Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

47. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State¹

8747.

Geneva, October 6, 1989, 1211Z

SUBJECT

• Official—Informal

1. Secret—Entire Text.

2. There follows draft MemCon of September 19 NST Subgroup (morning session), cleared by Amb. Burt, Lint Brooks and Jim Medas, for further Washington clearances. Am sending diskette with this and text of other MemCons via pouch.

3. NST subgroup

— Wyoming ministerial/Washington portion

— Second session

4. Meeting date: September 19, 1989

— Time: 10:40 a.m.–1:00 p.m.

— Place: Department of State

5. Participants:

U.S.

• Richard Burt (NST)
• Linton Brooks (NST)
• James Medas (NST)
• Lucas Fischer (ACDA)
• Robert Joseph (OSD)
• Eugene Daniel (JCS)
• Alan Foley (IC)
• Richard Davis (NSC)
• Robert Walpole (PM)
• Robert Einhorn (S/P)
• Jeffrey Starr (NST)
• Thomas Foley (T/ART)
• Marshall Brown (ACDA/GC)
• Eleanor Sutter (EUR/SOV), Notetaker
• Deborah Garretson, Interpreter
• Galina Tunik, Interpreter
• Alan French, Interpreter

USSR

• Yuriy K. Nazarkin (MFA)
• Yuriy I. Roslyakov (MFA)
• V.S. Koltunov (MOD)
• Igor Neverov (Embassy)
• Aleksandr Zhgutov (Embassy)

Organizational Questions

6. Burt began by asking Nazarkin’s preference as to language and organization of the session. Nazarkin said he would speak English, since today’s talks would be more specific than those of the previous day and it would save time. Nazarkin proposed a general review of all questions covered the previous day. He noted that there were two problems: first, he suggested a special afternoon meeting of experts on telemetry to discuss questions concerning the draft agreement tabled by the U.S. side; the questions would be very technical and specific. Second, he said the Soviet delegation was not prepared to respond conclusively on all issues raised the previous day. Though the meeting had been reported to Moscow, because of the time difference a response had not yet been received. Nazarkin proposed the sides hold an additional session the next day, so the Soviet side could speak more conclusively. The sides agreed that telemetry experts would meet that afternoon.

7. Burt suggested that a conforming group meet separately as soon as possible to discuss the language in the draft strategic exercise notification agreement; Nazarkin agreed.

Verification & Stability Measures: Umbrella Agreement

8. Burt raised the Soviet draft umbrella agreement on verification and stability measures, and asked whether the U.S.-proposed changes were acceptable to the Soviet side. Nazarkin said the Soviet team in Washington had analyzed the U.S. changes and found them all to be improvements; they were all editorial and presented no problems. The Soviet side had reported this to Moscow. However, the Soviet side would need instructions in order to finalize the agreement, so Nazarkin suggested this be done the next day. Burt and Nazarkin agreed to hold a conforming meeting on the umbrella agreement the next day.

Data Denial

9. Turning to the subject of telemetry, Burt said the U.S. was willing to hold the experts’ meeting, but that there were also political and legal questions to be discussed. According to the philosophy of the draft Soviet umbrella agreement on verification and stability measures, these were trial verification measures and experiments intended to improve the START agreement, to build on the sides’ knowledge. In that light, Burt asked whether the Soviet side still saw a need to revise Article VI. Nazarkin replied affirmatively, but said he understood Burt’s point; the duration should be consistent with the duration of the START treaty. The Soviet side did not yet have a formula that would take the U.S. point of view into account; more time was required. But the Soviet side was ready to listen to and study any specific suggestions the U.S. side might have.

10. Burt said the U.S. side had no specific suggestions at this stage, but was faced with something of a dilemma. The U.S. side was satisfied with its draft and thought it would be helpful for both sides; it would be useful to conclude the agreement prior to completion of the START agreement. The U.S. side did not want it to slip away; it would be useful to codify what was already agreed. But the U.S. side did not want to give up the opportunity to improve or build upon this agreement. So it would be important, as the sides thought about Article VI, to keep options open to improve or build upon this agreement. The U.S. side was not prepared to have Article VI reflect an agreement to cease discussion of this subject, because the U.S. side felt it would be possible to make further improvements. This was the dilemma—Burt asked Nazarkin’s view of how to resolve it.

11. Nazarkin said he saw the psychological problem the U.S. had with changing its own text. He had not yet had sufficient time to analyze it and prepare suggestions. If the sides decided to meet the next day—and his understanding was that this had been agreed—the Soviet side would have more time later in the day to discuss and analyze the agreement amongst themselves.

