48. Memorandum of Conversation1
MEETING
- Sub-group on the Nuclear and Space Talks of the U.S.-Soviet Ministerial Working Group on Arms Control
PLACE
- Department of State, EUR conference room
Ambassador Burt said he didn’t think the sub-group needed to meet for long, but it could take stock and do some useful technical work.
Ambassador Nazarkin agreed. He wanted to lead off by making two points. First, the Soviet side would have some reactions to the additional elements of common ground on mobile ICBM verification offered by the U.S. side. Second, the changes proposed by the U.S. to the Soviet draft umbrella agreement on verification and stability measures were acceptable.
Burt said that was good and that a conforming group should be asked to provide final versions of English and Russian texts.
Nazarkin agreed (and Neverev and Brown were designated to work on the final texts). Concerning the agreement on advanced notification of strategic exercises, Nazarkin said the Soviet side could agree to the English text handed over by the U.S. delegation in Geneva if the U.S. side could agree to the Russian text that was handed over earlier this week when the Soviet delegation arrived in Washington.
Medas pointed out that the word “one” was used in the second line of Article I of the English text. There was a consensus that a comparable concept was not contained in the Russian version. The U.S. side had therefore proposed a change that would make the Russian text conform to the English one.
Nazarkin said that the proposed change wouldn’t quite do so. In Russian, there was no singular equivalent of the English term “military exercise.” When the Russian plural word was put in the singular, it meant a philosophy or theory, or something like that. It was therefore preferable to keep the original Russian and English versions of the text. If changes had to be made, this would take time to get authority.
Medas said there was ambiguity in the way the Russian version was constructed. It was possible to draw Nazarkin’s conclusion, but also to draw other conclusions. Therefore, it was better to clarify it.
[Page 356]Burt said that, if the experts continued to feel there was ambiguity, then it should be clarified. Perhaps the experts could meet again and try to find a solution.
Nazarkin said he hoped that wouldn’t be necessary. Although his conviction was that the Russian equivalent of “military exercise” should not be used in the singular, he was prepared to do so in this case. He would therefore accept a literal interpretation of the English even though it sounded a bit strange in Russian.
Burt said he appreciated Nazarkin’s willingness to bend the beautiful Russian language.
Koltunov, turning the discussion to the agreement on data denial, argued that it was important to have a clear understanding of what practices were prohibited and what were permitted. Data could be transmitted in many different ways, such as low-energy, narrow beams, compressed data, and complicated algorithms. The U.S. draft did not make clear what was allowed. Unless the text was made more specific, there would be disagreements which neither side should want. One possibility was to have an addendum which listed techniques that would be incompatible with the sides’ obligations.
Foley said he thought the two sides had a clear understanding of the technical issues. The U.S. side was prepared to entertain the idea of an addendum. We wanted to stress, however, that the U.S. August 4 paper2 was explicitly limited to ballistic missiles, whereas several of the Soviet technical concerns pertained to cruise missiles. The U.S. was not proposing to change current practices except those practices intended to deny data to the other side. He had enumerated some of those practices on Monday.3 He reiterated that the U.S. was not asking the Soviet side to change its practices except for those practices intended to deny data.
Nazarkin said this was a difficult and complicated matter. He had understood in Geneva that an early agreement would contain only those elements already agreed in NST. Thus, it was fair that it would cover only launches from test sites. But there was no agreement in Geneva on the question of systems to be covered. Mr. Foley mentioned that cruise missiles should not be included. But there was disagreement on this. He didn’t want to say the problem was insurmountable. But further time was required for decisions. There was also the question of duration. The U.S. side wanted an agreement on telemetry as a trial verification measure. But if it was only a trial measure, it would not resolve the telemetry issue as a whole, and it could come back to complicate the completion of START. That was why the Soviet side wanted [Page 357] to separate the telemetry issue from START. A solution could be found prior to START and its duration could run parallel to START’s duration.
