Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

50. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Jackson Hole, Wyoming, September 22, 1989, 5–7 p.m.

MEETING

• U.S.-Soviet Ministerial Working Group on Arms Control

PLACE

• Moose I room, Jackson Lake Lodge, Jackson Hole, Wyoming

Ambassador Bartholomew welcomed Karpov and his colleagues, indicated that he planned first to address START and D&S and then move on to other subjects, and offered the floor to Karpov.

Ambassador Karpov said that leading off with START and D&S was fine and that the Soviet delegation would use “simultaneous whispering” interpretation for the non-English speakers.

Bartholomew proceeded by outlining U.S. views on D&S. He noted that U.S. goals remained unchanged. We were committed to protecting our right to ABM research, development and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty. We would continue to explore effective strategic defenses in order to be in a position to make an informed decision on deployment—and to deploy effective strategic defenses when they are ready. It thus remained essential for a D&S agreement not to foreclose future possibilities or to contain limits on SDI beyond those of the ABM Treaty. Moreover, a START Treaty should not be held hostage to reaching agreement on D&S.

Bartholomew said the U.S. noted with interest President Gorbachev’s references in his letter² to D&S as well as comments provided by Minister Shevardnadze. With respect to the idea of dropping the non-withdrawal period, we of course had no objection as this was a Soviet proposal. We assumed there were no preconditions for this move. With respect to the proposal for defining specifically what can be done within the framework of the ABM Treaty, this sounded like a renewal of the Soviet “list” proposal of 1987, which we believed was more restrictive than the ABM Treaty and presented major verification problems. U.S. initiatives for clarifying what could be done under the ABM Treaty—on notification of testing in space and on not objecting to each other’s space-based sensors—did not have these drawbacks. The Soviet side should work with these initiatives.

Bartholomew said he wanted to check his understanding of what he had heard from the Soviet side on START-ABM linkage. According to his understanding, the two sides would continue negotiating in Geneva on START and D&S. The Soviet side was now prepared to complete, sign, and implement START even if, at that time, there was no agreement on D&S. It seemed to follow that the Soviet side was also prepared to withdraw its proposal in the JDT that would terminate START if the D&S or ABM treaties were violated. The standard withdrawal provision would therefore not make reference to the D&S or ABM treaties. Were these understandings correct?

Karpov replied that his Minister had confirmed Soviet belief in the interrelationship between adherence to the ABM Treaty and 50% reductions. Both of those elements depended on each other. SALT I was the cornerstone of SALT II and START. The relationship could not be broken. The question was how to agree to that interdependence. The Soviet side suggested keeping the essence of the December 1987 agreement but looking for a simpler formula for expressing it. If the proposal for a non-withdrawal period was too difficult, we could withdraw it and search for other ways of guaranteeing that the ABM Treaty remained in force and that both sides were abiding by their obligations. That was why Shevardnadze said that, if there was a gross violation of the ABM Treaty, the other side should have the right to use START’s withdrawal provision. This idea might be expressed in a special article, in an agreed interpretation, or in some other manner. The form was less important than the essence.

Ambassador Burt asked Karpov to confirm that we could go ahead and sign START even if D&S issues were not yet agreed.

Karpov said that was correct.

Burt asked what withdrawal provision START would contain.

Karpov replied that it would contain the “classic” one.

Burt asked what would happen to the bracketed Soviet language providing for termination of START if either side violated the ABM or D&S agreements.

Karpov responded that, if the bracketed formulation was not acceptable, it could be dropped. But there should be an agreed interpretation that use of the withdrawal provision would be justified in case of a gross violation of the ABM Treaty.

Ambassador Cooper asked whether there were preconditions for withdrawing the proposal for a non-withdrawal period.

Karpov said the proposal was not linked.

Cooper asked what the Soviet position was toward other elements of the Washington Summit Joint Statement.

Karpov replied that the centerpiece of that statement was that both sides should carry out their obligations under the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972. One way to carry them out was not to withdraw from the Treaty for an agreed period. Now we should look for another way.

Cooper asked whether the Soviet side still supported a separate agreement.

Karpov said a separate agreement was no longer necessary and could be dropped.

Cooper inquired about the three-year period of discussions on strategic stability at the end of which each side would be free to choose its own course of action if the two had not agreed otherwise.

Karpov said the three-year period also was no longer necessary. Now the Soviet side believed that strategic stability discussions could begin right after the signing of START. All problems not solved by that time could be discussed.

Cooper pointed out that each side’s freedom to choose its own course of action, which was agreed in the WSJS, was not contentious. He did not understand the argument that it should be dropped along with the idea of the non-withdrawal period.

Karpov responded that, if the non-withdrawal period is dropped, then all elements dependent on it must also drop. We must find a new approach.

Burt asked whether discussions on what is and isn’t permitted would begin right away, and also whether there was anything new in the Soviet position on this issue.

Karpov recalled that the U.S. had called the 1987 “list” proposal more restrictive than the ABM Treaty. Now the Soviet side wanted to explore another approach that enabled both sides to conduct research and certain kinds of space-based testing, but that banned testing in space of ABM systems and components and prototypes of those systems and components. If the U.S. agreed with this general approach, we could go deeper into the issue and see whether more concrete elements could be listed in a general way defining the frontiers of what is possible. Or we could list devices that correspond to the ABM Treaty’s provisions. The Soviet side was prepared to look for a common solution.

Cooper said that this is what he recalled from 1987. The Soviet side then was prepared to permit some testing in space. But we studied the specific parameters that were proposed and found them complicated, unverifiable, and more restrictive than the ABM Treaty.

Karpov said the two sides should look forward and asked what the U.S. suggested in this area.

