Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

85. Memorandum From the Undersecretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology (Bartholomew) to Secretary of State Baker¹

Washington, March 8, 1990

Mr. Secretary,

For your Friday White House meeting² attached are:

Tab 1: START Follow-on

Tab 2: Ban on MIRVed Mobile ICBMs

Tab 3: SNF and FOTL (which I understand might also be raised)³

Tab 4: an important report from Rick on Shevardnadze’s views on START and the Ministerial.

One thought not covered in any of these papers. I have the feeling (no real evidence) that Cheney may say that we should consider whether we should continue to try to complete soon (as the President has directed) a treaty that “some” think has been made irrelevant and unratifiable by changed circumstances; or take the time to make big changes—e.g., totally eliminate heavies—that would put a “real” Bush stamp on the treaty and fully exploit Soviet flexibility (or weakness). This could combine with Brent’s interest in the “big change” of banning MIRVed mobiles. Another factor that could be involved is the idea that you can’t have CFE and START on the Hill in the same time frame and it would be better to have CFE up there first.

As I said, I don’t have any real evidence for this and it seems very unlikely given the way it takes us back to an earlier debate the President resolved and the high risks involved. Gorbachev does need this agreement but he can’t and won’t make concessions that would kill him politically to get it and time can make him harder to deal with—with the buildup of pressures inside the USSR and from German unification.

Nazarkin reports that Shevardnadze wants to resolve all the major START issues at the April Ministerial and says the Soviets will be “flexible and forthcoming to do so.” But he also says, on instructions from Shevardnadze, that if the US pushes for more on heavy missiles the Soviets “will not move one inch” because it would create big political problems for Gorbachev and Shevardnadze with the military.

The President is right. We need to nail START down first. That will be a major achievement that will bear a Bush stamp. We can add to the Bush stamp by a declaration of intention for START II that points to new directions—including heavies and MIRVed mobiles—building on the basic achievement.

Maybe I’m seeing ghosts. I hope so.

Reg

Tab 1

Paper Prepared in the Department of State⁴

Washington, March 8, 1990

START Follow-on

Post-START Process

• The START treaty is not the end of the process. There will be follow-on negotiations because this is politically unavoidable and there are opportunities for further steps that we should pursue.

• Our objective should be to build on the START treaty (via amendments and new protocols), not to replace it with a new 400 page treaty.

• Negotiations should begin after START entry into force (not signature as the Soviets propose), so as not to appear to prejudge the outcome on ratification.

• Negotiations should be bilateral US/Soviet only. We have no interest in bringing in the UK, France, or China.

• A joint declaration of intent for follow-on negotiations at the June summit could do good work for us, but negotiations would not begin until after entry into force of the START treaty.

Our General Approach to Follow-on Negotiations

• Strategic nuclear forces are here to stay; our objective is not zero.

• The primary focus should be on enhancing stability. That means concentrating reductions on destabilizing systems that threaten a first strike.

• Agreements should reduce costs as well as risks. They should impose constraints on Soviet systems that reduce the cost of countervailing US forces.

Specific US Objectives

• Eliminate heavy missiles.

• Phase out fixed MIRVed ICBMs.

• Phase out mobile MIRVed ICBMs.

• Reduce the 4900 ballistic missile warhead ceiling (while maintaining an 1100 gap for heavy bombers and ALCMs between that ceiling and the overall warhead ceiling).

Soviet Objectives

• The Soviets want follow-on negotiations to begin as soon as START is signed, and cover both offense and defense.

• They want a joint statement at the summit dealing with these elements:

— The content and format of the negotiations.

— The relationship between offense and defense, taking account of reductions and new technologies.

— The character of further reductions, including removing incentives to strike first, reducing concentration of warheads, and giving preference to survivable systems.

— ASAT and space-to-earth weapons.

— Predictability and reduction in the risk of nuclear war.

Next steps

• There is a fair amount of common ground between our objectives and what Nazarkin has put forward in general terms.