12. (At this point U.S. Legal Advisor Brown arrived; Medas, Brown, French, Roslyakov and Neverov left to work on conforming the strategic exercise notification agreement.)

Mobile ICBM Verification

13. Turning to the subject of mobile ICBM verification, Burt noted that the U.S. position still called for a ban on mobile ICBMs, but said the subject had been discussed recently at the highest levels of the U.S. Government. (At this point Nazarkin suggested that the sides begin to use an interpreter.) Continuing, Burt said serious consideration had been given to lifting the ban on mobile ICBMs. Such a move would bring the sides closer to completing a START agreement, but it also made the question of effective verification more urgent. In that spirit, Burt said, the U.S. side had given the Soviet side a list of additional elements of common ground for the verification of mobile ICBMs. He asked whether the Soviet side was ready to discuss them, emphasizing that the U.S. side was seeking to identify individual points of common ground, and did not consider its proposed elements to be a “take it or leave it” package. Burt hoped the sides could concentrate on those elements the Soviet side found constructive and work on those.

14. Nazarkin welcomed the idea of elaborating additional elements of common ground. He said the Soviet side had tried to study the U.S. proposals the previous day but had run out of time. He thought the Soviet side would be prepared to return for more productive work on this subject at the next meeting. Nazarkin asked Burt to clarify how the U.S. side saw the relationship of these additional points with the existing document on common ground:² was this intended as an entirely new document? As a replacement for the previous document? Burt replied that the U.S. side had no clear-cut plan. If agreement could be reached on the additional elements, then the sides could examine the existing document to see how the new elements fit. Alternatively, during the course of this week’s meetings the sides could produce a new document which would contain additional elements of common ground. In the longer term, the sides could use these areas of agreement not so much to change the previous common ground document, as to provide a basis for further work in Geneva. The ultimate aim was to produce something that could be incorporated into the JDT. Burt made a practical suggestion: the sides should focus first on the new elements of common ground, then examine the older document to see whether there were any inconsistencies or problems. Nazarkin agreed. He thanked Burt for the clarification and called Burt’s approach a good and practical one. Burt said the U.S. side would study the old elements of common ground to see whether there were any problems, so these could be addressed in the sides’ discussions.

Unit of Account

15. Burt turned next to the issue of unit of account, and asked whether Nazarkin had any brilliant ideas on that issue. Nazarkin said that after discussion amongst themselves the Soviet side had concluded that their formula was more logical. The order did not change the substance, but Soviet experts believed that putting launchers first was more logical because missiles were associated with launchers, and not the reverse. This was especially the opinion of Col. Koltunov, who was the person most responsible for this issue. But Nazarkin thought probably Amb. Burt would have an even more brilliant idea.

16. Burt said U.S. lawyers had said his previous suggestion of reversing the order in the English and Russian texts of the treaty was not brilliant. So for now he had run out of brilliant ideas, but fortunately Mr. Joseph, the OSD representative who would soon be in Geneva in an important job, understood these issues. Burt asked Joseph to explain why he believed the U.S. position was more logical.

17. Thanking Burt, Joseph said he thought both sides could make arguments based on logic. The U.S. side had taken the position that the unit of account should be missiles, because they actually killed people. Joseph did not think it would be profitable to debate, based on logic, Nazarkin’s reference the previous day to the question of whether the bullet or the gun was more dangerous. Joseph thought it would be more compelling to explain why it would cause problems for the U.S. side if launchers were used as the unit of account. First, launchers were more difficult to define than missiles. Second, the phrase “launcher and its associated missile” would cause problems in the JDT for the U.S. side due to the issue of “non-deployed launchers” or “non-deployed bombers,” because the U.S. position did not provide for the concept of non-deployed launchers. To be perfectly candid, Joseph said, perhaps the greater problem with putting launchers first was a political one for the U.S. side. One major criticism of the SALT II approach had been that launchers, and not missiles, had been counted. This was a very practical problem that was independent of logic. This was why the U.S. side supported the compromise package it had tabled the previous day and asked the Soviet side to accept it.

18. Nazarkin said he would follow Burt’s brilliant idea of allowing his military expert to speak, and invited Col. Koltunov to present his reasons for preferring the Soviet position.

