Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

86. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, undated

BUILDING ON START

— There is now great momentum in every area of arms control, especially START. If we continue at the current pace, we will be able to initial the START Treaty at the June Summit.

— President Bush wants to use the momentum we have generated and move boldly to build on our achievements.

— This means focusing not just on numbers but on measures that can truly enhance strategic stability. There are two specific ways to do this:

— The first is to eliminate mobile MIRVed ICBMs—now, before both sides have so much invested in these systems that their elimination will be very difficult.²

— The second is to eliminate, over a longer period of time, the remaining land-based MIRVs—namely those in silos.³

— I will outline these concepts briefly and would like to discuss them in more detail at the Ministerial, including whether we can begin to make these stabilizing improvements in the current negotiations. But let me emphasize that we do not want to do anything to delay initialing START at the Washington Summit.⁴

— We think a ban on mobile MIRVs could be incorporated into START without delay. The US is prepared to cancel the rail-garrison system in exchange for the elimination of your mobile SS–24. I know you have several SS–24 trains deployed, but the US also has a developed system, a budget to deploy it rapidly, and the political ability to proceed if necessary.⁵

— We are also prepared to eliminate silo-based MIRVs over a longer period of time, although we recognize that this proposal would require extensive negotiations. But if the two sides are able to go down this deMIRVing path, it would be possible to side-step remaining differences about constraints on heavy ICBMs in the current START negotiations.

— If you see merit in an approach along these lines, we should work the details at the Washington Ministerial at the end of which President Bush and President Gorbachev could announce an agreement to ban mobile MIRVs in START, to initial the START agreement at the Washington Summit, and to immediately turn to the longer-term goal of eliminating land-based MIRVs.

— On the other hand, if you cannot agree to a ban on mobile MIRVs in the current START agreement, perhaps the two sides could announce at the April Ministerial that we would begin talks, immediately after the current START agreement is initialed in June, to eliminate first mobile MIRVs and then all land-based MIRVs.

— I wanted to present these ideas to you now so that you will have time to consider them. I know you have ideas of your own for follow-on negotiations which we can discuss at our April meeting.

— In sum, we are prepared to agree to ban mobile MIRVed ICBMs in the current START agreement provided that can be done without delaying the Treaty, and to address other stabilizing measures in follow-on negotiations that could begin as soon as the Treaty is initialed.

— If you cannot agree to dealing with MIRV mobiles in the current negotiations, we could agree to turn immediately to these issues once the current START agreement is initialed at the Summit.

— I hope that you agree that conditions will never be better for both sides to capture and build upon the momentum we have generated in the negotiations.

1. Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Presidential Records, Brent Scowcroft Collection, USSR Chronological Files, START Files, OA/ID 91122–003, Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe—Strategic Arms Control (October 1989–April 1990). Secret. A stamped notation indicates that Scowcroft saw the paper. A stamped notation indicates that Bush saw the paper. Bush wrote at the top of the paper: “1st Week in March.” He also wrote in the right-corner: “Patty (1) save in personal files (2) Major Dramatic proposal—I told [illegible] go ahead GB 3–15.”
2. Bush placed a checkmark to the left of this point and underlined: “eliminate mobile MIRVed ICBMs—now.”
3. Bush placed a checkmark to the left of this point.
4. Bush placed a checkmark to the left of this point.
5. Bush placed two checkmarks to the left of this point and underlined the first instance of “SS–24.”