Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

64. Information Memorandum From the Head of the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks (Burt) to Secretary of State Baker¹

Washington, December 18, 1989

SUBJECT

• From Malta to Moscow: START and the Shevardnadze Ministerial

Geneva round has ended. Want to give you my personal thoughts on where we go from here, especially your next meeting with Shevardnadze.

○ Malta was clearly a big success for START. Can we finish treaty by 1990? Based on last round experience, my answer is yes:

— The problem will not be in Geneva—two delegations have developed good working relationships and my counterpart, Nazarkin, is pragmatic, ready-to-deal and is increasingly well-wired back home.

— Problem should also not be in Washington: Interagency players seem to have got the “Malta message” on START and while some die-hards are still dragging their feet, I expect that Reg Bartholomew and Arnie Kantor will drive the process. Perhaps a bigger problem is that State and other agencies are not devoting sufficient manpower to working through hundreds of unresolved issues.

— A still bigger potential problem: Moscow’s attitude. It became clear during last round that Soviets think they have made all the important moves in START and that, in particular, we haven’t responded to their Jackson Hole initiatives.

— Doesn’t mean that they are losing interest in START. It’s as important as ever for them. But Nazarkin tells me that with Gorbachev under fire from hardliners on other issues (for seeing the Pope, etc.), that it will be harder for him to unilaterally move START forward.

— Thus, if you come to Moscow ready to take the initiative on a range of START issues, this could actually stimulate Soviet concessions in the longer run.

○ Thus, you should consider a “Malta strategy” for Moscow: Begin your arms control presentation with a list of START initiatives—both to show Shevardnadze that you mean business and to focus discussion on your agenda. Reg tells me he shares this view.

The START Agenda for Moscow

○ There are four major issues:

○ ALCMs: Now’s the time to settle this issue. Nothing’s changed other than the favorable budget decision which should make it easier to bring Cheney along. As you know, while the ALCM issue is complex, there are two key questions:

Counting: The Soviets want a larger number to attribute to each ALCM-equipped aircraft—the maximum for which a bomber can be equipped. We want a smaller number—10—to give us some “free” ALCMs as a hedge against Soviet air defenses.

Range: Both sides agree that only ALCMs above a certain range will count in START—the Soviets want 600 kilometers while we are holding out for 1500.

— Obviously, the solution to ALCMs lies in finding an acceptable trade-off between counting and range. On counting, you should explore higher discounts (12 or so) as well as a maximum ceiling on “free” ALCMs per bomber (20). In the end, I think (and, more importantly, the Chiefs agree) that we could live with the Soviet “as equipped.” On range, we could probably go down to 1,000 KM and maybe even 800.

— If we do end up moving toward the Soviet “as equipped” ALCM position, then we should insist that Moscow concedes on all the secondary ALCM issues still in dispute, including ALCM conventional-nuclear distinguishability.

○ Non-Deployed Missiles: We’ve been grappling with this subject for years and there’s no reason to delay a solution. SALT II only limited deployed missiles, so original U.S. goal in START in limiting NDMs was designed to deal with three contingencies: (1) reconstitution (rapidly reloading missile silos with new missiles); (2) soft launch (firing missiles from quickly-assembled, above-ground launchers) and (3) breaking out from a treaty.

— In recent years, however, two developments have led us to reconsider whether NDM numerical Limits are really worthwhile:
First, we have now largely agreed with the Soviets on a comprehensive and effective set of procedures that deal with these contingencies without resorting to NDM numerical limits, i.e., geographic constraints on NDMs, a ban on rapid reload and limits on soft-launchers.
Second, years of negotiating experience have shown that numerical NDM limits would create our own military (unless the limits were so high as to be meaning less). Moreover, NDM limits would be enormously complex to verify and thus could be a focus for criticism during ratification debate.

— The Soviets have come to accept the idea of NDM limits, but extend the concept to ALCMs and SLCMs, something we can’t buy. But in the last round, Nazarkin proposed dropping all NDM limits outside missile deployment areas. This is an interesting idea. But it would be politically too hard at this stage to drop the idea of numerical NDM limits altogether. Thus, the best solution to a difficult problem would be to only seek NDM limits on mobile ICBMs. Not only is this approach plausible (mobile NDMs could pose the biggest breakout and reconstitution a threat) but we have indications that the Soviets would go along.

— Another benefit: NDM limits on mobiles would fit nicely with our proposal for perimeter-portal monitoring for Soviet and U.S. mobiles. These missiles could also be candidates for missile “tagging.”

— The biggest benefit, however, would be to the negotiating process: By solving NDMs we would move the negotiations forward while at the same time strengthen mobile verification.

○ Telemetry: We have made good progress on defining a data-denial agreement that would cover missile telemetry. We need such an agreement for ratification—the Senate will want to be sure that we can monitor new missile development.

— But several questions remain: should it be an indefinite agreement? How do we handle SDI or black programs? How broadly or narrowly should “data denial” be defined? And finally, if there are disputes over data denial how will they be resolved?

— At the nub of this issue is the familiar question of whether we are prepared to accept the same restrictive regime on protecting missile information that we want to impose on Moscow.