• We should follow-up by giving Amb. Burt authority to go beyond listening to Nazarkin (which we authorized in Moscow) and to present the following US views:

— There will be follow-on negotiations.

— They should begin after START entry into force.

— They should be US/Soviet only.

— They should aim to build on START, not replace it.

— We are prepared to work with the Soviets in Geneva on a document to be issued at the June summit.

• With this guidance Amb. Burt would continue the discussions with Nazarkin, seeking agreement on these points and drawing out Soviet ideas.

• Closer to June we can put forward specific proposals on the content of the document for the summit, reflecting both the general approach and the specific US objectives outlined above.

Tab 2

Paper Prepared in the Department of State⁵

Washington, March 8, 1990

Ban on MIRVed Mobile ICBMs

• I have reviewed the attached papers on conversations⁶ with Nunn and Warner on banning mobile MIRVed ICBMs and offer the following thoughts:

• You can judge better than I the politics of a ban on the Hill. But you also have to judge the politics, domestically as well as internationally, of the delay in START that could result.

• We might be able to get a MIRVed mobile ban, but only after intensive negotiations that would significantly extend the time required to get a treaty.

— The fact is Gorbachev could not—politically—give up a major deployed system that cost billions, only in return for a US system which does not yet exist and may never exist because of Congressional opposition.

— We would not and could not do such a deal if the tables were reversed. Nor can Gorbachev. He must get something more substantial for a ban.

— What that might be is not certain. But the logical targets are US programs of principal concern to the Soviets, e.g., SDI, Trident II, or lowering the 4900—all of which would give us major problems.

— And the Soviet price could be even higher if we up the ante by packaging a ban on MIRVed mobiles with a limit on fixed MIRVed ICBMs to stop the Soviets from replacing mobile SS–24s with silo SS–24s with no gain for strategic stability.

— It is true, as Nunn says, that Akhromeyev and Chervov have made positive noises about a MIRVed mobile ban.

— But if they think it’s such a good idea, why haven’t they proposed it?

— Their position of “if you propose it we’ll consider it” leaves all their options open, and positions them to fix a price if we come asking for a ban.

— In any event, we also hear from the Soviets that a MIRVed mobile ban may be a good idea for START II.

• Nevertheless, if the President decides to propose a ban on mobile MIRVs now, my suggestion would be to proceed as follows:

— Propose in START to ban MIRVed mobile ICBMs, and permit 500 single-RV mobile ICBMs. (This is about what we project for SS–25s, and gives ample room for US Small ICBMs.)

— Propose as an objective for START II that we aim to eliminate over a period of years all ICBM MIRVs.

— Consistent with this goal, propose in START not to increase the numbers of fixed ICBM MIRVs (implement by a ceiling of 2100 warheads on fixed MIRVd ICBMs, our estimate of what the Soviets plan to deploy on fixed SS–18s and SS–24s under START). We could then argue that the rail SS–24s are being eliminated, not shifted to silos.

— Consistent with this goal, propose that flight tests of MIRVed ICBMs be limited to three per year, that no new types of MIRVed ICBMs be developed, and no MIRVed ICBMs be produced after Jan. 1 1992. These constraints would apply to the SS–18, SS–24, MX, and MM III. (They would replace our proposed ban on heavy ICBM testing and production, which would be dropped, as would the US proposed 3300 ICBM warhead limit.)

— Adjust the US program to put most of the money into an accelerated Small ICBM program, for deployment initially in Minuteman silos with the option to deploy later on mobile launchers.

• Obviously this package would hit the Soviets hard—abandoning their big investment in survivable rail SS–24s, capping silo SS–18s and SS–24s, curtailing flight testing of SS–18s and SS–24s, and halting production of the new SS–18 Mod 5. They would, to be sure, see some pluses—no rail MX, constraints on MX and MM III testing, and relaxation of US proposed constraints on heavy ICBMs.

