Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

87. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State¹

1675.

Brussels, March 16, 1990, 1823Z

SUBJECT

• NST Delegation Briefs the NAC: March 7 Question and Answer Session

1. Secret—Entire Text.

2. Summary: U.S. NST negotiators Ambassadors Richard Burt and David Smith had a lively, productive discussion with NATO Permreps in the question and answer session following their prepared statements at the March 7 NAC.² Unlike in past sessions, there was virtually no allied questioning of U.S. negotiating positions. A number of the allied Ambassadors called the briefings by Burt and Smith encouraging. The allies seemed surprised that the Soviets had moved toward U.S. positions in so many areas, particularly on the issue of SLCMs. In line with this, several Permreps asked questions about the possibility of a START II negotiation, reflecting an overall feeling that a START agreement is near. End Summary.

SLCM’s

3. Canadian Permrep Smith, who had strongly criticized the U.S. position on SLCM’s at previous NST briefings, noted that the Soviets had dropped their opposition to U.S. insistence on handling SLCM’s in a declaratory regime. He wondered whether discussions on SLCM limits had focused on production rather than deployment. He also wanted to know whether the Soviet had received a quid pro quo in return for agreeing to a declaratory SLCM regime.

4. In response, Ambassador Burt reminded Permrep Smith that he had told the NAC back in November³ that the Soviets would move toward our declaratory approach. There had been no quid pro quo. He indicated that the U.S. had originally wanted to declare inventories as part of the regime, but the Soviets insisted this would require verification. When we changed our position to declaration of deployments, the Soviets agreed to drop verification measures.

5. Belgian Permrep Thuysbaert asked whether the U.S. wanted to exclude conventional SLCM’s from any declaratory regime. Ambassador Burt confirmed that this was the case, but that the issue remained to be resolved with the Soviets, who wished to include both nuclear and conventional SLCMs. Burt said this issue and the question of range, where the U.S. proposed 300 km and the Soviets 600 km, were the only two unresolved issues on SLCMs. Deputy U.K. Permrep Beattie asked whether there would be ay formal linkage between the START Treaty and the side declaration on SLCM’s, for example, with respect to duration. Ambassador Burt responded that there would be no linkage between the two agreements, although he anticipated that they would be coterminus. He noted that the U.S. was seeking a 15-year limit for START.

6. Norwegian Permrep Kristvik suggested that the U.S.–Soviet decision to deal with SLCM’s outside the START Treaty was essentially “political” and then asked whether the U.S. would disclose to the Soviets any information in its SLCM declaration that was not already available in public documents. Ambassador Burt said he did not agree that parallel SLCM declarations were only a political solution. The main problems surrounding SLCM verification and limitation had been rooted in profound technical and operational concerns.

7. As the U.S. had maintained all along, it was simply impossible to verify adequately SLCM’s limits. Thus, any attempt to impose treaty constraints on SLCM’s would jeopardize the treaty itself. Ambassador Burt added that the U.S. would declare its deployment plans as laid out in the five-year defense program (FYDP). That information, given the transparency of the U.S. political system, would already be in the public domain. The U.S. also intended to provide some information regarding the categories of ships and submarines on which SLCM’s would be deployed. This approach would contribute to both transparency of force structure and predictability of intentions.

ALCM’s

8. German Permrep von Ploetz asked how the subject of conventional strategic bombers had been handled. He also wanted to know whether the counting rules on ALCM’s differed for different types of aircraft. Ambassador Burt answered that the U.S. opposed including conventional bombers under the 1600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicle limit. The two sides were not far apart on the issue, however. The U.S. proposed excluding 115 conventional bombers from the limit, while the Soviets wanted only 100 excluded. But there was still a problem over whether the right to exclude conventional bombers would be a continuous one. French Permrep Robin asked whether the Soviets would have the right to inspect U.S. bomber bases outside U.S. territory. Burt replied that the U.S. had no strategic bomber bases outside U.S. territory, so this was not an issue. He added that the Soviets wanted inspection rights at Holy Loch, Scotland, since U.S. submarines deployed there; however, the U.S. opposed this position.

