Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

61. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Malta, December 3, 1989, 4:35–6:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Second Expanded Bilateral Session

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• James A. Baker, Secretary of State
• John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
• Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Howard Graves (LTG), Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
• Dennis Ross, Director Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
• Condoleezza Rice, Director, Soviet and East European Affairs, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
• Interpreter
• Mikhail Gorbachev, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR
• Eduard Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs
• Aleksandr Yakovlev, Member, Politburo; Chairman, International Policy Commission, Central Committee
• Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
• Anatoliy Chernyaev, Aide to Chairman Gorbachev (Notetaker)
• Anatoliy Dobrynin, Advisor to the Chairman, USSR Supreme Soviet
• Sergey Akhromeyev, Advisor to the Chairman, USSR Supreme Soviet
• Interpreter

Chairman Gorbachev: Well, what remains to be covered? I know our Ministers have something to cover and, after all, I am your guest today. (laughs) (U)

The President: How do you like my ship? The press was yelling at me on the Belknap that everything was cut short. I told them that we worked at lunch too. (U)

Chairman Gorbachev: Overall it was five hours. We know better. If you don’t mind—because of this we could have a press conference together. (U)

The President: We have arranged to do something together and then a press conference. (U)

Chairman Gorbachev: Have you announced that? Because I think our press conference will have to be here on the Gorkii. I thought it would be better to do it here. (U)

The President: If we do that the press will think I’m dodging their questions. They will say I don’t want to answer their questions. (U)

Chairman Gorbachev: O.K. We will come out together—not for a press conference—answer a few questions. Then I will just have a press meeting not a press conference. (U)

The President: Fine. I’ll have a final answer for you after the meeting. (U)

Chairman Gorbachev: Mr. President, yesterday I responded to your proposals. Maybe you want to listen to our suggestions. I will take into account what you said. This is an informal meeting—the first—between the two of us. I want to say to you and the United States that the Soviet Union will under no circumstances START a war—that is very important. The Soviet Union is ready no longer to regard the United States as an adversary and is ready to state that our relationship is cooperative. That is the first point. (S)

Second, we favor joint efforts for verifiable limits on nuclear weapons. We are interested in continuing arms control but need to go beyond the arms race and renounce the creation of new weapons. Our military people are already cooperating. I want to thank you for giving General Yazov a chance to familiarize himself with U.S. armed forces.² (S)

Third, we have a defensive military doctrine. We have given explanations to the United States of what is meant by it. I want to note that the structure of our armed forces is changing—assuming a defensive nature. They are declining in bridging, landing equipment and changing the location of our airforces. We are removing strike aircraft and putting defensive aircraft where the strike aircraft were located. We are not keeping these activities secret. Our military people are ready to meet with yours and to discuss certain suggestions for adopting and implementing defensive doctrine. (S)

Still, the U.S. is proceeding on the basis of flexible response which was in the past justified but now—now that there are recognized changes at the political-military level—why isn’t the United States moving to change the posture of its own armed forces. This is very important. I have read the Brussels Statement (I think it is sixty pages) and there is no real change as yet. (S)

Another fundamental point. We have been discussing the dynamics of negotiations. Let me point to one problem that I think is of great importance. Both of us recognized that both sides have created tremendous military power and are becoming aware of catastrophic consequences. We have shown political will to eliminate that threat. We signed the first treaty together—the INF treaty. (S)

The President: Thanks for what you sent me by Dobrynin—the piece of the SS–20. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev: This is the only realistic perspective. A lot has been done and the prospects from what you did yesterday are good. But something worries us. It is the naval issue which is still outside the process of negotiation. This is an emotional issue for previous Administrations and ours and to a certain extent we understand that the U.S. is a sea power whose lifeline is the sea and ocean. We know that the U.S. has a tradition of building these kinds of armed forces. (S)

It is not an easy issue but just look at the situation. As of the early 1950s the U.S.S.R. was surrounded by naval bases—500,000 men, hundreds of aircraft, huge fleets. The U.S. has aircraft carriers with about 1500 aircraft. All that is deployed in waters adjacent to us. In this context, I am not speaking about submarines. (S)

The Vienna talks will result in lowering the confrontation on land and the prospects are good on strategic arms. We believe that soon we are entitled to expect that the naval threat to us should be reduced. (S)

