Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

62. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State¹

11242.

Geneva, December 12, 1989, 1011Z

SUBJECT

• START: Negotiator’s End of Round Assessment

1. This is NST/START-XII-017. Secret—Entire Text.

2. This cable forwards my personal assessment of Round XII. I will deal with verification and stability in a separate cable.

The Atmosphere in Geneva

3. The pace this round was generally fast, reaching 34 separate meetings during the peak week. The Soviets continue to show every indication of being eager to move forward. Nazarkin told me during the round that the Soviet Union was more eager for a START agreement than we were.

4. At the same time, all was not sweetness and light. The Soviets were obstinate on several issues, many of them related to implementing the Wyoming formula on unit of account. The problems appear to originate with the Soviet military, but I cannot judge whether they are personal or institutional. In a private discussion late in the round, Nazarkin told me he had some “troublemakers” on his delegation.

Accomplishments

5. Despite the intense pace, our progress was primarily confined to details and to verification and stability. Thanks to good work both here and in Washington, we reached agreement on two trial verification measures, exchanging letters on heavy bomber inspections and almost completing agreement on trial RV OSI. We made some progress on other measures as well, as I indicate in a separate cable on the subject.

6. On the basic START Treaty itself, while no major START issue was resolved, we did gain a better understanding of some (e.g. non-circumvention and Treaty duration). Among the accomplishments:

A. We came close to implementing the Wyoming formula for unit of account.

B. We made changes in over 90 treaty provisions, generally narrowing or eliminating differences with the Soviets on details.

C. We reorganized the mobiles joint working paper, made a presentation on U.S. mobile ICBM basing concepts, and implemented the mobile verification agreements from Wyoming. Late in the round we told the Soviets we would merge the mobile joint working paper into the Treaty itself at the start of the next round.

D. Large sections of the conversion or elimination protocol are now agreed. We reached agreement that actions, not notifications change accountability, worked on simplifying notification provisions, and narrowed differences on several other issues.

E. We made similar progress on the inspection protocol, reaching total agreement on the text for an early exchange of lists of inspectors, solving the long-standing issue of monitoring support personnel, and, we hope, paving the way to solve the equally long-standing issue of defining an inspection site.

F. On throw-weight, the Soviets tabled a new protocol, patterned on the U.S. draft. The new protocol moves in our direction in several ways, but the Soviets still reject our idea of capturing the full throw-weight potential of future systems.

G. We restructured three annexes in the memorandum of understanding, those dealing with ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. We continue to be hampered by the large number of outstanding issues in this area.

7. None of this is spectacular, but it represents good progress. We are now in good position to move quickly as major decisions are made.

Looking Ahead

8. With the new, post-Malta emphasis on START we will have to be ready to maintain the same pace, but deal with far more substantial—and thus far more contentious—issues. In that regard, while I was once again very pleased with the support given us by the backstopping process, where virtually all of our requests were answered promptly and helpfully, I was disappointed that none of the major issues under review—RV counting, mobile verification and the like—led to decisions in time to be useful this round. We simply are not going to be able to complete the task the President has set for us of coming to closure on all major issues by the summit if we do not bite the bullet and begin making major decisions.

9. Despite my exhortations to do more, the delegation and I are appreciative of Washington’s efforts to support us. I hope all involved in the START process have a happy holiday and return renewed and invigorated for what may well be several very intense months.

Burt

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D891080–0737. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent Priority for information to the Embassy in Moscow, the Mission to NATO, and USNMR SHAPE.