9. On ALCM counting rules, Ambassador Burt said that both B–52’s and B–1’s would be attributed with 10 ALCMs, but would be permitted to carry up to 20. Soviet bears and blackjacks would be attributed with 8 ALCM’s and be permitted to carry up to 12. In return for these counting rules the Soviets were permitted 40 percent more bombers than the U.S. This was merely a cosmetic U.S. concession, however, since the additional aircraft would be counted against the 1600 SNDV limit. Ambassador Burt also confirmed that range was the only remaining unresolved ALCM issue. The U.S. had come down from 1500 to 1000 kilometers, but the Soviets were holding firm at 600. Burt indicated that the U.S. objective was to protect its options for deploying conventionally-armed ALCM’s with ranges up to 1000 km especially if distinguishing nuclear ALCMs from conventional ALCMs proved difficult.

Mobile ICBM’s

10. In response to a question from German Permrep von Ploetz, Ambassador Burt said there had been no agreement on mobile ICBM sublimits because of the ongoing debate on the issue in the U.S. The Bush administration had proposed a strategic modernization program including both a rail and a road mobile system. The issue had not been resolved with the Congress and there could be no resolution in Geneva until it was.

Inspection of Early Warning Radar Sites

11. Danish Permrep Bierring expressed satisfaction that the Baker-Shevardnadze meeting had produced agreement on reciprocal inspections of early warning radars. He asked if the U.S. knew when the Soviets would want to visit Thule. In reply, Ambassador Burt emphasized that the U.S. had agreed to the radar inspections on the basis of close consultations with the UK and Danish governments and on the understanding that the Soviet side would permit inspection of two of their radars. Ambassador Burt stated, however, that the U.S. did not yet know when the Soviet side would want to visit Thule.

ABM/START linkage

12. Several Permreps wondered whether the problem of linkage between START and ABM Treaty adherence had actually been settled. French Ambassador Robin, for one, suggested that the Soviet threat to withdraw from START if the U.S. violated the ABM Treaty would constitute a “Sword of Damocles” hanging over the START Treaty. In response, Ambassador Burt noted that the START Treaty contained a standard clause permitting the parties to withdraw if supreme national interests were at stake. Whether, in the end, the U.S. would have to accommodate desires by some in the Senate for greater clarity on permitted and prohibited ABM activities was a decision the President would have to make in consultation with the Senate. Smith agreed and said he thought the Soviets had given their bottom line—they had a preference to resolve the permitted-prohibited issue, but would not fall on their swords.

13. Burt added that within seven years of START ratification the Soviets would have already destroyed 50 percent of their heavy ICBM’s, reduced their throw weight by the same amount, and cut their overall strategic forces by about 35 percent. Having done all that, it was “very, very unlikely” that they would then withdraw from the treaty in response to U.S. moves in the area of strategic defense. The political costs would be too high, particularly after START reductions. The Soviets are trying to save face on the linkage issue, but they lost. We should declare victory and move on. Smith added that the Soviets had backed down because they want a START Treaty

14. On the substantive merits of the issue, Burt said that the U.S. would not agree that exercising our rights under the ABM Treaty would justify Soviet withdrawal from START. Smith said that delinkage was a license to keep talking in Geneva and there were signs of progress, at least on the margins. A new agreement which addressed the future was preferable to arguments over the ABM Treaty. However, the U.S. has told the Soviet side that it will retain its right to interpret the ABM Treaty as it believes proper, that it will not accept limits more restrictive than the ABM Treaty. Therefore, U.S. activity permitted by the ABM Treaty could not possibly justify Soviet withdrawal from START.

Strategic Defenses

15. The German and Canadian Permreps wondered whether the U.S. had noted any shift in Soviet thinking about strategic defenses. Ambassador Smith replied that Soviet attitudes toward both the ABM Treaty and strategic defenses seemed to be moving slowly but steadily in the U.S. direction. He noted that the super-restrictive Soviet ABM interpretation of 1985 had given way to successively less restrictive ones. They now appeared to be nearing the so-called “narrow” interpretation. Also, the Soviets themselves were now proposing that offense-defense issues be addressed in the post-START timeframe. The U.S. favored such discussions now, and was trying to convince the Soviets that a negotiated cooperative transition is the best course for both sides.

