51. Editorial Note
On September 23, 1989, Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and their delegations met at the AMK Ranch in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, from 11:30 a.m.–1:00 p.m., to consider the reports of the ministerial’s bilateral working groups on bilateral and transnational issues. The memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1989–1992, vol. III, Soviet Union, Russia, and Post-Soviet States: High-Level Contacts.
[Page 371]Later that day, the U.S. and Soviet delegations released a Joint Statement, which included the following passage on the Nuclear and Space Talks (all brackets are in the original):
“Regarding ABM [antiballistic missiles] and space, the Soviet side introduced a new approach aimed at resolving this significant issue. Both sides agree that the Soviet approach opens the way to achieve and implementing a START [strategic arms reduction talks] treaty without reaching a defense and space agreement. The sides agreed to drop the approach of a nonwithdrawal commitment while continuing to discuss ways to ensure predictability in the development of the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship under conditions of strategic stability to reduce the risk of nuclear war. The U.S. side said it would consider carefully the other aspects of the overall Soviet approach. Both sides agreed that their negotiators would consider these issues in Geneva. They also agreed that the negotiations would discuss the U.S. invitation for Soviet Government experts to visit two U.S. facilities involved in strategic defense research.
“The Soviet side stated that, guided by its longstanding goal of strengthening the ABM Treaty regime, it had decided to completely dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar station. The U.S. side expressed satisfaction with this announcement. At the same time, the Soviet side stressed again the necessity of removing its concerns about the U.S. radar stations in Greenland and Great Britain. The U.S. side promised to consider these concerns, in consultation with its allies.
“In the interest of promoting progress in the negotiations, the Secretary announced that the U.S. side was withdrawing its proposal to ban mobile ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles] in START, contingent on the funding by the U.S. Congress of U.S. mobile ICBMs. The Soviet side expressed satisfaction with this announcement, and the two sides agreed on the need further to develop provisions for effective verification for limits on mobile ICBMs. In this connection, they also reached agreement on additional elements of common ground regarding the verification of mobile ICBMs, building on the elements agreed at the Moscow summit and subsequent work in Geneva.
“Both sides noted the need to resolve the ALCM [air-launched cruise missiles] and SLCM [sea-launched cruise missiles] issues. On ALCMs, the Soviet side put forward a new idea concerning its approach on how to deal with ALCMs and heavy bombers.
“On SLCMs, the Soviet side offered new approaches for dealing with this difficult problem. The Soviet side raised the possibility of dealing with SLCMs in a broader naval arms context. As for the nuclear and space talks, the Soviet side appealed to the American side to concentrate on verification and said that in the context of a verification system for SLCMs, these weapons could be limited outside of the text of a [Page 372] START treaty on the basis of reciprocal obligations. While reiterating its willingness to study the Soviet ideas, the U.S. side, for its part, emphasized its doubts about the feasibility of a workable verification system for SLCMs and noted its longstanding view that there are serious problems involved in any discussion of the limitation of naval arms.
“The Soviet side responded positively to President Bush’s June initiative on verification and stability measures. In this regard, the Secretary and the Foreign Minister had a thorough exchange on the details of the initiative and signed an agreement encouraging the development of such measures and outlining principles for implementing them. They also completed an agreement on the advance notification of major strategic exercises. The sides examined the other verification and stability measures and agreed to explore these further in Geneva.
“The sides also agreed that, for purposes of the 1,600 START limit, ballistic missiles will be defined in terms of missiles and their associated launchers, thus resolving a longstanding issue.
“New instructions will be issued to negotiators to take account of the exchanges on these and other START issues.” (Department of State Bulletin, November 1989, pp. 5–6).