49. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev to President Bush1
Unofficial Translation
Dear Mr. President,
I think that the letter you sent me on June 202 opens a new and important stage in our private exchanges. I share your view that direct contacts between us are indispensable, particularly as regards exchanges on the substance of the most important problems whose [Page 362] solution would advance relations between our two countries and strengthen international security.
Negotiations on nuclear and space weapons, with which your letter is concerned, unquestionably require our priority attention both as the essential component in the efforts to reduce the risk of war in general and as assurance of continuity in the historic process of real nuclear disarmament which we started by signing the landmark INF Treaty.
We in the Soviet Union believe—and the round of the Geneva talks which ended in August has confirmed this—that progress achieved thus far provides good groundwork on which to build. Our approaches have quite a lot in common, as has already been recorded in joint documents adopted at summit meetings and in the documents being worked out at the talks. In a word, as you put it, the accomplishments thus far provide a firm foundation for the conclusion of an agreement. This is a very important political statement, binding on both sides.
At the same time there are issues of a fundamental nature which remain unresolved, thus impeding the conclusion of a treaty on 50 percent reductions in strategic offensive arms. I urge you to focus on their solution. I think that at present the talks have reached a critical point, which requires bold political decisions that would bring them to an early successful completion.
In your letter you address the principles of strategic stability. Indeed, removing incentives for first strike, reducing the concentration of warheads on strategic delivery vehicles and giving preference to systems with higher survivability are important guidelines for the NST talks. I am convinced that we must adhere to them both during the talks on 50 percent reductions in strategic offensive arms and at the talks which should follow them to consider even deeper and more radical cuts in the context of strategic stability.
One more general consideration: For a long time the development of the strategic armed forces of our two countries was influenced by geographical and other factors that led to the emergence of significant differences as to their structure. In seeking agreement to reduce strategic offensive arms we must, of course, regard with understanding those special features of each side. We must find common denominators which, while taking account of the differences in the structure of our strategic arms would result in strengthening strategic stability.
To turn now to some specific issues of the NST talks.
You note in your letter that we are divided by a conceptual gap on the questions of ABM and space. Is there a way out of the situation? I think it can be found if the problem is approached more pragmatically.
The important thing here is to continue to abide by the understanding regarding the ABM Treaty which was reached in December [Page 363] 1987 at the Washington summit, namely to observe the Treaty as signed in 1972.
I wish to propose the following: Let us set aside, for the time being, our conceptual argument about whether the placing of weapons in outer space and the deployment of ABM systems will strengthen strategic stability or have an opposite effect. Let us not make more difficult the already complex NST talks by pressing this issue. We could go back to it at the talks on strategic stability, right after the signing of the treaty on strategic offensive arms. We have already agreed to hold such talks.
We also continue to differ in our understanding of what is prohibited and what is permitted by the ABM Treaty. Even though I am convinced that our interpretation is correct, we will evidently fail to make headway if we continue arguing along old lines. The way out, as we see it, would be to attempt to define specifically what can be done within the framework of the ABM Treaty.
The discussion of the question of establishing a period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty has also taken on the character of a conceptual debate. In order to facilitate the solution of other issues at the talks we could drop our insistence on our proposal for such a fixed period of non-withdrawal.
The Soviet Foreign Minister and the US Secretary of State could, if the above considerations prove to be acceptable, work out on their basis appropriate instructions for our delegations at the NST talks.
As we understand, difficulties remain in connection with the so-called issue of the Krasnoyarsk radar. On several occasions I offered various solutions which, in our view, could remove the concerns of the US side. Unfortunately, they have failed to reach their goal. In order to clear up completely the path toward the early conclusion of a treaty on strategic offensive arms, we have taken a radical decision—to completely eliminate that facility. We would expect that the US side will reciprocate so as to remove our concerns related to the US radars in Greenland and Great Britain.
As regards the questions related directly to strategic offensive arms, the greatest difficulties concern long-range SLCMs. Breaking the deadlock in this issue is long overdue. This, as I see it, calls for a major political decision to trade off our mutual concerns. This problem should be analyzed jointly once again, among other things from the standpoint of a broader approach to the problem of naval armaments.
A productive dialogue on that problem should begin at long last at the NST talks. Your side is invoking the difficulties of verification. Why not focus at these talks on the problem of verification with regard to nuclear SLCMs, while the problem of limiting them could be solved taking account of the results of the work on verification. Eduard Shevardnadze is prepared to discuss this matter in greater detail with [Page 364] the Secretary of State and you and I could return to this question, if necessary, at our upcoming meeting.
The problem of ALCMs also remains unresolved although some approaches to its solution began to emerge during the last round. It is obvious that the issues related to ALCMs and heavy bombers must be dealt with as a package. In so doing it is important not to allow the possibility of eroding the ceiling of 6000 warheads. I think that this knot can be untied already in the course of this ministerial meeting.
Finally, the questions of verification. It appears that we can note our common desire to ensure maximum confidence of the two sides that the future treaty on strategic offensive arms will be observed. Your idea of testing verification methods prior to its conclusion appears to be useful. At the same time this can hardly be achieved effectively if a selective method is used, under which monitoring the facilities for the production of strategic offensive arms would apply to mobile ICBMs only.
Clearly, under the treaty itself verification will cover all arms falling within the category of strategic offensive arms, and verification obligations must be equal so as to rule out a one-sided approach. Therefore, trial verification measures should be tested with regard to any kind of strategic offensive arms to be covered by the future treaty. This would provide reliable guarantees of compliance.
We advocate a similar approach to the question of data exchange on strategic offensive arms. We are also prepared to accept familiarization visits on the basis of reciprocity.
I believe that an agreement in principle could be reached between our two countries at foreign minister level concerning the preparation of trial verification and stability measures and their implementation as they become ready. In the course of the upcoming round of the NST talks specific parameters and procedures for carrying out such trial measures could be negotiated.
It would seem that an agreement on notifications regarding major strategic force exercises, which is virtually ready, could be signed at this ministerial meeting.
[Omitted here is material not related to START.]
In closing, Mr. President, I wish to express my willingness for further exchanges on the issues addressed here and the hope that they will advance the cause of peace and security.
Sincerely yours,
- Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Presidential Records, Brent Scowcroft Collection, Special Separate USSR Notes Files, Gorbachev Files, OA/ID 91126–002, Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989–June 1990 [2]. No classification marking. A typed notation at the top of the letter reads “Unofficial translation.” Shevardnadze handed the letter to Bush on the afternoon of September 21. The complete letter is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1989–1992, vol. III, Soviet Union, Russia, and Post-Soviet States: High-Level Contacts. The memorandum of conversation for their 2–3:05 p.m. meeting with U.S. and Soviet officials, by which time Shevardnadze had already delivered the letter to Bush, is scheduled for publication ibid. Following the meeting, Shevardnadze and Baker got on a plane to fly to Jackson Hole. The memoranda of their conversations on the plane, as well as during their September 22 meetings in Wyoming, are scheduled for publication ibid.↩
- See Document 34.↩