— This is highly complex and sensitive area. We should be able to resolve it in the near future if both governments are prepared to bite the bullet. In order to lay the groundwork for a solution in your meeting in Moscow, I may need to meet with Nazarkin on the subject in mid-January in Geneva.

○ Heavy ICBMs: Soviet acceptance of further limits on the SS–18 would give us a big boost for ratification. The Soviets have accepted a 50% cut (down to 154), but their new version of the SS–18 (the Mod 5) is more lethal, already causing conservatives to complain.

— In many, many conversations with Nazarkin, I have pushed for either further SS–18 reductions or a limit on SS–18 testing (which would reduce its reliability). His response: Let’s talk about further SS–18 limits in START II.

— The President raised this in Malta and you should follow up in Moscow. Our message is simple: Their continued modernization of this first-strike missile is not consistent with their new “military sufficiency” rhetoric and could jeopardize the ratification effort. Our goal: Further SS–18 cuts in return for allowing modernization.

The Soviet Agenda

Shevardnadze will clearly have his own laundry list but some of his items, like SLCMs, may offer opportunities.

○ Defense and Space/ABM Treaty: You’ll get complaints about our lack of response on their Jackson Hole ABM move. Don’t take it too seriously: Nazarkin has been told that this is an end-game issue and I think Moscow understands this.

○ SLCMs: Soviet complaints about SLCMs are more serious—they clearly want to get moving on this and will probably urge you to agree to a verification dialogue. I suggest a three-part, preemptive strategy.

— First, the Soviets have said they are prepared to settle SLCMs outside of START. We favor a non-binding declaratory statement on SLCMs. So why not, as Reg suggests, give Shevardnadze a draft statement and get his response? This may open the door to a good give-and-take on the issue. (I’m attaching a possible draft statement.)²

— Secondly, we should agree to a verification dialogue with clear understanding that we will hold up our part of the conservation by explaining the problems of verification.

— Thirdly, you should privately explore a cruise missile package deal, that is, an arrangement in which the Soviets bought our approach to SLCMs in return to buying their approach to ALCMs (at least, “as equipped” counting.) Nazarkin believes that if we were to take the initiative on a package deal, we might be pleasantly surprised.)

○ Non-circumvention: The Soviets think this issue should be resolved sooner rather than later and I agree. Existing Soviet language would prevent us from providing the Trident II missile to the British. I have made it crystal clear to Nazarkin that this won’t fly.

— A possible solution: If Shevardnadze raises non-circumvention, you could agree to a general discussion as long as their anti-British language is dropped. In INF we accepted the idea of not undertaking any international obligations in conflict with the Treaty. This approach could work for START.

○ Stability Talks and START II: With a START Treaty on the horizon, the Soviets are already pushing for talks about a follow-on negotiation. In part, this helps them deflect pressure for more ambitious moves now, such as further SS–18 cuts. But it also reflects “new thinking” in Moscow about further nuclear reduction and “minimum deterrence.”

— We don’t even have a position on whether there will even be a START II, let alone what its focus would be. This is one gap in our position we should fill before Moscow. In my view, it would be a mistake, especially right now, to appear to be unwilling to talk to the Soviets about the future of nuclear arms control. One approach: Without prejudging the U.S. position on the timing and goals for START II, the two negotiations could be authorized to hold informal discussions and report back to the ministers at a convenient time.

Filling in the Gaps

○ Most of the issues outlined above are ones in which each side has a position and the positions disagree. There is, as you know, another category—areas in which one or both sides do not have clear positions. In all honesty, most of the gaps in the existing treaty belong to us.

○ The commitment to fill in the most important gaps in time for your meeting with Shevardnadze will provide strong stimulus to the bureaucracy. As noted above, it will also give you the high ground in the meeting itself.

○ It’s not necessary for you to get involved in the details of most of these unresolved issues. You only need to know that they have been analyzed to death for years and are thus well understood. “We need further time to study the problem” is not an acceptable argument anymore.

○ With this as a backdrop, I would like to see you arrive in Moscow with a fully-defined U.S. position on the following:

— perimeter-portal continuous monitoring: What plants need U.S. monitors to check missile production?

— suspect site inspections: What limits must we put on such inspections to protect our own sensitive facilities?

— phasing of reductions: Within the agreed seven year reduction period, how many separate reduction steps and what intermediate limits do we want?

— treaty duration: Will START be indefinite, last for a fixed number of years, or last until superseded?

— treatment of “new kinds” of strategic offensive arms: How do we deal with exotic future systems like air to surface ballistic missiles or “space planes”?

— definition of a new type: Our rules are different for existing and future types of ballistic missiles and bombers. How do we tell when something is a new type?

— RV counting for future types of ballistic missiles: We negotiated the numbers of RVs we would attribute to existing ballistic missiles. What rule will we use to decide how many to attribute to new systems?

— initial accountability: At what stage in their development should new systems come under the START restrictions?

○ Bottom line: If you can get authority to offer some compromises and if we can push the system to flesh out our positions, Moscow will start us on the home stretch to a treaty in 1990.

1. Source: Department of State, STARS, Document Number 198929259-0. Secret. Sent through Bartholomew, who did not initial the memorandum.
2. Not found.