Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

46. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 18, 1989, 2:30–6 p.m.

MEETING

• Sub-group on the Nuclear and Space Talks of the U.S.-Soviet Ministerial Working Group on Arms Control

PLACE

• Department of State, 8th floor meeting room

Ambassador Burt welcomed the Soviet delegation members and asked about their requirements for interpretation.

Ambassador Nazarkin said that two members needed interpretation. General subjects should be dealt with in both languages, while any editing of texts could be done only in English.

Burt said the U.S. side was prepared to turn to the Soviet draft of an umbrella agreement on verification and stability measures (VSM).

Nazarkin agreed to begin with the umbrella agreement and added that the Soviet side also wished to discuss other topics, including unit of account and the document handed over by the U.S. on mobile ICBMs.

Burt stated that the U.S. agreed in principle with the idea of an umbrella VSM agreement and thought such an agreement should, if possible, be concluded in Wyoming. The U.S. side had examined the Soviet draft and wanted to suggest improvements, while preserving both sides’ positions in the negotiations. Burt then handed over the U.S. mark-up of the Soviet text² and briefly noted the proposed changes. He concluded that the U.S. side had tried to be responsive. It was hoped that the changes would help clarify the text and expedite agreement.

Nazarkin expressed his appreciation for the quick and constructive U.S. response. The changes at first glance did not seem to create serious problems. They would be studied and a response would be provided at the next sub-group meeting. Nazarkin then suggested that attention be turned to another document almost ready for signing—the one on advanced notification of strategic exercises. He wished, in particular, to note the change proposed by the Soviet side in Article I of the Russian text.

Burt asked for an explanation of that change and whether there were other proposed changes.

Nazarkin briefly cited a few other changes that he characterized as “strictly editorial.” Concerning Article I, the Soviet side wanted to stress that we were talking about notification of a major strategic exercise in each calendar year. The Soviet side had had doubts which were dispelled that morning when the U.S. side stated that, if Global Shield were not carried out in a particular year, notification would be provided for the largest exercise held that year.

Burt, restating the U.S. approach, said that we would notify Global Shield annually. If, for some reason, Global Shield was not held one year, the U.S. would provide notification of the exercise involving bomber aircraft that it believed was the largest that year. The U.S. side wanted to avoid compliance problems that might arise if one side notified what it believed to be the largest but the other side did not believe it was the largest. He suggested that a few people from both sides get together and try to work it out.

Nazarkin agreed.

Burt, turning to unit of account, said the U.S. side had studied the issue carefully and now wished to propose a compromise. In provisions describing what would be limited under the 1600 ceiling, U.S. references to “ICBM” and “SLBM” and Soviet references to “launcher for ICBM” and “launcher for SLBM” would be replaced as appropriate with either “deployed ICBM and its associated launcher” or “deployed SLBM and its associated launcher.” Thus, what would be limited would be a set of two things (missile and launcher), not a single item (missile or launcher). The change would affect primarily Articles III and VII. It did not in any way affect the U.S. position on non-deployed missiles, and it did not affect the determination of when missiles become deployed. Agreement on this compromise would clear away numerous brackets in the JDT.

Nazarkin said the Soviet side shared the desire to resolve this issue in Washington or Wyoming this week so that the delegations could implement the solution in Geneva. In fact, while the U.S. was studying the issue in Washington, the Soviet side had come up with a similar solution in Moscow, one that also involved a combined unit of a launcher and a missile. But in our Russian version, the order was different—“ICBM launcher and its associated ICBM” or “SLBM launcher and its associated SLBM.”

Burt asked himself how he knew the Soviet side would put launchers first.

Nazarkin acknowledged there was a slight difference. But, he argued, it was more logical to put launchers first. This was clear when one looked at SLBMs.

Joseph said that, from the U.S. perspective, it was clearly more logical to have missiles first.

Nazarkin suggested that the issue be revisited at the next meeting of the sub-group.

Burt said the two sides seemed to agree conceptually that we should be limiting two things as a unit. It should now be possible to find a solution. If possible, we should avoid having to send the issue to Ministers to resolve.