19. Koltunov thanked Joseph for his clarification of the U.S. position, and said the Soviet side would analyze it again. There were some elements with which the Soviet side could agree, he said, but there were others on which it was difficult to agree. In the Soviet view, the main thing was what the sides had established the previous day: for the 1600 limit in Article VII of the JDT, the unit of account is a system or complex consisting of a launcher and a missile (or a missile and a launcher). Other areas in the JDT were no problem because they concerned either a launcher or a missile. But from a practical point of view the launcher should come first because it was not by chance that the SALT treaty had used launchers. If one assumed it would be hard to define a launcher and that therefore it should be in second place—then, Koltunov wished to note, the same problem would exist no matter which word came first. From a practical standpoint, if a launcher was built it was more practical to view a missile as made for that launcher. But practical difficulties arose when you began with the missile and put it with the launcher. Koltunov repeated that both sides were assuming that launchers should be used above all for counting and monitoring. In both versions the same situation existed: each deployed launcher corresponded to a missile, and the reverse was also true. So in either case there would be a strict correspondence between a deployed launcher and a deployed missile. Koltunov said perhaps the sides needed more time to think about this question and to reach a mutually acceptable solution.

20. Burt said that in listening to Koltunov’s very learned statement he had been impressed, and he knew Nazarkin had been impressed by what Mr. Joseph had said. But Burt had two things he wished to add. He was a bit concerned with Koltunov’s last assertion that the sides needed more time to address this issue. The sides had a tremendous amount of work ahead of them in Geneva. They now had conceptual agreement on the unit of account issue. The START negotiations had been in progress since 1982, Burt said; if the Soviet or U.S. public knew the sides were still arguing about what was being limited both negotiators would be hanged. So, having reached conceptual agreement, Burt thought the sides had to make a commitment to resolve the issue, sooner rather than later. If the sides always backed away from tough issues, they would never reach agreement. Secondly, Burt wanted to make a personal appeal to Nazarkin: recalling his days as a newspaper reporter during the SALT II debate of 1979, he remembered that one of the main lines of attack was that the agreement only limited launchers. That was why the U.S. side was very mindful of the fact that there would be a debate on any agreement signed, and that this agreement would be compared to SALT II. Burt and others would be asked to testify and explain how they had improved the START treaty by comparison with SALT II. Symbolism would be very important in that debate; for the negotiations to succeed each side would have to take into account the domestic circumstances of the other side. Thus Burt appealed to Nazarkin to take into account the special psychological requirements of the U.S. side.

21. Nazarkin said that first he wanted to state that in principle the sides had already reached agreement on this issue, because they had agreed to count a combination of both items. The problem they were now discussing was psychological and theological. Burt agreed. Nazarkin said the sides would solve it; he was sure that when Col. Koltunov referred to needing more time he was referring to time spent in Washington, not in Geneva. It would be a matter of a few days. Nazarkin saw two possible options: either the sides would find a compromise that would satisfy the ambitions of both sides—and frankly Nazarkin said he did not see such a solution—or they could toss a coin. Burt replied that he had just said the same thing to Brooks; he suggested facetiously that Joseph and Koltunov be asked to toss a coin. Burt offered another mock solution: since both delegations had very creative people, Koltunov and Joseph should be locked in a room with no windows and given no food or water until they found an answer. Nazarkin said the sides should try this approach; Koltunov warned that he had had a good breakfast that morning.

Short-Time-Of-Flight (STOF)

22. Turning to another issue, Burt raised the draft short-time-of-flight (STOF) declaration the U.S. side had handed over the previous day, and the Soviet suggestion that it be broadened. He said the U.S. had concluded that in order to balance effective limits on the acquisition of STOF capabilities with minimum interference on testing unrelated to STOF, it would be desirable to proceed in the following way: both sides would, in parallel, declare their intention not to conduct from land or sea any flight of less than fifteen minutes in duration, from time of launch to time of impact, of any SLBM of a type that had demonstrated a range of more than 500 km.

23. Burt then made some specific comments concerning the U.S. approach. First, he noted that in response to Soviet questions during Round XI the text defined what is meant by STOF: 15 minutes or less from the time of impact of the first RV or final boost stage of the SLBM. The essential feature is that a short time of flight implies reduced warning time. This is what creates greater instability. Second, Burt said, the declaration would apply only to SLBMs which had demonstrated a range in excess of 500 km. This provision is intended to distinguish between strategic missiles and current tactical sea-based missiles on both sides, which should not be included. Burt recalled that in May Foreign Minister Shevardnadze had told Secretary Baker that the Soviet side was ready to discuss the problem of Depressed-Trajectory (DT) SLBMs. The U.S. had viewed this as a very positive sign, Burt said. In examining the DT problem, the U.S. side had recognized that the aim was to reduce the possibility of short-warning attack by SLBMs. One way for SLBMs to undertake a short-warning attack was by means of a DT launch. But U.S. experts had concluded that there were other ways a short-warning attack could be conducted by SLBMs. They had also concluded that it would be enormously difficult to define the specific parameters of a DT attack. This was why the U.S. had come up with an approach designed to achieve the same objective—incorporating DT along with other forms of short-warning attack, Burt said.

