81. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- Meeting with Senators Nunn and Warner
The President: Did you meet the Norwegian Prime Minister? He has a good message about maintaining defense budgets and paying attention to the issues of the NATO tanks. Sam, I did my homework; I read your paper.2 Let’s take up where we left off.
Senator Warner: I have a paper, too.3 It’s an overlay on Nunn.
The President: Where were we?
Senator Nunn: The whole strategic program is going to be under severe pressure on the Hill, mainly because of the budget but also because of changes in the world. Personally, I think we definitely have to continue modernization, but we will have to package it if we hope to sell it on the Hill.
I have long thought we should eliminate MIRV’s. The Scowcroft Commission laid the basis for deMIRVing. The M-X would have been gone by 1985 except for the Scowcroft report. It is interesting that the Soviets seem to have taken the report and the concept seriously. DOD gave the report lip service but then wandered off in its own direction.
Gov Sununu: Is the small missile inherently non-MIRVed?
Senator Nunn: The small missile is currently non-MIRV, but it could have two warheads if that were considered essential. A big problem with the M-X is that ten warheads are an inherently attractive target. The Rail Garrison deployment is survivable when flushed but more vulnerable than in silos when garrisoned. In my opinion, the main case [Page 511] to be made for Rail Garrison is to send signals in the event of crisis or attack in Europe. That possibility is greatly diminished now and the most likely scenario would be war by accident.
The President: Isn’t that an argument for SDI?
Senator Nunn: Yes, but not for the current SDI program. (Mentioned illustratively the priorities for the current SDI program.)
The President: Have you heard the Brilliant Pebbles briefing? It is very impressive.
Senator Nunn: Not yet. I want to.
The President: How about the SS–18?
Senator Nunn: We should get rid of all MIRVed ICBMs, but focusing on mobiles is a good first step. The next arms race ahead of us is the mobile MIRV race and that race is where we should concentrate the first step. I would like to do it all and get rid of all MIRVs—but that would probably take 10 years. Rail Garrison is basically geared to an escalation scenario. That now is much less likely. (I left for about two minutes. I believe his first point was the same he made yesterday—doing without a mobile for several years.) The other big argument against the small missile is cost. Rail Garrison cost is about $6 billion over the next four years. Accelerated SICBMs would be about $2 billion over the same four years. So you would save $4 billion over the short term, but the SICBM would cost $20 billion more than Rail Garrison over the long term. But you could just build the missiles, keep the mobility elements in R&D, and reserve judgment about mobility to see if we get John’s plan to get rid of all MIRV’s.
Gov Sununu: If they deMIRV, we don’t need mobility, do we?
Senator Nunn: Depends on SLBM accuracy and a number of other things, but we don’t have to decide that now.
Gov Sununu: Can you turn this into a Republican missile? It is now viewed as a Democratic missile.
Senator Warner: It is not really a Democratic missile (names a number of Republicans who helped develop or support the concept)—but it does have somewhat that perception.
The President: This is a fascinating conversation, but let me make something clear. I have great faith in Cheney. This is a listening session for me. I feel a bit uncomfortable about the perception and don’t want the to leave the impression I negotiate without him.
Senator Warner: I talked with Wolfowitz after yesterday’s meeting just to keep him abreast. I think he would be comfortable with total deMIRVing.
The President: How about verification?
Senator Nunn: Silo verification is easy but silo basing is an unstable deployment mode [2 lines not declassified] I think you could verify [Page 512] destruction of rail mobile SS–24s easier than the SS–25s. (Discussion of SS–18 warheads.) On the B–2, the Air Force, I think, made a mistake focusing on finding mobile missiles. If we try to find theirs, they will try to find ours, then we are back where we all were. I would focus on finding other moveable targets—like the Red Army.
The President: So sorry, but I am going to have to break this off.
- Source: Department of State, Economic and Agricultural Affairs, Lot 96D484, Robert B. Zoellick, Under Secretary for Economic and Agricultural Affairs, Gates Group NODIS. Secret. The meeting took place in the Oval Office.↩
- See Document 80.↩
- See Document 82.↩