Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

56. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State¹

9860.

Geneva, November 6, 1989, 1710Z

SUBJECT

• START Negotiator’s Midround Report

1. Secret—Entire Text.

2. In this mid-round START update, I would like to give you my personal assessment of the status of the negotiations, summarize the areas where I think we can make some progress and outline what I believe we need to do to move ahead.

3. After Jackson Hole, the atmospherics continue to be good, both in my meetings with Nazarkin and in the working groups. In general, there has been a good, technical give-and-take with few polemics. In fact, last week Nazarkin told me that he is convinced that the Soviets want an agreement more than we do. However, my impression is that Nazarkin is trying to overcome some internal obstacles to be as forthcoming as he can.

4. The Soviet record on substance has been mixed. Some of their responses and proposals have been constructive, such as the restructured mobiles paper and RV inspection. In some cases, they have held steadfastly to old positions, as with ALCMs. At times, there have been apparent disconnects between Nazarkin and some of his delegation, as on unit of account and telemetry. Interestingly, he hinted in one conversation that he is fighting a rearguard action against some of the military hardliners on his delegation.

5. Under the circumstances, our best course of action is to demonstrate that we are serious by fleshing out our position. If we do this, I think we will find that the Soviets are prepared to buy on to much of it.

Summary of the Round to Date

6. The following are the highlights of the round.

— Unit of account: we recently presented our approach for implementing the Wyoming unit of account agreement. Although it was well received in the treaty text working group, it is clear that some on the Soviet delegation are resisting conforming the treaty documents to reflect the agreement, especially in the mobiles and MOU working groups.

— ALCMs: there has been little exchange on ALCMs, except for distinguishability, and the Soviets have not yet agreed to record their proposal to exclude former heavy bombers from the 1600 limit.

— SLCMs: there has also been little development on SLCMs. Nazarkin followed through on proposing a separate agreement, emphasizing binding limitations and discussions on verification. He told me that these two issues must be resolved before they will take the SLCM language out of the treaty text.

— Mobile ICBMs: the work on mobile ICBMs is proceeding well. While noticeably disappointed about not merging the mobile text (JWP) into the JDT, the Soviets tabled a complete restructuring of the JWP at the beginning of the round. This was a constructive step and we have tabled a version of our own based on the Soviet text.

— Noncircumvention: Nazarkin has probed our commitment to the British trident program. I responded that for the U.S. to reduce its commitment is inconceivable. Asking whether U.S. commitment was limited to D–5 or extended beyond, Nazarkin said that this issue is not “insurmountable.”

— NDMs: Nazarkin outlined “new ideas” on non-deployed missiles, saying they would eliminate numerical constraints on NDM outside missile bases, but retain them within missile bases. The Soviet approach looks interesting and we will be probing to learn more.

— Throw-weight: the Soviets are pressing us hard on details of our approaches both on range capability, and on how we will determine throw-weight of existing U.S. missiles and evaluate values for Soviet missiles. They have resurrected the SALT II approach for existing missiles and have hinted they are working on a new approach for future types.

— Inspections: work on the inspection protocol has been going well. The sides have resolved the issue of monitoring support personnel (a key question from last round), and are converging on definition of inspection site.

— In MOU, we are restructuring annexes on ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers. In the treaty text group, the Soviets proposed an approach to limitations on case and cass that could be of interest to us.

— Verification/Stability: Nazarkin and I are focusing on telemetry and RV inspections, and the working group has addressed the other issues with mixed results.

— Nazarkin said he would drop their requirement to include cruise missiles in a telemetry agreement, if we can resolve the duration problem. A solution may be in sight, but solving duration could be complicated by continued Soviet resistance to extending data measurement and broadcast obligations to training launches. Also we are getting mixed signals on whether the Soviets still insist on defining permitted and prohibited data transmission practices.

— Both of us think there are no insurmountable obstacles to getting an RV OSI agreement this round, but we are both waiting on additional guidance from our capitals necessary to finish an agreement.

— We have agreed to hold the first of the unique identifier briefings this month. In some other areas, most notably early PPCMs, we seem to be having difficulty in maintaining momentum. The Soviets tabled a proposal on heavy bomber inspections. We think that aspects of it could be interesting and will be forwarding recommendations shortly.

— Other: Nazarkin and I had productive discussions on several secondary issues. As a result, we agreed to hold expert level meetings to discuss ALCM distinguishability, non-deployed missiles, and the requirement to remove missiles from canisters prior to elimination. It is too soon to say what the results will be, but we are laying a good groundwork for eventual resolution of these issues.

What Can Washington Do to Help?

7. For the remainder of the round, we will focus our efforts on those issues that can be resolved in the next few weeks or that will break logjams. Washington can help by working some key issues on a quick turn-around basis, while maintaining momentum on other issues. FYI: we currently plan to exchange final treaty documents on December 8, which implies a cut-off date for new material NG later than December 1.

— Both Nazarkin and I think we can resolve RV inspections this round. The Soviets have agreed with the essence of our proposal, and likely will agree to demonstrations for both an ICBM and SLBM. We need to be ready to tell the Soviets which of their missiles we want to see and when we can start the process. A quick response on the RFG allowing us to commit to D–5 and peacekeeper inspections and deciding what Soviet missiles we want to inspect would help considerably.

— A decision on range capability is absolutely critical to our efforts in throw-weight. If the U.S. can explain how it intends to determine range capability, I think we can break the logjam in throw-weight and get the Soviets to engage on our protocol.

— We will need authority to begin to merge the mobiles joint working paper with the treaty text as soon as possible after Congress acts on Peacekeeper and Midgetman. This will give us the most latitude to implement the merger and follow through on the secretary’s initiative. Even after we merge text, it is important that we continue to work the verification problem, fill in the gaps in our positions, and reconcile our own mobile deployment plans and the work we are doing in Geneva.

— The next step we should take in PPCMs is to lay down procedures for conducting monitoring. By definition, the longer we wait, the less the value of this initiative.

8. In the rush to finish short-deadline work, I realize it is easy to let longer term issues slide. But we need to maintain our momentum on other issues, so that during the rounds before the summit our position is fleshed out.

— I am glad to hear that work is progressing well on RV counting for future types of ballistic missiles. This is one of the most important issues to resolve in START.

— However, I am disappointed that phasing of reductions and establishing intermediate limits apparently have been reduced in priority in the START work program. This fundamental issue has been discussed off and on for a long time; we need to crystallize what the problems are and try to solve them.

— The Soviet interest in engaging on NDMs highlights the need for the U.S. to form a position on this key issue, which is central to much of our thinking on other issues, such as PPM and SSI.

— We also need to maintain our efforts on the MOU review. The list of unresolved issues is pretty long, and we need a steady-paced effort to work through them. The delegation is working on some ideas to help focus the review efforts.

9. These are my thoughts, and those of many on the delegation. Making decisions on the issues mentioned in this message will, I think, prove invaluable as we head into the upcoming period of ministerials and negotiating rounds before the spring summit. Keeping up the pace now will help us get to the summit in good shape. Cheers. Rick.

Burt

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D890968–0079. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.