Burt said the discussion had been useful. It had exposed the fact that there were some fundamental differences as well as some technical problems. Consistent with the approach taken in the U.S. initiative on verification and stability measures, the U.S. side proposed reaching agreement on elements of common ground on data denial and implementing them as a means of achieving in the longer run an adequate START agreement. Of course, there currently were differences. The question of cruise missiles was one of them. But the sides should implement now what was already agreed and then come up with more fully satisfactory solutions in the context of a START treaty. Differences appeared to exist on what practices would be prohibited, on the treatment of cruise missiles, and on the Article VI duration question. Also, the Soviet side did not yet address the issue of test ranges. It did not seem as if the subject could be resolved today. It could be returned to later in the week and in Geneva. He concluded that the most constructive approach was to codify what was agreed to date and leave open the opportunity for both sides to seek better outcomes in a completed START agreement.
Nazarkin agreed that the subject required further study. There was not enough time here. He also shared the view that what was already agreed should be recorded. But there was an inconsistency between the U.S. document’s addendum, which listed specific types of ICBMs and SLBMs only and Article IX, paragraph 4 of the START JDT, which contained both U.S. and Soviet formulations in brackets.
Brooks reiterated the importance of capturing common ground without prejudicing the positions of either side.
Nazarkin remarked that, in addition to excluding cruise missiles, the U.S. approach did not include all ballistic I missiles—only those flight tested after October 1, 1964.
Burt said Nazarkin had just reinforced his point that differences remained and that the two sides should move on. Turning to the unit of account issue, Burt asked if there was a response to the U.S. compromise offer.
Nazarkin said he wanted to clarify one point. If the U.S. proposal were accepted, would the number of missiles and launchers be the same?
Burt said that, in terms of the 1600 ceiling, the number would be the same. The thing that would be limited would change from a single item to a set of two items—missile and launcher. This would affect only the provisions dealing with the 1600 limit, primarily in Articles III and VII.
Nazarkin stated that, ad referendum and in a spirit of compromise, the Soviet side was prepared to accept the U.S. formulation as a general rule. But it did not exclude the possibility that, in working out the texts, certain exceptional circumstances might arise requiring departures from the rule.
[Page 358]Burt expressed his appreciation for the Soviet move, noting that it reflected Nazarkin’s personal efforts to move the negotiations forward. He recognized that, in adopting the U.S. approach as a general rule, the two sides would have to determine its applicability in specific cases. Agreement on the unit of account would achieve more than many would think. On the U.S. side, it would help obtain wide support during the ratification process. And limiting both missiles and launchers would be a real step forward in arms control. Burt next turned to short-time-of-flight (STOF) SLBMs, and called on Mr. Brooks to outline the U.S. approach.
Brooks noted that in Geneva the U.S. side discussed three ways to achieve short time of flight—depressed trajectory, shaped trajectory, and reducing range. One of the Soviet counterproposals focused on ensuring range would not be reduced by requiring ballistic missile submarines to remain beyond a certain minimum distance from the shores of the other Party. This revealed a difference of approach. The U.S. did not seek to reduce the threat of surprise attack by altering current practices because such an attempt would be both unverifiable and operationally unacceptable to both sides. Instead, it sought to restrain the ability to develop future capabilities for surprise attack by mutual restraint in the testing of STOF SLBMs. While limitations on submarine operations would reduce survivability and thus lessen stability, foreswearing development of STOF SLBMs—which neither side had so far chosen purposefully to develop—was inherently stabilizing. Operational restrictions such as stand-off zones could easily be violated in hours or days, and thus did nothing to inhibit acquisition of a STOF capability. It would be unwise and unacceptable to attempt restrictions on submarine operations.
Nazarkin asked whether the 15-minute limitation would apply to submarines in such a way that they would not be able to approach a coast at a distance related to the flight time of a missile.
Brooks said no. The U.S. was trying to limit flight testing of new missiles and certification of older missiles to fly at reduced ranges or flight times.
Burt added that, if neither side developed such a capability, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to carry out attacks using STOF, including near the coast of the other side.
Brooks said the U.S. was trying to prevent future problems, not to address current problems.
Nazarkin, after consulting with Soviet experts, provided a drawing4 illustrating depressed, shaped, and short-range trajectories and asked how each would be treated under the U.S. proposal.
[Page 359]Burt noted that the drawing indicated nothing about time. If any of the flights illustrated on the drawing took less than 15 minutes, it would not be permitted. If the flights took longer than 15 minutes, they would be permitted.
Nazarkin said Soviet experts found a certain inconsistency in what Brooks had said, especially the remark that the U.S. proposal did not extend to present practices.
Burt said Brooks was only referring to a broader approach that would require changes in the operational practices of ships and submarines.
