Office of the Historian

92. Memorandum From the Head of the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks and Chief (Burt) to Secretary of State Baker1

Washington, April 2, 1990

SUBJECT

  • Re: Nazarkin’s Preview on START

Following our meeting yesterday afternoon,2 Nazarkin called me to say that he had just arrived from Moscow. Shevardnadze had dispatched him to Washington early to preview Soviet concerns and thinking about the Ministerial.

Nazarkin’s main general point was that Shevardnadze wants to do a lot of START business at the Ministerial. The Soviet side, from Shevardnadze down to technical experts, will be geared up to engage on a range of issues. According to Nazarkin, these include the following:

•
ALCMs—Nazarkin said this is “item #1” and the Soviets really want to solve it this week. Nazarkin thinks that if we accept 600 km range, then the way will be cleared for resolution of all other ALCM-related issues, including conventional bombers and future ALCM attribution. But Nazarkin’s key message was that if we can’t solve ALCMs at this meeting, real problems would emerge. This is a “critical moment” for the START treaty, he said, and, in the absence of an ALCM deal, the Soviet military could try to walk back not only the ALCM deal but also other elements of the START package.
Nazarkin stressed that this was not a threat but rather a reflection of the Soviet military’s anxiety over parts of the START treaty. I was non-committal, but emphasized that you thought you went the extra mile in Moscow by going from 1500 km down to 800 km, I said that if Shevardnadze felt ALCM range was as important as Nazarkin was indicating, then Shevardnadze should raise it directly with you at the Wednesday3 night one-on-one.4
•
SLCMs—The Soviets also are prepared to close out the SLCM issue at this Ministerial. Shevardnadze apparently will bring a new SLCM proposal with him. Nazarkin declined to preview the proposal but said that it was “not very simple”. I infer from Nazarkin’s comments [Page 551] that Shevardnadze is not thinking along the lines of a trade-off of range for nuclear-conventional.5
•
Future Negotiations—Nazarkin said Shevardnadze wants to agree on a statement on START II at this meeting. However, Nazarkin said that speaking personally he hoped we would have a draft statement to propose because the Soviet statement was “empty” and “not very good”. He said he still hoped to persuade Shevardnadze not to table it.6

Those were Nazarkin’s main messages. But he also said that Shevardnadze would propose ideas on other START issues:

•
Verification of road mobile missiles—He said the Shevardnadze would have new ideas on this tricky technical issue.
•
Perimeter portal monitoring—The Soviets will be ready to work this question, but he emphasized that the Soviets want reciprocity in any deal.
•
Noncircumvention—Nazarkin said they will be ready to reach agreement on this, as well as the related subject of third country basing.
•
Backfire—Interestingly, the Soviets want to solve the Backfire question sooner rather than later. He said their preferred course was to put it in CFE but he seemed to hint that if this approach was not good enough then they might be prepared to do something in START.

Finally, Nazarkin said Shevardnadze was bringing along some technical experts and that they would be ready to meet with our experts on the issues of R & D boosters, suspect site inspections, throw-weight, and phasing of reductions.

Nazarkin stressed that Shevardnadze wants to get START finished, as quickly as possible. Along these lines, I asked him if Shevardnadze would be attracted to the idea of assigning the Geneva delegations a list of issues to resolve by the next Ministerial. Nazarkin reacted very enthusiastically and said he thought his boss would love the idea.

  1. Source: Department of State, Policy Planning Staff, Lot 03D102, Dennis Ross Files, US/Soviet Ministerial April 4–6, 1990. Secret. Sent through Bartholomew, who did not initial the memorandum. Zoellick wrote in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum: “DR—worth reading. Bob.”↩
  2. Not further identified.↩
  3. April 4.↩
  4. An unknown hand drew a bracket to the right of this sentence.↩
  5. Zoellick wrote in the left hand margin beside this point: “DR—This could be tricky. May reflect Soviet unease with Moscow outcome.”↩
  6. Zoellick wrote in the left-hand margin beside this point: “Apparently, their draft avoids specific categories.”↩