89. Telegram From Secretary of State Baker’s Delegation to the Department of State and the White House1
SUBJECT
- My Meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
I met with Eduard Shevardnadze for three and one-half hours tonight. Once again, we had a wide-ranging and rather extraordinary discussion. In addition to discussing the summit dates and the dates [Page 543] for our May ministerial, we covered START, Germany, Lithuania and internal developments in the Soviet Union, Africa, and Afghanistan.
I can’t say that we resolved anything, but the character of our discussion is another reminder of the changed nature of our relationship. Let me briefly run through each topic.
Summit Dates
I gave him our proposed dates—either June 18–22 or the earlier time of June 11–15. I also outlined your preferred scenarios for time in Washington and at Kennebunkport. He responded that in principle they would accept the scenarios, but they needed to come earlier in this month. The June 11–15 dates conflicted with the first ever Congress of the Russia Federated Republic’s Communist Party. This was a very important political event for Gorbachev and he couldn’t miss it or alter the date. Pushing the summit date later would interfere with the big Party Congress that was so critical to Gorbachev’s success. He said again that it was essential that the summit come before the Party Congress—implying that a successful summit would boost Gorbachev going into the Russian and the Union-wide Party Congress.
Shevardnadze said that he and Gorbachev had gone over dates carefully, and the only times that worked were in the first week in June, specifically the June 4–8 timeframe. He was afraid no other time would work, and hoped we would be understanding given their “complex” internal situation and their “upcoming big events.”
I told him those dates coincided with a state visit to Washington of the Amir of Bahrain and the spring NAC ministerial. I said I would talk it over with you and see what we could arrange to meet their needs.
START
On START, Shevardnadze said he thought we would be able to resolve all the major issues by the June summit. He then ran through several issues, he would like to settle quickly: ALCMs, SLCMs, the non-circumvention clause, and duration of the treaty. Of these, the only one where he felt there was a problem was ALCMs, where he said they have no fall-back on the 600 km range.
I told him if that was the case, then our two presidents would have to resolve this one because I had no further room to move on range. He responded by saying our presidents’ time was too valuable to spend on a technical issue like this and we would have to resolve it. We will see if or when they move on this; I suspect it may be the last thing agreed to because Gorbachev clearly has to overrule Akhromeyev.
I then raised our START proposal, making clear that I was not seeking an answer now, why I thought it had merit, and above all else, [Page 544] how no idea should in any way impede our completion of the START treaty. I said I hoped he would give us a response when he comes to Washington in two weeks.
He told me that he would try to have an answer by that time, and emphasized that he very much “valued” our presenting new ideas, and especially in this fashion. He added they were working on new ideas on strategic stability, that none had crystalized yet, that their military and members of the Supreme Soviet were often times “emotional” on all such ideas, and that they too would do nothing to impede an agreement. As he put it, “our first objective is to complete the START agreement.”
[Omitted here is material not related to START]
- Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N900002–0204. Secret.↩