Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

57. Memorandum From the Undersecretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology (Bartholomew) to Secretary of State Baker¹

Washington, November 9, 1989

SUBJECT

• Getting START on Track

In my memo to you on the Bush-Gorbachev meeting² I said that the Washington process is not now on track towards settlement of the major START issues at next year’s summit and ratification of the START treaty in this Administration. This is the memo I promised you on how to get on track. I have designed it as a basis for you to talk privately to the President and to Scowcroft and Cheney because it will take a strong “top down” push. You might want to have a small meeting with me and others to talk it out before you proceed.

The START Timeline

Come 1992, this Administration can have completed and ratified the most remarkable array of arms control agreements in history: START, CFE, TTB and PNET, US-USSR CW reductions. I don’t think it’s necessary to argue at length why we should make a major effort to bring START home before 1992 (even though some might argue that if we have CFE and the other agreements we don’t “need” START). A good START agreement that serves major US interests is within reach. START is at the top of the Soviet agenda. We have much more control over the bilateral START negotiations than we do over the multilateral CFE negotiations and START is farther along. Finally, START has high priority in Congress and the public as the one negotiation about weapons that can destroy the US, and there is a broad perception that the negotiations are well along and considerable expectation that we’ll have a treaty by 1992.

Thus, US interests, relations with the Soviets, what is doable, and domestic expectations all point to a major effort to complete and sign a START treaty no later than the spring of 1991 so that it can be ratified before the election year. To give some sense of the timeline that implies, consider that even after we crack all the big issues (ALCMs, SLCMs, mobile ICBMs, etc.) it will still take months to complete a Treaty text. A much simpler INF agreement that covered only a few systems took six months of intense work and several Ministerials to complete even after the major issues were settled. You will find that once you and your colleagues settle the big problems, a new layer of secondary issues looms larger and must be taken on. Thus, if we haven’t broken the back of the central issues by the end of the 1990 Summit, and move smartly through the thicket of secondary issues thereafter, we won’t bring START into force before the election.

The Current Track Won’t Get Us There

If the Washington process remains stuck on the current track, we can’t get there from here. Consider:

— There is no sense around town that START is urgent business. For example, some proposals in the PCC work program on developing US positions stretch out more than a year.

— No work is underway in the interagency process on the big issues such as ALCMs (look at Tab A for a summary of the status of the major START issues). The interagency process is instead focused on necessary work on important but secondary issues (e.g., mobile ICBM verification, RV counting).

— We don’t even have a complete US START position on the table, or a work program to fill in the gaps. The gaps include mobile ICBM limits, non-deployed missiles, Perimeter-Portal Monitoring, suspect-site inspection, RV counting, treaty duration, and a host of lesser questions. The list at Tab B gives you a feel for just how many gaps there are.

— Against this background, the Geneva delegation is doing what it can to work the secondary issues with the Soviets, and is trying to stimulate Washington decisions that it needs by sending in its own analysis and recommendations.

The fact is if we continue on this track you will have precious little to do on START when you meet with Shevardnadze in the USSR. (And I think that if in the early December meeting the President announces your meeting as part of an agreed work program, late January gives more of a sense of immediate follow-up than early February.) Nor would we be able to substitute other arms control action because NTT is behind us, we can’t move bilaterally on CFE, and the process on the President’s CW initiative may not be ripe for your intervention. In sum, START would be front and center in your meeting with Shevardnadze for these reasons and because he will make it so.

What Needs to be Done

Some might argue that the best way to get to the best START treaty before 1992 is to pressure Gorbachev to make more concessions by continuing to hold back on the main issues while engaging on the secondary questions, and maybe doing just enough from time to time to keep him coming. The rationale for this negotiating strategy, simply put, is that Gorbachev so intensely wants and needs START (because of his difficulties) that we have very strong leverage.

There are risks with this strategy. At some point the Soviets will catch on, probably quite soon since neither Gorbachev nor Shevardnadze are patsies. In fact, what we are hearing in Geneva is that they think this is already the game we are playing. Gorbachev cannot appear to be making all the concessions. You would feel this directly in your encounters with Shevardnadze, who will not want to bear the entire burden to make these meetings successful. And it would not be in anyone’s interest if one of the pre-summit Ministerials fails.

The final irony is that hanging back now leads to a high risk that at the end of the day we will be confronted with a choice between no agreement or a settlement on worse terms than we could have negotiated. In other words, by trying to force Gorbachev to make all the early concessions, he gets to structure the outcome according to his priorities. And leaving key issues for resolution at the last moment opens us to criticism for compromising under pressure of deadlines.

Instead, we need to move now to an approach that recognizes that the major issues can involve discrete trade-offs and can be settled one-by-one, using Ministerials and the Summit as decision points in the process. Our strategic programs are moving forward so we can now engage with the Soviets.

An orderly process of careful analysis of trade-offs, determination of what we need and where we can be flexible, and steady engagement with the Soviets can serve our interests better than leaving everything to what would be portrayed as frenzied end-game deal cutting.

You will need to develop a consensus starting with the President and with Scowcroft and Cheney to take this approach.

The more immediate steps are:

— Implement the line proposed in my memo on the Bush-Gorbachev meeting, i.e., agreement to resolve all the major START isues by the 1990 Summit.