Nazarkin agreed and suggested turning to non-deployed missiles. He said limits on non-deployed arms should apply to all types of arms, including cruise missiles, and he recalled Soviet proposals to limit spare ALCMs at air bases and spare SLCMs at stationing points.

Burt said the U.S. position on non-deployed missiles was still under review, so he would not have anything new to say. However, he continued to believe that it made no sense, both from a military and verification standpoint, to limit either non-deployed ALCMs or SLCMs (deployed or non-deployed).

Nazarkin wanted to return briefly to the question of unit of account. If agreement could be reached, how could it be recorded? Would we prepare a text that would provide guidance to the delegations?

Burt said he didn’t think a text was necessary. He suggested that the two sides think about the issue overnight. There was agreement in substance; the question now was which term to put first, missiles or launchers. Emphasizing that he was speaking personally, Burt wondered whether a way out of the dilemma was to put missiles first in the English text and launchers first in the Russian text.

Nazarkin said he would give it some thought.

Burt, moving on to mobile ICBM verification, said he wanted to elaborate on a paper provided to the Soviet side earlier which contained proposals by the U.S. for additional elements of common ground on mobile verification. The first element was that rail garrisons be limited in size. Such a limitation would ensure that rail launchers could not move long distances without prior notification. The U.S. side was prepared to discuss various ways of recording the size limit if a limit expressed in square kilometers was a problem. The second element was that, upon returning to garrison from a dispersal, rail-mobile forces be subject to enhanced NTM, as were road-mobile ICBMs. The third was that, following dispersals, the other side should have a right both to enhanced NTM and to OSI. The current Soviet position permitted only one or the other. The fourth element was that the number of restricted areas for road mobiles be unlimited. The limit of five restricted areas proposed by the Soviet side did not provide sufficient flexibility. Fifth, the U.S. side was prepared to agree that the number of road-mobile launchers and missiles in a restricted area should not exceed 10. Sixth, the U.S. side suggested combining the Soviet-proposed NTM enhancement measure of displaying road-mobile launchers next to their fixed structures following dispersals with the previously agreed measure of opening roofs of fixed structures for mobile launchers. The U.S. side did not believe that the display of launchers next to their structures would be effective without the roofs of those structures being open. If agreement could be reached on these additional elements of common ground, the delegations could be instructed to incorporate them into the Joint Working Paper next round.

Burt continued that the U.S. saw positive elements in the Soviet four-part categorization of movements of mobile systems, but believed that routine movements and relocations should be subject to detailed post-notification as well as pre-notification. If the Soviet side could agree to such post-notification, the delegations could be directed to work out the content of these notifications as well as the specific categories of movement. However, final agreement would depend on resolution of the definition of “deployed” and on the detailed content of the notifications. Moreover, the U.S. was still reviewing the Soviet approach of defining a deployed mobile ICBM and launcher as one where the missile is contained in its launcher. This issue would be addressed in Geneva. Finally, the U.S. side would be prepared to discuss the Soviet proposal that spare mobile launchers and non-deployed mobile ICBMs be prohibited in restricted areas and rail garrisons. Agreement on this would also depend on the definition of “deployed.” Burt then handed Nazarkin a copy of his talking points on mobile ICBM verification.³

Nazarkin, referring to the U.S. paper, said that the U.S. side favored limiting the size of rail garrisons, whereas the Soviet side favored declaring their sizes.

Khromov added that they were not against having dimensions mentioned, but those dimensions could vary from case to case.

Koltunov asked whether limits on size would be expressed in terms of square kilometers.

Burt said some alternatives might be considered, such as kilometers of track within a garrison or the distance between any parking site or maintenance facility and a geographic coordinate or reference point within the garrison. But the two sides seemed to have different concepts, with the U.S. talking about a limit and the Soviet side only talking about stating the size of garrisons.

Khromov, interrupting, asked rhetorically whether the U.S. intended to limit the size of its submarine bases or only declare their size.

Brooks replied that the area of submarine bases would be specified in site diagrams, but that the parallel was not relevant. Mobile ICBMs were difficult to count. As an aid to counting, they would remain in specific locations except under certain circumstances. If those locations were unlimited in size, the rationale for having them would be negated. This situation did not exist for other strategic offensive arms.