I will venture an initiative. I believe we should start talks on naval arms. Maybe through confidence building measures or reducing the level of naval activities we could do something. After we are finished at CFE and START we need to go over to naval issues. (S)

I know that the U.S. faces other potential problems than the Soviet Union but in the same way that the U.S. feels Europe is important we need security from any ocean threat. (S)

Now I would like to make some remarks on the current talks. I understand that we do not want to discuss details at this meeting. But I want to make remarks on three items. I would like to continue discussion and have the military people do it. We must come to grips with problems and see them clearly. (S)

First, we must better understand the relationship between the ABM and the START treaty—taking into account the Shevardnadze proposals to Baker. (S)

Second, we believe it is important to get a handle on heavy bombers and ALCMs. If the current U.S. proposal were adopted, the overall aggregate total would be not 6000 but over 8500. We are not seeking an advantage for ourselves—the actual loads should be equalizing. (S)

Third, SLCMs. I already talked about it. If I understand you correctly, it is to resolve the START issues by the time of the Summit by the end of 1990 and have a treaty signed. (S)

Another important point too—Scowcroft and Akhromeyev have had some very useful talks. The U.S. and Soviet navies have nuclear weapons such as submarines and SLCMs and tactical nuclear weapons—nuclear mines, etc. (S)

Submarines are strategic weapons and are verifiable and will be in the structure of both arsenals. It is a part of the triad of forces. (S)

But the rest—tactical nuclear forces at sea—should be eliminated. This was suggested in informal discussions. I hope neither Scowcroft nor Akhromeyev will be offended by my now putting this on the table more formally. (S)

We would be ready to do away with all nuclear forces at sea—that would be the easiest for verification. Well. (S)

The problem is reducing not only weapons but people:

First, our proposal that overall aggregates should be 1.3 million a reduction of 1 million men by each side. NATO has not agreed. I think that people will find the decision to reduce weapons and not people unacceptable. (S)

Second, there is the issue of reducing the numbers of personnel deployed on foreign territory. We are proposing that the numbers of personnel be reduced to 300,000 men per alliance. This is like a proposal suggested first by the Soviet Union but your proposal does not deal with many foreign troops on the soil of the Western alliance (the UK, France, etc.) (S)

Third, our proposal is for a ceiling of 4700 front-line tactical aircraft. I also suggested that there should be a sub-ceiling on defensive interceptor aircraft. (S)

Nothing has been agreed and I want to request that the next Ministerial look at these concerns. (S)

Fourth, on open skies, we support the proposal and will participate. We intend to work positively and intend to have our military people look at it closely but we should also develop open seas, open space. (S)

[At this point Chairman Gorbachev hands over a map of U.S. bases surrounding the Soviet Union.]³

The President: These are U.S.? (U)

Chairman Gorbachev: You see the USSR is clear (laughs) but the Sixth Fleet is moving. (U)

The President: Where is the SLAVA? (U)

Chairman Gorbachev: Not on the map. (U)

[Omitted here are discussions not related to START.]

1. Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, Condoleezza Rice Files, Soviet Union/USSR Subject Files, OA/ID CF00178–008, Summit at Malta December 1989: Malta Memcons [1]. Drafted by Rice. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. Brackets are in the original. The meeting took place on the Maxim Gorky cruise liner. The full memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1989–1992, vol. III, Soviet Union, Russia, and Post-Soviet States: High-Level Contacts.
2. Reference is to Yazov’s trip to the United States, October 1–7. In telegram 28180 from Moscow, October 10, the Embassy transmitted a report of Joyce’s meeting with Yazov upon his arrival in Moscow on October 7: “Yazov praised arrangements for the visit unstintingly. He seemed exhilarated by the trip. In a five-minute monologue hardly punctuated by pauses to take a breath, he repeatedly praised the openness his U.S. hosts had shown in his visits to military sites. He noted that at San Diego and at Luke AFB he had seen things that SecDef Cheney had said many Americans would not see. Soviet pilots had been allowed to sit in advanced U.S. aircraft other members of the delegation had seen missile sites. ‘We could not feel that anything had been hidden from us.’” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D890874–0499)
3. Not found.