— Fill the gaps in the US position so we have a full proposal on the table before your next meeting with Shevardnadze. A complete proposal is essential for moving on track.

— Aim to solve the mobile ICBM and ALCM issues at the next Ministerial. This means knowing in advance what we need and what tradeoffs we can accept.

— Work with Scowcroft to energize the interagency process to achieve these objectives.

Tab A

Paper Prepared in the Department of State³

Washington, undated

Status of the Major START Issues

○ ALCMs and bombers. These issues should be settled as a package, including ALCM counting, ALCM range, distinguishability between nuclear and conventional ALCMs, conventional bombers, and verification and inspection measures.

	US position	Soviet position
ALCM range	1500 km	600 km
ALCM counting	attribute 10 per ALCM bomber	as equipped
Distinguishability	observable differences	functionally-related differences and observable differences
Conventional bombers	exempt 115	exempt 100 older bombers only

○ SLCMs. The Soviets now propose to settle this issue through binding declarations outside START but worked out by the START delegations. The declarations would be verified with special measures, and the Soviets want to discuss SLCM verification now in Geneva. The US proposes non-binding declarations of intent as the only solution given the insurmountable verification problems.

○ Mobile ICBMs. We have announced we are prepared to lift our proposed ban, contingent on Congressional funding of US mobile missile programs. The Soviets propose to limit mobile ICBMs to 1600 warheads on 800 missiles. In the meantime, work continues in Geneva on a separate Joint Working Paper on mobile ICBM verification, which will be folded into the joint draft Treaty text once the US lifts its ban.

○ Heavy ICBMs. The US proposes to ban the production, testing or deployment of additional heavy ICBMs with the objective of forcing the Soviet SS-18 force to wither away over time. The Soviets would permit remaining SS-18s (154 would be left after 50% reductions) to be modernized, but would ban “new types” of heavies.

○ ICBM Sublimit. The US proposes a limit of 3000–3300 ICBM RVs. The Soviets have stated that they will accept such a sublimit only if it is applied to SLBM RVs as well.

○ Constraints on Non-deployed Systems. The US in the past has advocated constraints (not clearly specified) on certain non-deployed ICBMs (mobiles, heavies, and modern ICBMs). This position has been under review since the beginning of the year, and the delegation is under instructions not to address this subject. (There is, in fact, no review underway.) The Soviets recently introduced a new position, which would limit the number of spare missiles at deployment sites; otherwise excess missiles could be located only at specific locations (storage sites, repair facilities, elimination sites, etc.), but with no limits on numbers. The Soviets would apply these constraints to all types of strategic systems including ALCMs and SLCMs.

Tab B

Paper Prepared in the Department of State⁴

Washington, undated

Gaps in the U.S. Position. (Extracted from PM paper “Status of START”, 10/20/89)⁵

○ RV Counting Issues. While we agreed at the Washington Summit on RV counts for existing types of missiles, we have not yet taken a position on how to count RVs on future types of ballistic missiles.

○ Non-deployed Missiles (i.e., spare missiles not deployed on launchers). The US position is currently under review. This issue is particularly significant because NDM limits drive much of our verification position.

○ Mobiles. The US does not currently have a position on how many warheads to permit on mobile ICBMs, and what other limits we may seek on mobiles. We are reexamining key elements of our mobile verification plans, including the utility of deployment areas. Numerous other blanks within our mobile verification position remain.

○ PPM. The US position on what ballistic missile motor production facilities to subject to perimeter portal monitoring is also under review. In addition, we have not decided whether to PPM mobile launcher production facilities.

○ Suspect Site Inspection. We are also reviewing whether to expand the list of facilities subject to mandatory SSI. In addition, we are reviewing whether to modify the right-of-refusal portion of our current proposal.

○ Missile Accountability. The U.S. currently does not have a position on when missiles and heavy bombers initially become accountable under the Treaty.

○ Tagging. Work remains to be done internally on what kind of tagging regime is technologically and operationally feasible.

○ ICCMs and ASBMs. We have not decided whether to ban or permit intercontinental cruise missiles or air-to-surface ballistic missiles above a certain range.

○ Data MOU. The US position on the categories of data to be contained in the Data Memorandum of Understanding is currently under review.

○ Number and Duration of Phases. While the sides agree to a seven year reductions period, the US has made no proposal on the number of phases in that period or their duration.

○ New Types of Definitions. We need to make up our minds on the allowable changes to a missile, bomber, or ALCM type that, when exceeded, would categorize the altered item as a new type under the Treaty’s provisions. This is particularly important for ballistic missiles since in a number of cases (e.g., throw-weight calculation, RV counting) we treat new types differently from existing types.

○ Treaty Duration. We need to develop a position on the length of the Treaty’s duration (e.g. a fixed period or until signing of another treaty) and the conditions for expiration.

○ Numerical Values and Verification Details. Dozens of blanks remain for numerical values. Numerous verification details in the Inspection Protocol remain (e.g. pre-inspection movement restrictions and details of the SSI regime).

1. Source: Department of State, Economic and Agricultural Affairs, Robert B. Zoellick, Under Secretary for Economic and Agricultural Affairs, Lot 96D484, START-NODIS. Secret; Nodis. No drafting information was found.
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3. Secret.
4. Secret.
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