets have turned us down).
All this suggests that, if Shevy does indeed turn us down today on MIRVed mobiles, the Secretary should immediately seek authority to make proposals this week on heavies and mobile sublimits. The Soviets might not be able to accept them at this Ministerial; but at least the issues would be resolved in May. Otherwise, we could have a June cliffhanger. (As we’ve repeatedly discussed, if the Soviets do show interest in our Namibia initiative, we’ll also need supplementary guidance this week—on singles, silo MIRVs, and heavies.)
What proposals should the Secretary seek authority to make in the event the Soviets reject our MIRVed mobile ban?
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- Reaffirm 154 ceiling on heavies; relax ban on heavy ICBM production and testing in favor of looser constraints (quota of 3 flights per year, production cutoff by 1992, and ceilings on launchweight/throwweight of heavies set at levels of the mod 5);
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- Propose ceiling of 1000 warheads on mobile ICBMs (including MIRVs and singles);
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- (Optional, although I still like it, especially if de-MIRVing gets pushed to START II agenda) Replace 3300 limit with 2100 ceiling on silo-based MIRVs (would accommodate Soviet plans while putting a Bush marker down on future de-MIRVing);
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- Propose that two sides agree in June joint statement on follow-on talks: (a) to eliminate heavy ICBMs over an agreed period and (b) to pursue the goal of reducing and eventually eliminating land-based MIRVed ICBMs. (By the way, Namibia guidance says that, if Soviets can’t do MIRVed mobile ban now, we should ask them to commit to it in START II. But why should they ban them after spending a few billion more rubles? That’s why we should generalize the goal as in above formulation.)
[illegible in the original]
- Source: Department of State, Policy Planning Staff, Lot 03D102, Dennis Ross Files, US-Moscow Ministerial 1990. Secret. Zoellick wrote in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum: “DR—Let me know if you want me to do some contingency drafting. Also, you can reach me tonight, after your 1-on-1. Bob.”↩
- Reference is to Don Oberdorfer, “Shevardnadze Backs ‘Honest Dialogue’ to Solve Lithuania Crisis,” Washington Post, April 4, 1990, p. A33.↩