55. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union1
338441.
Washington, October 21,
1989, 0307Z
SUBJECT
- Bartholomew-Dubinin Discussion on START, CW
- 1.
- Secret—Entire Text.
- 2.
- Summary. During the course of an October 20 meeting on another subject, Under Secretary Bartholomew and Soviet Ambassador Dubinin discussed the status of START and the President’s initiative on CW. End Summary.
- 3.
- Dubinin asked for Bartholomew’s assessment of the status of the START talks and when a START treaty might be completed. Bartholomew replied that there was a common view within the USG on our serious intent to move expeditiously in START and that Wyoming had been helpful. Moreover, the summit would focus attention on START. He personally felt it a tall order to finish a treaty by the summit. But the U.S. would be working hard at it.
- 4.
- Dubinin commented that he had the impression the U.S. delegation was awaiting new instructions. Bartholomew replied that, before the U.S. could make changes in its position on mobile missiles, as the Secretary had said previously, we had to get action from Congress. This now was a matter of dealing with Congress, not the Geneva negotiations. However, Bartholomew felt there had been some good practical developments between Ambassadors Burt and Nazarkin on a range of secondary but important issues.
- 5.
- Dubinin asked about other questions. Bartholomew observed that Nazarkin was pursuing the Soviet positions on ALCMs and SLCMs. Both sides would have to think hard on these questions. With regard to SLCMs, the idea of not treating them as part of the START Treaty was a positive step, but the sides still had some difficult differences. Looking out the next seven-nine months, there was much intensive work to do. He expected an active period of engagement, both between the ministers and negotiators.
- 6.
- Dubinin asked Bartholomew to comment on the U.S. approach to the CW problem. Bartholomew said the U.S. was ready to work now with the Soviets on reducing CW stockpiles to 20 percent of the current U.S. level, even before a CW convention. This was of real interest. He [Page 381] could imagine accomplishing such a bilateral agreement reasonably quickly.
- 7.
- Dubinin asked how the sides would get from an 80 percent reduction down to two percent. Bartholomew explained that the U.S. would agree to reduce to two percent in the context of a CW convention. We would then reduce to zero once we were satisfied that all CW-capable states had signed the convention. PM/TMP Director Walker added that the previous U.S. position had been that the U.S. would not enter into a convention until all CW-capable states had signed. The President’s UNGA initiative did not require this and thus should accelerate the convention’s entry into force.
Eagleburger
- Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D890912-0016. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent Priority for information to NST Geneva and Geneva. Drafted by Pifer; cleared by Tefft, Timbie, and Dobbins and in EUR/RPM, PM/TMP, S/S, and S/S-O; approved by Bartholomew.↩