Cooper replied that the initiatives tabled by the U.S. in 1988 regarding testing in space and sensors should be built upon. Also progress had been made on the predictability.³

Bartholomew suggested that the group turn to SLCMs. He noted that Shevardnadze had spoken of an obligation on SLCMs that might be separate from a START Treaty.

Karpov interrupted to say there must have been a misunderstanding. The Minister didn’t say “separate.” He said that SLCM obligations did not have to be in the text of the START Treaty, but would be agreed “in connection with” the Treaty.

Burt said that in Washington there had been a suggestion that such an approach might be similar to the Backfire declaration in SALT II. Would that be a model?

Karpov responded that a similar approach might be used. The important thing was that any exchange of statements create obligations for both sides to limit SLCMs and provide for measures of verification. We should consider what kinds of verification measures can be agreed, perhaps a combination of OSI and technical means. While discussing trial methods of verification, why not discuss SLCM verification?

Burt asked whether verification experiments on SLCMs were a precondition to considering approaches for dealing with SLCMs.

Karpov said the two sides had agreed in principle to trial verification methods. The Soviet side insisted that some methods be applied to cruise missiles.

Burt asked again whether trial verification of SLCMs was a precondition.

Karpov said it was “part of the parcel.”

Burt asked whether the Soviet side still proposed limits on conventional SLCMs.

Karpov replied that, because of the similarity between conventional and nuclear SLCMs, it was useful to have limits on the non-nuclear as well.

Burt said that the Secretary had earlier rejected the idea of entering into negotiations on naval arms. Did the Soviet side consider completion of such negotiations to be a precondition for START?

Karpov asked whether the Secretary had actually been so categorical in rejecting talks on naval arms.

Burt said he had been.

Karpov said the Soviet side understood U.S. arguments about sea lanes of communication, allied guarantees, and so forth, and was not against discussing the safety of those routes.

Burt said he thought Shevardnadze had spoken about narrow negotiations on naval nuclear arms.

Karpov replied “that too.” There could be a U.S.-Soviet seminar on the functions of navies as a basis for achieving further understanding of these issues.

Burt asked whether this would be sufficient to remove SLCMs from START.

Karpov said no.

Burt noted that he had previously explained the benefits of non-binding declarations. Could the Soviet side see circumstances, perhaps as part of a broader package, in which it could consider such non-binding declarations?

Karpov asked whether declarations, if non-binding, would restrict activities in any way. If not, what was their sense?

Ambassador Rowny asked whether they had to be binding.

Karpov replied “naturally.” He didn’t see non-binding declarations as part of any parcel.

Rowny asked whether there must be verification.

Karpov said yes.

Burt asked what in the Soviet approach was new.

Karpov replied that in December 1987 both sides agreed to solve the SLCM problem, but as part of the treaty. Now a solution was possible outside the text of the treaty.

Burt, turning to ALCMs, noted that the Secretary had recognized the Soviet move on conventional bombers.

Karpov interrupted to say that the Secretary had put it immediately into his pocket.

Burt continued that the two principal ALCM issues were counting and range. He wondered how the Soviet side expected to solve the ALCM issue when it was asking the U.S. to accept its position on both.

Karpov claimed that at Reykjavik it had been agreed that 600 kilometers was the dividing line between short and long-range air-to-surface missiles. Only on that condition had there been agreement on the rule for counting gravity bombs and SRAMs. If the range were changed, this would reopen the bomber counting rule.

Ambassador Nazarkin asked for a formal reaction to the new Soviet idea of counting ALCM bombers “as actually equipped.”⁴

Ambassador Robinson said that OSI was designed to ensure that the energy of the explosion was properly coupled to the ground and that there was no decoupling that would provide artificially low seismic readings.

Karpov said that, if OSI above 35 kt was meant to guard against decoupling, weren’t seismic methods also needed to check this?

Robinson explained that there would be three regimes. Below 35 kt, the sides would rely on NTM, primarily seismic. Above 35, there would be OSI rights because this was the range of energies where there would be concern about decoupling explosions of 150 kt. Above 50, there would be a choice between hydrodynamic and supplementing NTM with seismic.

Palenykh said that the U.S. side seemed for the first time to be calling for the use of seismic only above 50 kt. This required consultations with experts before the Soviet side could provide a response.

Robinson said it was correct that the U.S. had not previously agreed to accept seismic under any condition. In connection with the PNET, we had discussed 35–50 kt.

Palenykh said there was a difference between explosions at test sites and PNEs at unknown places.

Robinson said the possibility for decoupling existed regardless of location. The possibilities for decoupling were man-made.

Palenykh said he didn’t know whether this would be a sticking point. They would need to speak to specialists.

Robinson asked whether the problem was the trigger for seismic or CORRTEX or both.

Karpov said both, also the 35 kt trigger for OSI. The Soviet side believed seismic was useful at any level, even below 50.

Robinson said he thought the Soviet side had suggested a 75-kt trigger for seismic.

Karpov said there was a misunderstanding.

Bartholomew said that, if the Soviet side was saying seismic could be used for every shot regardless of yield, then this would call into question the basis for the U.S. proposal. The two sides did not seem as far advanced as he had expected. Concluding the session, Bartholomew asked the participants to keep open the possibility of meeting again later that evening.

1. Source: Department of State, Verification, Compliance and Implementation, Subject Files, 1983–2005, Lot 06D436, Wyoming Ministerial, Sept. 18–23, 1989. Secret. The meeting took place in the Moose I room of the Jackson Lake Lodge.
2. See Document 49.
3. One page is missing from the copy on file.
4. One page is missing from the copy on file.