Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

63. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State¹

11244.

Geneva, December 12, 1989, 1015Z

SUBJECT

• START: Negotiator’s End of Round Report on Verification and Stability Measures

REF:

• NST GENEVA 010880, NST/START–XII–013²

1. This is NST/START–XII–018. Secret—Entire Text.

2. This cable will review the status of the verification and stability measures and, where appropriate, indicate any further guidance required for Round XIII.

RV Inspection and Heavy Bomber Exhibitions

3. On December 8, the U.S. and Soviet heads of delegation exchanged letters providing for heavy bomber exhibitions that will begin with the Soviet exhibit of the bear. Sides are close to completion of a conformed text of letters to agree on trial RV inspections as well.

4. Sides did not reach final agreement on the RV inspection letters when the Soviet side balked at the U.S. proposal that the Soviet side commit to demonstrate procedures on the “most modern MIRVed version” of the SS–18. Soviet head of delegation said that there was insufficient time to get Moscow’s agreement to changing their draft letter to clarify that the most modern MIRVed version of the SS–18 would be shown. On December 9, U.S. head of delegation handed Soviet head of delegation an amended draft letter that would obligate each side to show the “most modern MIRVed version” of each of the agreed missiles, i.e., the Peacekeeper, the SS–18, the Trident II, and the SS–N–23. Soviet head of delegation preliminary assessment was that this formulation would be very helpful in Moscow.

5. U.S. side awaits Soviet response to the amended RV inspection letter. We may receive word during Nazarkin’s visit to Washington late this week and attempt to reach closure on this issue.

Telemetry Encryption/Data Denial

6. Reftel summarizes current state of play on the telemetry encryption issue and suggests steps to address this issue during the inter-round period. Original telemetry guidance specified that the U.S. should seek only an interim solution to the encrypt (#)³ that the time and complexity required to reach an interim solution is about the same as that required to resolve the issue in the long term. Consequently, I believe that Washington should consider resolving the telemetry issue as a separate agreement of indefinite duration.

8. Unexecuted telemetry guidance: START Guidance XII–002,⁴ paras 9 and 10: allowing U.S. side to agree to indefinite duration agreement that could be superseded, and providing specific information for U.S. ballistic missile test ranges. Also negotiating group did not execute guidance authorizing U.S. side to list specific older Soviet systems which could be exempt from the requirement to make measurements and broadcast telemetry from non-test range locations. Negotiating group opted to wait until the Soviet side provides answers to U.S. questions regarding Soviet problems with equipping specific types of missiles.

Early Exchange of Data

9. During Round XI, the U.S. proposed a prompt exchange and periodic update of data for the fully agreed categories in the MOU. Subsequent to the exchange, experts would conduct reciprocal familiarization visits to learn more about the forces, operational practices, and facilities that would be subject to inspection under the treaty. At the end of Round XI, the U.S. tabled a non-paper listing MOU categories, both fully agreed and agreed in principle, as the basis for organizing the data exchange.

10. The initial Soviet response in Round XII to the U.S. proposal was somewhat negative. While the Soviet side agreed that a data exchange was a good idea, it proposed to exchange only limited aggregate data on overall numbers of strategic systems. During the course of the round, however, the Soviets asked numerous detailed questions about the timing of a data exchange, indicating informally that they preferred to exchange data in six increments with two week intervals to permit time to study exchanged data between sessions. In this way, it became apparent that the Soviets might be considering a broader data exchange than originally suggested.

11. On December 4, the Soviets proposed a six stage data exchange. The first stage would cover aggregate data for deployed strategic offensive arms, including ALCMs and SLCMs. The second stage would cover non-deployed systems. The four subsequent stages, although less specifically outlined, would cover facilities, locations, and technical data for strategic offensive arms, including ALCMs and SLCMs. The U.S. side presented new points on its proposed familiarization visits.

12. Washington backstopping should review the Soviet proposal and prepare guidance for a U.S. response early in Round XIII, including consideration of how the U.S. wants to handle data exchanges for systems for which U.S. and Soviet positions differ. I think that the U.S. should be prepared next round to begin the exchange process if/when final agreement is reached on the scope and categories of the exchange. Washington should also decide whether data provided by guidance XII–33⁵ will be updated.