24. Noting that the sides had established an honest and straightforward relationship, Burt assured Nazarkin that the U.S. side had no hidden agenda in this case. This was not an attempt to limit a capability on the Soviet side while keeping it for ourselves. The U.S. proposal did not cover all types of threat, but it did deal with one specific concern which, as the Soviet side was aware, had been registered by some influential members of the U.S. Congress. Burt said that the sides’ ability to reach an understanding regarding STOF tests and launches would be seen as a positive step to achieve greater strategic stability between the two sides. Recalling the U.S.-proposed declaration handed over the previous day, Burt said that under the U.S. approach the sides would make parallel declarations. Burt asked whether the Soviet side was prepared to discuss the more limited U.S. approach. If not, he said he would inform Secretary Baker and suggest that this issue be taken off the agenda for the time being.

25. Nazarkin said he appreciated very much the relationship which Burt had correctly characterized as honest and straightforward. In that spirit, he said, he would explain the Soviet position on this issue and on the U.S. proposal. He said the U.S. paper contained an absolutely new idea. It was interesting—he did not deny that it was interesting—but it was new. The Soviet side had reported it to Moscow, but there had been no time to analyze it; the Soviet delegation was awaiting Moscow’s reaction. Nazarkin said he had listened with interest to Burt’s observations with regard to the Soviet presentation the previous day of a broader approach; he said the Soviet side would study Burt’s observations very attentively. At this point Nazarkin said the Soviet side could not offer any more definite reply regarding the U.S. proposal. They were not rejecting it, he said, and would listen with interest if the U.S. side had any more ideas to clarify and support its proposal. This was all Nazarkin could say for the present; a more conclusive reaction would have to await the arrival of the main Soviet delegation.

26. Burt asked Brooks whether he would like to add anything. Brooks said that Ambassador Burt had expressed the U.S. view the previous day: this was a confidence-building measure under which both sides would make a public statement of what the U.S. believed was both sides’ private intentions. The U.S. thought this would be a good thing. At the same time, in studying Soviet questions from the previous round the U.S. side had become convinced that there was no way to meet this objective in a completely verifiable way; thus the U.S. had conceived the idea of reciprocal declarations as a symbol of the confidence the sides are trying to build as they move toward a more stable relationship.

27. After Nazarkin had thanked Brooks, Burt expressed his own understanding that this proposal would not alter in any significant degree the existing operational practices of the two sides. The Soviet side might ask why, in that case, was an agreement necessary? The answer, Burt said, was that this proposal stemmed from a desire to deal with concerns that might exist in the Soviet Union or the United States that, in the future, such capabilities could be developed for unilateral advantage and could raise the risk of a first strike. Burt said that in his view there was a need to head off those kinds of concerns. To the extent that the sides could create greater confidence and predictability in both sides’ forces and intentions, not only would greater arms control progress be possible but also greater confidence and trust in the relationship. Nazarkin thanked Burt for the clarification and asked whether the U.S. side had any further items on its agenda. Burt suggested a short break so the conforming group on the strategic exercise notification agreement could present its report.

Strategic Exercise Notification (Conforming Issues)

28. After the break, Medas reported general agreement on the text of the strategic exercise notification agreement, but pointed out that in Article I Neverov had suggested that the English version refer to notification of “the” major strategic forces exercise instead of “one.” The sides had agreed that the Russian formulation should say “the major . . .” (“Samyi Krupnyi”). In Article II, Medas continued, a change had been made in the English text which did not require a change in the Russian text, but which reflected the Russian better and was consistent with treaty Article X/Paragraph 5: the first sentence would read: “each party shall provide to the other party the notifications required . . .” This was parallel to language in Article II/Paragraph 2, Medas said. Medas also noted that in paragraph 2, the language had been adjusted to be more consistent with treaty language: “provided” was used instead of “made,” and “prior to” was used in the second sentence. The sides were still discussing the question of the date, Medas said, and the Soviet side was checking the language in Article II/Paragraphs 2–3.

29. Nazarkin thanked Medas, and sought confirmation that the time used in Article II/Paragraph Two was equivalent to Greenwich Mean Time; Burt confirmed that it was. Nazarkin reiterated the Soviet request that Article I refer to “the major” exercise, since this was closest to the Russian “Samyi Krupnyi;” he said he would have to confirm this with higher authorities, but thought it would be acceptable. Burt gave AD Ref U.S. agreement to the changes in Articles II and III, but sought to explain, as he had the previous day, the U.S. approach concerning Article I. The U.S. proposal would obligate both sides to notify “one” major strategic forces exercise involving heavy bombers per year. As the U.S. had said, our intention is to notify Global Shield, which is the largest such exercise if it is held. If Global Shield were canceled, the U.S. would notify another major exercise—the largest one held in that year involving heavy bombers. However, to avoid the difficulty of defining precisely what would be “the” largest exercise, the legal obligation would be to notify “one” exercise; the U.S. side had not tried to define “largest.” Thus, the U.S. side would have to consider whether it could accept the word “the” in Article I.