• It would be a hard sell, and we would probably have to make adjustments and contend with some sort of counterproposal before such a deal could be closed. If it can be sold, the package has the virtue of settling the heavy issue as well as mobiles.

• As a final point, as we focus on putting in place the last provisions of START, we should remember that the provisions that are already agreed would bring Soviet ICBM warheads down from 6600 to 3200, Soviet heavy ICBM warheads down from 3080 to 1540, and Soviet fixed ICBM MIRVs down from 5500 to 2100. So what we are doing is further turning the screws on an agreement that already squeezes the Soviets hard.

Tab 4

Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State⁷

Geneva, March 8, 1990, 1459Z

SUBJECT

• Shevardnadze Views on START

1. Mr. Secretary:
I met this morning with my Soviet counterpart, Nazarkin, who just returned from Moscow where he was briefing the Soviet People’s Congress. While in Moscow, Nazarkin met with Shevardnadze and was instructed to pass along the following comments.

2. Nazarkin said that Shevardnadze has decided to make a major effort to finish all the major outstanding issues in START at the April ministerial. Nazarkin added that he would discuss with me a list of such issues within the next few days. He commented that this desire to resolve the major issues at the ministerial reflected a high-level Soviet decision to get as much as possible accomplished in START at the June summit. This includes, according to Nazarkin, the issuing of a joint statement of intent on follow-on negotiations—START II. (Comment: The Soviet desire to release a statement of intent on future negotiations at the June summit, whether or not START is ready for signature, is a change in their position. Previously, the Soviets said the sides should release such a statement at the time of START signature. End Comment)

3. Nazarkin said that in order to finish all major issues, the Soviets would be “flexible and forthcoming”, but with one major exception—heavy missiles. U.S. insistence on further limits on heavy missiles would create big political problems for Gorbachev and Shevardnadze, especially with the military. Nazarkin said he was instructed to tell me that if the U.S. pushes for further reductions or limits on heavy missiles, the Soviets “will not to move one inch”.

4. Nazarkin added that his own contacts had confirmed that the Supreme Soviet would not ratify a START Treaty which contained any further limits on SS–18’s. Nazarkin argued that the sides should agree to defer heavy missiles to START II and, in that context, that the Soviets might be able to agree to include further limits on heavies in a joint statement on a declaration of intent on START II.

5. Finally, Nazarkin said he had returned to Geneva with new ideas on ALCMs and SLCMs. He said he was not yet ready to present these ideas because he needed to do some preparations, but that he would do so soon.

6. My initial thoughts on the above are as follows:

— On one hand, I am encouraged that the Soviets want to finish off all major issues at the April ministerial and that they are even prepared to say that they will be “flexible and forthcoming”. That said, we also need to fill in the gaps in our own negotiating position and be ready to engage on all major issues at the ministerial—less than four weeks from now.

— As Reg knows, I think we should take the Soviets at their word on heavy missiles. I have pushed very hard on further reductions or limits but apparently the Soviet military is hard over on further constraints. We should not get ourselves in a box by tabling a non-negotiable position on heavies. Instead, we should declare victory for having reduced Soviet heavy missiles by 50% and work to get a firm Soviet commitment to take further steps in START II.

— I feel strongly that START II is a political winner at home and has the added benefit that it will score you points with Shevardnadze. At the April ministerial, you should accept Shevardnadze’s proposal to issue a joint statement of intent on follow-on negotiations at the June summit and task Nazarkin and me to negotiate a text.

7. Cheers, Rick

1. Source: Department of State, Economic and Agricultural Affairs, Lot 96D484, Robert B. Zoellick, Under Secretary for Economic and Agricultural Affairs, Gates Group NODIS. Secret.
2. Friday, March 9. Not further identified.
3. Attached but not printed is a March 8 paper entitled “SNF and Follow-on-to Lance (FOTL).”
4. Secret.
5. Secret.
6. Not attached. See Documents 79 and 81.
7. Secret.