16. On SDI, Ambassador Smith noted that the Soviet media had lessened its harsh anti-SDI rhetoric. Articles had even begun to appear suggesting that the Soviets should pursue advanced strategic defenses. In part, this reflected a growing Soviet appreciation of the nuclear threat from third countries. Perhaps some thinking on defensive sufficiency was starting to creep into Soviet strategic thought. There had also been some recent progress in the DST talks themselves. The Soviets had made their first positive moves on predictability measures since May 1988. The fact that they had dropped their ABM/START linkage was itself evidence of a thaw in Soviet attitudes toward strategic defenses. Danish Permrep Bierring asked whether the U.S. envisaged ever sharing technology with the Soviets as a means of enhancing predictability and confidence. Ambassador Smith replied that the two sides were pursuing data exchanges as well as meetings of experts, visits to labs, and observations of tests to enhance confidence. But there had been no discussion of technology sharing in the negotiations.

17. Belgian Permrep Thuysbaert asked whether news of U.S. progress on SDI work like Brilliant Pebbles did not harden Soviet positions in Geneva. Smith replied that U.S. technical and economic strength was certainly a key Soviet concern, but one that could be handled. Predictability measures would avert technological surprise and a negotiated cooperative transition would ensure stability. For example, the Soviet scientists who attended the December visit to U.S. SDI labs surely went away with a balanced view that the U.S. is devoting resources and making progress in SDI, that the Americans can make SDI work, but that they have no desire to do anything precipitous, surprising, or destabilizing. On balance, U.S. SDI progress is forcing the Soviets to deal with the future of deterrence. Therefore, SDI progress helps, not hurts, the Geneva talks.

START Timetable

18. Permreps were naturally interested in when the START Treaty would be finished. Ambassador Burt told them the goal set by President Bush and President Gorbachev at Malta was to solve all outstanding major substantive issues by the summit. He said that both delegations intended to remain in Geneva until then, with short breaks for the Baker-Shevardnadze ministerial in early April and summit preparations in May or June. He was hopeful that a completed treaty would be ready for signature by the end of the year. In response to a specific question on this point from French Permrep Robin, Burt indicated that he did not anticipate that the resolution of U.S. position on funding mobile missiles system would affect the June summit timetable.

START II

19. Ambassador Burt’s remarks in his prepared statement regarding Soviet proposals for START II attracted considerable interest from Permreps. Both the German and Canadian Permreps asked him about Soviet thinking regarding any follow-on negotiations. Canadian Permrep Smith noted that former Soviet START negotiator Viktor Karpov had recently told the Canadians that the Soviets were very interested in limiting or reducing MIRV’s in future negotiations.

20. In response, Ambassador Burt said though the U.S. had not taken a formal position on START II, he had been authorized to listen to Soviet ideas on the subject. He had begun such discussions with his Soviet counterpart. He had noticed a definite shift in Soviet thinking. After World War II the Soviets had looked at nuclear weapons as little more than long-range artillery. But their strategic planners had begun to do their homework and were beginning to adopt traditional U.S. concepts on strategic stability, e.g., benefits of deMIRVing. Ambassador Burt confirmed that the Soviets do seem interested in deMIRVing under a START II agreement as a way of achieving greater stability. Their development of the SS–25 clearly demonstrated such an interest. In addition, the Soviets had presented ideas on reducing first strike instabilities, reducing warhead concentrations, and reducing the overall vulnerability of systems.

21. Both Burt and Smith noted in replies to questions that the U.S. was prepared to listen to ideas on START II, but emphasized that the U.S. intended to approach the issue in a thoughtful and prudent manner. Burt observed that there was one school of thought that the U.S. should take some time to assess what had been achieved in START before embarking on a new round of negotiations. Another school of thought, however, held that the U.S. ought to take advantage of what might be a singular opportunity to pursue further stabilizing reductions in the strategic field. He noted that he was probing the Soviets on their views so that President Bush could render an informed decision by the June summit.

Taft

1. Source: Department of State, Economic and Agricultural Affairs, Lot 96D484, Robert B. Zoellick, Under Secretary for Economic and Agricultural Affairs, US/Sov Minis: Apr ’90. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to NATO Collective.
2. In telegram 1424, March 7, the Mission to NATO transmitted Smith’s prepared statement to the Department (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D900212-0095) In telegram 1425, March 7, the Mission to NATO transmitted Burt’s prepared statement to the Department (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D900212-0099).
3. In telegram 6214, November 9, 1989, the Mission to NATO transmitted the discussion following Burt and Smith’s presentation to the North Atlantic Council. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D89980-0274).