Koltunov said he wanted to address a hypothetical case. Assuming a side had three rail garrisons—with lengths of 20 km, 40 km, and 100 km—adopting a limit of 30 km would require that side to alter arrangements already established. This would be a problem.

Burt said that, if he understood properly, there was no objection in principle to a limit. There was a concern about ensuring that existing deployment plans were accommodated.

Koltunov said that introducing limits brought this sort of problem.

Daniel noted that the U.S. had not specified a size. They might be large.

Burt suggested that the Soviet side indicate what kind of size would accommodate its plans—whether in terms of area or kilometers of track. The U.S. interest was to ensure that rail launchers could not move long distances without notification.

Koltunov then turned to the U.S.-proposed element that “upon return of a dispersed force to restricted areas or rail garrisons, the other side would have the right to designate a percentage of the total deployed road- or rail-mobile force for on-site inspection, enhanced NTM measures or both.” He asked whether the percentage applied to the entire number of launchers in the force or the number dispersed.

Brooks responded that it applied to the entire force because there would not be a limit on the percentage of the force that could be dispersed. The proposed element was designed to give confidence that, after dispersal, the situation had returned to what existed prior to dispersal.

Nazarkin asked whether inspection and enhanced NTM would be applied to the same area or to different areas.

Brooks replied that both methods could be applied to the same area, but this was not required. After one dispersal, enhanced NTM might be applied to one area and inspection to another. After another dispersal, both methods could be applied to the same area. It was up to the inspecting side.

Nazarkin suggested that the issue be returned to at the next meeting.

Burt, taking up the issue of data denial, said he welcomed Soviet readiness to enter into an agreement on this subject. He noted that the Soviet side had earlier asked about practices other than encryption that could deny full access to the data and asked Mr. Foley to provide a response.

Foley pointed out that encryption meant encoding data in a way that could not be decoded by the other side. But other means of data denial existed. One such method was to retrieve measurements by means other than the broadcast of the data, including on-board recording of measurements for later retrieval—commonly referred to as encapsulation of telemetry. Another method involved deliberate interference with the other side’s NTM, including by jamming—that is, broadcasting signals on or near the frequency on which data was transmitted. In general, the U.S. proposal would ban the deliberate intent to mask signal characteristics of data transmitted from a missile in flight.

Khromov asked if it was alright to conduct external trajectory measurements.

Foley said he was not sure he understood. If Khromov meant ground tracking of missiles, such as by radars, that was not included.

Khromov asked about optical, thermal, and other external means.

Foley reiterated that only transmission of data from missiles in flight was included, not ground stations.

Khromov asked whether passive information, such as thermal, came from on board.

Foley replied that, if thermal measurements were made from a ground station, then they would not be covered by the agreement. However, if a side broadcast from the ground at or near the frequency of the data transmitted from the missile, then that would be data denial.

Khromov said that, by means of bipolar reflectors, a side could hide the number of warheads.

Foley responded that measurements made on a missile must be broadcast in a way that gave the other side full access. No measures could be taken to deny such access.

Burt said that he had proceeded on the assumption that the proposed data denial agreement reflected considerable common ground. He hoped this was still the case.

Nazarkin said it was, but that it was important to understand the issues more precisely.

Burt asked whether Nazarkin was satisfied with the explanations.

Nazarkin nodded affirmatively. He then turned to the question of duration covered in Article VI of the agreement. As had been explained earlier, the Soviet side wanted to make the data denial agreement of unlimited duration. This would remove from the table a big issue that needed to be resolved in START and would thus move the negotiations forward. Would such an approach be acceptable in principle to the U.S.?

Burt said he thought the two sides were close on the substance of the issue, but he had questions about why the Soviet side wanted the agreement to be of unlimited duration. The U.S. wanted to record the level of agreement that had been reached to date. However, it didn’t want to foreclose the possibility of improvements being included in the completed START Treaty. As the Soviet draft umbrella agreement pointed out, one purpose of these measures was to serve as a trial to enable us to learn more and help us work out a better START agreement.