Khromov asked whether the U.S. had missiles with less than 15 minutes flight time.
Burt replied that any missile can be tested with less than 15 minutes flight time. Therefore, any ban on STOF capability would require extensive definitions and stringent verification provisions. Under the U.S. approach, nothing would prohibit the Soviet Union from developing a missile that had the capability for flights less than 15 minutes. But it would declare that it would not test a missile in that fashion. After long study, the U.S. had concluded that this was the most practical approach.
Nazarkin said the Soviet side would address the U.S. approach in Geneva. At the same time, it wanted to keep the broader Soviet approach on the agenda. Nazarkin then turned to U.S.-proposed additional elements of common ground on mobile ICBM verification. Regarding element 1A, the Soviet side proposed an alternative: “Rail garrisons would be limited in size recorded in the MOU. The manner of recording the size is to be agreed by the two sides.” The sizes recorded in the MOU would be the limiting factor. Assuming size would be limited in terms of length of track and assuming the Soviet side had garrisons of 20, 30, and 100 km, 100 km would be the absolute limit. This approach would not require the sides to change existing practices.
Burt asked whether the Soviet side was accepting the basic principle of limiting the size of rail garrisons.
Nazarkin asked what was meant by “limiting?”
Burt said the U.S. side wanted limits on the size of rail garrisons the same way it wanted limits on the size of road-mobile restricted areas. It was prepared to discuss size limitations that would meet both sides’ interests.
Nazarkin said there seemed to be a difference between the sides’ approaches. The U.S. approaches would appear to require changes in existing practices. The Soviet approach would not, although changes could be made in the future.
[Page 360]Burt said he wanted to understand the Soviet concern. If you had a garrison of 100 km and the agreement set a limit at 80, you wouldn’t want to rip up 20 km. Was that right?
Nazarkin said that was right. The maximum existing length would set the limit for the future.
Burt said the two sides seemed to agree on the need to establish a limit.
Nazarkin agreed on the need for limits, but felt they should apply to future practices, not present practices.
Burt asked whether existing practices would be subject to any limits under the Soviet approach.
Nazarkin said the sizes of existing garrisons would be recorded in the MOU. They could neither be enlarged nor made smaller. Turning to the U.S.-proposed element 1B, Nazarkin said the Soviet side could accept the U.S. formulation with the addition of “whose nature, scope, and procedures are to be agreed upon by the two sides.”
Burt said the U.S. side would study the Soviet modification, but it looked pretty good.
Koltunov, turning to element 2A (“the number of restricted areas for road-mobile ICBMs and their launchers shall not be limited”), said that, the fewer there were of restricted areas, the easier they would be to verify. What number did the U.S. want if not five?
Brooks pointed out that the U.S. was not yet certain about the basing mode for its road-mobile system. One approach would be to have a smaller number of road-mobile launchers in a restricted area than we believe to be the practice of the Soviet side. Thus, there could be different numbers of restricted areas for the two sides even if they had the same number of missiles and launchers. In the U.S. view, what was important was that the numbers be known, their size constrained, and their locations declared. This would provide the necessary verification without foreclosing options for U.S. road-mobile basing, which is several years in the future.
Khromov asked whether the U.S. believed the number of restricted areas should be limited in principle.
Brooks said no. Limiting the number of areas was not needed for verification. Also, the U.S. approach would avoid trying to force the sides to change existing practices.
Koltunov asked whether, if the sides agreed not to limit the number of restricted areas, the U.S. side could accept the Soviet view that a missile base should be comprised of no more than five RAs and a maintenance facility and that restricted areas should be limited in size to 100 square km.
Brooks said not completely.
[Page 361]Nazarkin, regarding element 2B (“no more than 10 road-mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be based or located in a restricted area”), proposed replacing “shall” with “may.”
Burt said this seemed acceptable as long as it was understood that neither side could deploy more than 10.
Nazarkin said 2C was acceptable, but that the Soviet side had problems with 3A. It was not understandable.
Burt suggested that, because of the late time, the sides return to the issue later.
Nazarkin nodded his approval.
Burt summed up by saying the work of the sub-group had been very productive. He thanked the Soviet side for its cooperation.
Nazarkin said he was also satisfied with the work of the sub-group and thanked the U.S. side for its constructive approach.