Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

58. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State¹

10407.

Geneva, November 21, 1989, 1207Z

SUBJECT

• START: Approaching the End of Round XII

1. Secret—Entire Text.

2. The atmosphere continues to be good here but it seems clear results will fall short of what both sides had hoped for this round. This is mainly due to unanticipated problems in implementing the new unit of account, slowness in getting anticipated new instructions from Washington and lack of new ideas from either side on the remaining major issues. At least, peace and friendship were much in evidence at a Soviet reception November 16 to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the beginning of SALT I in Helsinki.

Simplification of the Treaty

3. The need for simplification of the treaty—a theme I have been pushing for some time—is beginning to be more widely recognized here. The sides have reorganized and simplified the MOU and mobiles paper and made other minor fixes. The ACDA lawyers are looking at how we might rationalize the hodge-podge of terminology that has grown up and turn that into a coherent and internally consistent set of properly defined terms. Informally, the Soviets are pointing to the constraints on non-deployed missiles, provisions on case/cass and missile elimination procedures as areas where major simplifications should be made.

4. Everyone would readily agree with the general proposition that the Treaty is far too complex and needs an overhaul. The problems start when one looks at specifics—one person’s simplification will kill another person’s sacred cow. It may be that this is primarily a delegation responsibility. However, some direction from capitals along these lines might be helpful. For example, both sides could formally instruct the delegations to search for ways to simplify the Treaty. More specifically, State could help by focusing interagency attention on NDMS, case/cass and terminology as priority issues for between-the-rounds closure. The point to stress is that this should be done now, while we still have time to do it right, and not in the rush of the endgame.

Unit of Account

5. The sides are now deadlocked on a broad front on how to implement the new unit of account. My comments in the last O-I² remain valid, except that Soviet resistance has stiffened in the last week. They have now agreed to accept our formulation in Article III, which contains the legal obligation. The problem centers on how one views the origins of the unit which is subject to treaty limitations. Neither side wants to end the round with this issue unresolved, but some skillful footwork will be required to avoid that. Jim Medas and I are to meet informally with the Soviets November 21 to explore what might be done to break the deadlock.

6. As I understand it, the key to winning the essential parts of our position on unit of account may be our acceptance in some form of the concept of a “deployed” launcher. The Soviets insist (correctly) that the “launcher” in “deployed missile and its associated launcher” must mean a deployed launcher. They have made clear that their military would feel better about the new unit of account if we would agree on this point. Their approach to the new unit seems to run as follows:

— One establishes that a deployed launcher exists;

— Through the agreed counting rule, one assumes the deployed launcher contains a deployed missile;

— This defines the unit of account—“deployed missile and its associated (deployed) launcher”—which is the entity limited in Article III. The Soviets have agreed to omit the word “deployed” before “launcher” in Article III based upon our assurances that the language does refer to those launchers the soviet side considers “deployed.”

This seems perfectly reasonable, but there is one catch—the U.S. has never accepted the concept of deployed and non-deployed launchers (and heavy bombers). Like certain other theological aspects of our position, the reasons for this have been lost in the mists of time. My understanding is that it was simply a concern that a category of non-deployed launchers or heavy bombers could lead to large numbers of uncounted systems. There was never much danger of that and any possibility that this could happen was ruled out long ago. At the same time, we now have categories of “spare” launchers, test launchers, training launchers, launchers under construction and test heavy bombers, which are not counted in the 1600 aggregate, but limited separately in satisfactory ways.

7. It seems to me that the new unit of account makes the concept of a deployed launcher containing a deployed missile perfectly logical and almost inescapable. This is the unit counted in the 1600 aggregate. All other launchers not associated with deployed missiles are really non-deployed launchers, but one need not use this term, since they all have their own names as noted above. I think this indicates a possible solution to the current messy and quite unnecessary deadlock. If anyone sees a flaw in this, please call right away.

8. I want to call attention to the crucial role Ellie Sutter has played in this whole battle over unit of account. What seemed like a simple fix in Wyoming has proven to be anything but simple. Ellie has supplied a major portion of the intellectual effort on this, plus preparing much of the massive paperwork that was required.

Mobile ICBMs

9. Everyone is awaiting the decision on mobiles. If things are delayed another week, it will be physically difficult to merge the mobiles language into the JDT by the end of the round. Rick might insist that we do it anyway, of course. However, simply telling the Soviets the decision has been made and the merge will be carried out at the beginning of next round would be sufficient to satisfy the Soviets and preserve the Secretary’s reputation. In any case, the details of how the merge should be carried out should remain a delegation responsibility and not allowed to become an interagency agenda item in Washington during the break.

10. We still are not sure whether we will present the JCS concepts for U.S. road-mobile ICBM basing here or not. Burt and Brooks both strongly believe the DEL should not change its game plan just because an agency at home has an idea for changing the U.S. position. The presentation we made on rail garrisons was heavily larded with caveats, which did not come through in the reporting. Anything we say on concepts for road-mobiles will naturally be treated even more carefully. In the future, if something happens in Washington which would make carrying out some part of our instructions a mistake, please stimulate the backstopping apparatus to send us a cable to that effect.

11. The rumors of major changes in the U.S. approach to restricted areas do not fill us with joy. You can easily imagine the effect here if we jettison a concept long agreed at the highest level and carefully elaborated in agreed Treaty text (restricted areas) for one that is highly controversial (deployment areas).

New Kinds of SOA

12. Nazarkin has hinted at a solution to the disagreement caused by the Soviet proposal to ban new “kinds” of SOA in Article V. In response to our objections that this prohibition is too vague and the Treaty should deal with specific systems, he indicated that this proposal might be withdrawn if the U.S. agreed to ban ASBMs and ICCMs. We, of course, have had placeholder language on these for a long time and perhaps Nazarkin’s idea could be used to get a U.S. position at last.

Verification and Stability Measures

13. The batting average on the President’s initiative looks fair: strategic exercises agreement signed; tagging briefings due next week; Soviets positive on RV inspections, though details still to be worked out; Soviets hinting at a positive response on data exchange, though we have yet to hear a formal presentation. I expect the positive U.S. response on heavy bomber exhibitions will help balance the slate. The downsides: given the distance between the sides on the scope and purpose of early PPCM, I foresee no chance for early agreement unless the U.S. side decides to go with a far more modest approach initially—i.e., practice PPCM procedures appropriate to start at one location in each country, but put off an overall survey until later. We will need more question-and-answer sessions with the Soviets before the delegation will be ready to make a recommendation. Nazarkin seems to see STOF as effectively dead in the water, though there are working-level Soviet rumblings that it should be revived. Data Denial remains mired in the technical weeds for now, though there seems to be more high-level interest in pushing it through. We have heard nothing on the Soviet proposal for a SLCM verification experiment since the initial proposal was made.

December Summit

14. The only indication here on what Gorbachev might propose at the December 2–3 summit has been a Nazarkin comment to Rick that START-ABM linkage will be raised. I would guess that events in Eastern Europe will overshadow arms control and that we would prefer it that way in any case. Of course, the symbolism of being on a ship could prove irresistible (Naval Arms Control, SLCMs), but, if Gorbachev does make a move, something on CFE or CW looks more likely than START.

Burt

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D891014–0040. Secret; Immediate.
2. Reference is to telegram 9619 from NST Geneva, October 31. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D890948–0015)