Unique Identifiers

13. In July 1989, the United States proposed that technical experts from each side provide a briefing and demonstration of their most mature concept for unique identifiers. The U.S. proposal provided for follow-up meetings of experts for further discussion and investigation of these concepts. In addition, the U.S. proposed that the experts could develop a plan and schedule for a series of joint identification experiments for the most promising concepts.

14. On November 30 and December 1, experts from each side met to implement the first step of the U.S. proposal. The U.S. side provided a briefing of the U.S. tagging concept and demonstrated how to fabricate, apply and read reflective particle tags (RPT). The Soviet side provided briefings of four tagging concepts: internal excitation scintillators, “holograms,” silicon semiconductor detectors, and a digitalized reader for an RPT-like tag. Both sides agreed that further discussions involving technical experts could be conducted next round. In addition, the Soviet side hinted that, sometime in the spring, it could be ready to provide the U.S. side a demonstration of some or all of its four tagging technologies.

15. In preparation for Round XIII, Washington should review lab-prepared assessment of the Soviet technology briefing to prepare questions for the Soviets during expert discussions next round and to identify possible approaches to joint experiments.

Short Time of Flight (STOF)

16. U.S. initiated discussions with Soviets during Round XI on banning SLBM STOF launches, believing that Soviets shared interest in banning depressed trajectory flights. U.S. tabled text of parallel unilateral declarations on STOF and attempted to engage the Soviets during the expert sessions prior to Wyoming ministerial. Early this round, the Soviet side tabled a counterproposal that it claimed was intended to preclude the possibility of a surprise attack. A ban on depressed trajectory was only one aspect of the Soviet counterproposal; others included stand-off zones for SSBNs, heavy bombers, and aircraft carriers, and banning ALCMs, SLCMs, and heavy bombers that incorporate stealth technology. Subsequent discussions revealed that the Soviet side considered the U.S. STOF proposal to be “the most difficult” of the V&S measures. Nazarkin contends that the Soviet military is suspicious of this initiative.

17. I recommend that, while our proposal should formally remain on the table, the U.S. not pursue the STOF proposal at this time. Verification uncertainties mean that any agreement on STOF could, at best, be only a confidence-building measure. Inasmuch as the Soviets apparently have no interest in parallel unilateral declarations on STOF, the U.S. probably could not pursue they issue with the Soviet side without inviting a more visible Soviet repetition of its proposal.

Early PPCMs

18. Early in Round XII, both sides presented their different approaches to establishing early PPCMs. The U.S. tabled its guidance proposing establishment of PPCMs at declared SS–24 final assembly and first stage rocket motor production facilities. Its proposal reflected the objective of gaining greater confidence in the number of SS–24 mobile missiles produced between the establishment of PPCMs and the EIF of START. The Soviet side proposed to establish PPCMs at a production facility for one of the largest stages of peacekeeper and at Votkinsk. This proposal apparently reflected the objective of practicing PPCMs procedures.

19. Most of the discussion of these proposals during the round focused on Soviet questions regarding the purpose of establishing PPCMs at facilities involved in the casting of solid rocket motors (SRM) or cartridges for SRMs, the nature of descriptions of production and assembly processes, and the purpose of tours. The U.S. answered these questions in detail, arguing that these aspects of the U.S. proposal were essential to establish PPCMs that would effectively monitor production output of accountable SS–24 stages. The U.S. presented guidance on walk-through tours of listed production facilities.

20. The U.S. side will continue to push its PPCMs approach next round. Although the sides have different approaches to PPCMs, it will be important to have inspection procedures ready to table at the opening of Round XIII. This would permit the U.S. to engage the Soviets on the details of the U.S. proposal early. The value of this proposal is inherently linked to its early implementation.

Burt

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D891080-0768. Secret; Exdis. Sent Immediate. Sent Priority for information to the Mission to NATO, USNMR SHAPE, and Moscow.
2. Reference is to telegram 10880 from Geneva, December 4, 1989 (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D891054–065)
3. “Omission: Para 6 line 5 and Para ‘7’ omitted. Corrections to follow.” [Footnote is in the original.]
4. Reference is to telegram 8896 from NST Geneva, October 12. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D890881–0184)
5. Reference is to telegram 375962 from the Department of State to NST Geneva, November 23. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D891021–0302)