Nazarkin reiterated that making the agreement of unlimited duration would remove one of the difficulties in the way of START. It should not be viewed as only a trial measure.

Burt said that early agreement on data denial should not prejudice either side’s position on the issue in the completed START Treaty. He asked whether Nazarkin had any ideas on how to put the agreement into effect without foreclosing the possibility of future improvements. The two sides could return to the issue at the next meeting. One last point on telemetry. The two sides seemed willing to list test ranges. Was the Soviet side ready to do so?

Nazarkin didn’t foresee any difficulty, although his instructions didn’t cover this point. He would see if this problem could be overcome.

Khromov asked whether the U.S. was willing to apply the agreement to all types of missiles, cruise missiles as well as ballistic missiles.

Burt said the U.S. proposal focused on areas of common ground, and so it covered only ballistic missiles. He then suggested turning to short-time-of-flight (STOF) SLBMs. The U.S. had developed an approach that in its view balanced effective limits on the acquisition of STOF capabilities with minimum interference on testing unrelated to STOF. Under this approach, both sides would in parallel declare their intention not to conduct from land or sea any flight of less than fifteen minutes in duration, from time of launch to time of impact, of any SLBM of a type that has demonstrated a range of more than 500 km.

Burt continued that such declarations would help to restrict the ability to certify, through testing, future STOF SLBMs. At the same time, it would not affect development programs of missile systems other than STOF SLBMs; it would not significantly affect the testing practices used by the two sides for existing SLBMs; it would not affect the reliability of existing U.S. or Soviet SLBMs; and it would not restrict the operational capabilities or practices of existing SLBMs. The U.S. side recognized that seeking to preclude the acquisition of a STOF capability through such a testing constraint is subject to circumvention. In view of this potential circumvention problem, the best approach was to record these declarations in a manner that would politically constrain both sides, but would not be legally binding. He then handed over a text of the U.S. STOF declaration.⁴

Nazarkin asked how, where, and when the U.S. side visualized making the STOF declarations.

Burt responded that, if the two sides could reach agreement this week, the Ministers could make parallel declarations. If not, discussions would be continued in Geneva and a decision could later be taken about where and when.

Nazarkin said that originally the Soviet side wanted to focus on depressed trajectories. It came to the conclusion that it would be preferable to adopt a broader approach, one even broader than the U.S. approach. Specifically, it was important to focus on warning time. The surprise element of attack could result from STOF, but could also result from stealth characteristics. In addition to banning tests of depressed trajectory SLBMs, it would be necessary to ban arms that have the ability to reach their targets secretly, such as SLCMs, ALCMs, and heavy bombers with stealth characteristics; to ban flights of heavy bombers and navigation of aircraft carriers in zones from which it would be possible to reach the continental territory of the other side by means of air-to-surface missiles and carrier-based aircraft; and to ban the navigation of surface vessels and submarines carrying long-range cruise missiles in zones from which it would be possible to reach the continental territory of the other side.

Burt said the U.S. had tried to address a specific concern in a practical way, whereas the Soviet side seemed to be raising a variety of other issues that only complicated the matter and moved us away from a practical solution. He urged the Soviet side to narrow its focus to the specific issue of STOF.

Nazarkin said that Burt seemed to be closing the meeting on a negative note.

Burt, wrapping up, said that the two sides had made progress. He was encouraged by work on the umbrella VSM agreement. It should be possible to resolve language difficulties on the strategic exercises agreement. Perhaps it was also possible to reach a formulation meeting both sides’ concerns on telemetry. The sides were close to resolving the unit of account issue. And there was the possibility of progress on mobile ICBM verification. He noted that the entire Working Group would meet the next day at 10:00, after which the NST sub-group would reassemble.

1. Source: Department of State, Verification, Compliance and Implementation, Subject Files, 1983–2005, Lot 06D436, Wyoming Ministerial, Sept. 18–23, 1989. Secret. The meeting took place in the 8th floor meeting room of the Department of State. No drafting information was found.
2. Not found.
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4. Not found.