30. For example, Burt continued, suppose in 1995 the largest exercise planned by the U.S. side was Global Shield, and it was scheduled for September. Suppose that the next largest exercise that year took place in May and the third largest was planned for December. The U.S. intent was to notify Global Shield because it would be the largest. Suppose the May exercise was conducted, but in August Global Shield was canceled: in that case, our intent would be to notify the December exercise, the third largest. But in that case, the Soviet side would be able to say that the United States had violated the agreement, because “the largest exercise” in 1995 had taken place in May and the U.S. side had failed to provide notification. The U.S. side wanted to avoid that kind of ambiguity, Burt explained; we did not want to debate over what was “the” largest exercise. This was why the U.S. proposed to say “one” major exercise in Article I. But the intent was to notify global shield, if it took place.

31. Nazarkin said he understood the U.S. problem, and that the Soviet side would await U.S. confirmation that the change was acceptable. Burt pointed out that this could also be a problem for the Soviet side; Nazarkin confirmed that this was correct. After a brief caucus, Nazarkin said it appeared the Soviet side did have the same problem, and that the problem Burt had just described was a real problem. He said that apart from Article I, the Soviet side was prepared to agree that the entire text was ready. Regarding Article I, he proposed that the sides think about a way out of the situation Burt had described very precisely, and come back to the subject at the next day’s meeting.

32. Burt suggested that although the legal experts had agreed that “the” conformed to the Russian text, perhaps “a” could also work. Burt said that if the Russian text was compatible with “a,” then he thought the issue could be resolved. Nazarkin said Burt was correct in saying that “A” would bring the English text closer to the Russian version, but there was still a problem concerning the kind of exercise; “a major” was not necessarily equivalent to “the major.” Nazarkin asked whether, with this wording, the U.S. side would be able to refrain from notifying the Soviet Union of Global Shield. Burt replied negatively, quoting from a May 5, 1989 letter from Defense Secretary Cheney to Soviet Defense Minister Yazov: “The U.S. is prepared to notify you no less than fourteen days in advance of conduct of the U.S. strategic air command exercise “Global Shield,” on the understanding that in the same year the USSR will provide 14-day advance notification of a major Soviet strategic forces exercise involving heavy bomber aircraft.”

33. Brooks explained why the U.S.-proposed text of the agreement did not mention Global Shield by name even though it had been mentioned in the Cheney letter: the U.S. wanted to assure the Soviet side that when we did not hold Global Shield we would at least notify the Soviet side about some exercise. The goal was not to provide less information, Brooks said, but to guarantee that the Soviet side would receive at least one notification in each year. Burt added that he was sure Secretary Baker would confirm to Minister Shevardnadze that the U.S. side intended to notify Global Shield if it was held. The only point was that if Global Shield were canceled, the U.S. side wanted to avoid problems between the sides in determining what was “the” major exercise. Similarly, the U.S. side would expect the Soviet side to notify the U.S. side of what the Soviet side judged to be its major exercise—to avoid the problem of the U.S. side claiming it disagreed over which exercise was the major Soviet exercise.

34. Nazarkin suggested that the Russian text for Article I be left as it was; though he acknowledged it was a bit clumsy, he thought it reflected the idea correctly. The U.S. side would change the English to “a” major strategic exercise. And during the signing ceremony the U.S. side would give the same explanation Burt had just provided. Burt agreed.

35. Medas then raised a further issue: the use of the word “once” at the end of the same sentence in the agreement. Brown explained that the Russian use of “po odnomu” did not make sense if the English text had “a major exercise,” and suggested it would be preferable to say in Russian “o nachalye odnogo iz samykh krupnykh,” equivalent to the English “about the beginning of one of the largest (strategic exercises).”

36. Burt made a procedural suggestion: he thought the sides had made real progress. The U.S. side had agreed to notify Global Shield, while the Soviet side had agreed to the use of the word “A.” He proposed that the sides look at the use of the word “once” and resolve it the next day. Nazarkin agreed; he suggested that since both sides had work to do that afternoon, they wait until 5:00 p.m. to rejoin the Core Arms Control Group.

Burt

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D890881–0582. Secret; Priority.
2. Not found.