Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

52. Memorandum From Richard Davis of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)¹

Washington, September 27, 1989

SUBJECT

• U.S. Position on Mobile ICBMs in START

We need your decision urgently on how to implement in Geneva Secretary Baker’s announcement last week that we will “lift our ban on mobile ICBMs in START, contingent upon Congressional funding of our mobile ICBMs.”² Baker’s statement follows closely the language you and he worked out earlier with Secretary Cheney.

The negotiators in Geneva have been developing a detailed “joint working paper” on mobile ICBMs, separate from the Treaty text. This procedure has permitted us to negotiate detailed provisions on limiting and verifying mobile ICBMs while preserving the U.S. ban on mobiles in the formal Treaty text. This distinction has eroded over time, especially as the level of agreed detail in the joint mobile paper has grown. Today, the joint mobile paper contains the two sides’ detailed proposals in legal language, but it remains separate from the Treaty text.

State, ACDA and DOE believe that Baker’s announcement means that we should remove our formal ban on mobiles and agree to incorporate the joint mobile paper into the Treaty text. They believe that we have no significant leverage on mobile verification issues since the two sides’ proposals differ largely on details. Moreover, they argue, a failure to follow-up in Geneva on the Baker announcement and Ministerial Joint Statement would be seen by the Soviets as a cynical attempt to take public credit for making no change in the U.S. position. Finally, they argue that the mechanics of incorporating some 25 pages of mobile provisions into the Treaty would sharpen the remaining issues and facilitate their resolution.

OSD, Joint Staff and Ambassador Rowny favor retaining the separate joint mobile working paper until Congress funds Peacekeeper Rail-Garrison and Small ICBM. They argue that this course accurately interprets Baker’s statement and that a formal move now would leave us in a weakened position vis-a-vis the Soviets if Congress fails to support ICBM modernization.

NSC staff believe that no substantive issues are at stake. Rather, the question of how to proceed turns largely on judgments about the political and bureaucratic consequences of alternative symbolic moves. First, we need to choose between underscoring in Geneva our decision to lift our proposed ban on mobile ICBMs, and underscoring in Washington the fact that lifting the ban is contingent on Congressional funding of mobile ICBMs. Second, and with an eye on likely winners and losers on more substantive START issues down the road, we need to decide which side to take in this bureaucratic fight.

In making these decisions, it is useful to bear in mind that (a) we are likely to have a defense bill enacted—and therefore a clear decision on mobile ICBM funding—within the next few weeks, (b) the current consensus is that we are in reasonably good shape on this issue on the Hill, and (c) whatever we do in Geneva on this issue is unlikely to be noticed by, much less influence, what the Congress does on mobile ICBM funding. In brief, it is very unlikely that we will encounter any Congressional action that would cause us to reverse our decision to drop our mobile ban, but within a few weeks we are likely know for certain.

We have checked with Reg Bartholomew, who says that he is reflecting Secretary Baker’s views when he argues that the START delegation should be authorized to make the shift on mobiles now. Reg makes the point that to do otherwise would make a mockery of the Wyoming Joint Statement which observed that the U.S. side “was withdrawing” its proposed ban on mobiles. He notes that the Delegation can easily be instructed to make a statement that it will have to reverse its position on a mobile ban in the event Congress does not come through on the funding.

We have also checked with Steve Hadley and Howard Graves who feel strongly that no changes should be made in Geneva until the contingency has been satisfied. Howard makes the further point that no written decision on this issue has ever been made, nor has a JCS representative been present at any meeting that might have substituted for a formal decision.

NSC staff believe that the long-term bureaucratic costs are not worth overruling OSD and JCS on this issue. Although the Soviets will charge us with reneging on the Joint Statement, our Delegation should be able to temporize for the necessary two or three weeks, aided in part by a reiteration of the Baker statement that “the U.S. is withdrawing its proposal to ban mobile ICBMs in START, contingent on the funding by the U.S. Congress of U.S. mobile ICBMs.” If the delay is longer, we may have a significant problem in Geneva. In the meantime, our Delegation should be instructed to develop a detailed proposal for incorporating the mobiles language into the joint Treaty text, so they can proceed in Geneva promptly once the contingency is removed.

RECOMMENDATION

That our mobile ICBM proposal remain unchanged in Geneva. Our START Delegation should be authorized to reiterate Baker’s statement that “the U.S. is withdrawing its proposal to ban mobile ICBMs in START, contingent on the funding by the U.S. Congress of U.S. mobile ICBMs,” and to develop a detailed proposal for merging our mobile ICBM provisions into the Treaty text.³

Ginny Lampley, John Gordon, Bob Blackwill and Condi Rice concur.

1. Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Presidential Records, Brent Scowcroft Collection, Scowcroft Close-Hold Files, Box WI–13, NSC Original Files—IF—Brent Scowcroft Folder #3 [8920647–8921233]. Secret. Sent for action. Sent through Kanter. A stamped notation indicates Gates saw the memorandum.
2. See Document 51.
3. Gates initialed approval on behalf of Scowcroft.